United States-China Normalization: an Evaluation of Foreign Policy Decision Making by Chang, Jaw-ling Joanne
OccAsioNAl PApERs/ 
REpRiNTS SERiEs 
iN CoNTEMpORARY 
AsiAN STudiEs 
NUMBER 4 - 1986 (75) 
UNITED STATES-CHINA 
NORMALIZATION: AN EVALUATION OF 
FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING 
Jaw-ling Joanne Chang 
ScltoolofLAw 
UNivERsiTy 
of 
MARylANd. 
' 
, 
6 
I 
• 
0 
' ' 
' 
0 .~ 
cC 
0 

Occasional Papers/Reprint Series 
in Contemporary Asian Studies 
General Editor: Hungdah Chiu 
Acting Executive Editor: Shaiw-chei Chuang 
Managing Editor: Chih-Yu Wu 
Editorial Advisory Board 
Professor Robert A. Scalapino, University of California 
at Berkeley 
Professor Martin Wilbur, Columbia University 
Professor Gaston J. Sigur, George Washington University 
Professor Shao-chuan Leng, University of Virginia 
Professor James Hsiung, New York University 
Dr. Lih-wu Han, Political Science Association of the 
Republic of China 
Professor J. S. Prybyla, The Pennsylvania State University 
Professor Toshio Sawada, Sophia University, Japan 
Professor Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, Center for International 
Politics, University of Munich, Federal Republic of Germany 
Professor Choon-ho Park, International Legal Studies 
Korea University, Republic of Korea 
Published with the cooperation of the Maryland International Law Society 
All contributions (in English only) and communications should be sent to 
Professor Hungdah Chiu, University of Maryland School of Law, 
500 West Baltimore Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21201 USA. 
All publications in this series reflect only the views of the authors. 
While the editor accepts responsibility for the selection of materials to be published, 
the individual author is responsible for statements of facts and expressions of opinion con-
tained therein. 
Subscription is US $15.00 for 6 issues (regardless of the price of individual issues) in 
the United States and Canada and $20.00 for overseas. Check should be addressed to 
OPRSCAS and sent to Professor Hungdah Chiu. 
Price for single copy of this issue: US $8.00 (paper back) 
$12.00 (hard cover) 
© 1986 copublished by Monograph Series in World Affairs, University of Denver 
and Occasional Papers/Reprint Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Inc. 
ISSN 0730-0107 
ISBN 0-942182-77-4 (paper back) 
ISBN 0-942182-78-2 (hard cover) 
U.S. Library of Congress Card Catalog No. 86-25061 

UNITED STATES-CHINA 
NORMALIZATION 
AN EVALUATION OF FOREIGN 
POLICY DECISION MAKING 
Jaw-ling Joanne Chang 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR 
JAW-LING JOANNE CHANG is a scholar of international 
politics and U.S.-China relations. She is currently writing a book on 
Beijing's negotiating style. After studying international relations and 
political science at the National Taiwan University, Dr. Chang earned 
her M.A. at the University of Delaware and Ph.D. at the University of 
Maryland. She recently served as associate professor of Political 
Science at the National Taiwan University and research associate in 
the Institute of American Culture, Academia Sinica. She is presently 
a visiting scholar in the East Asian Legal Program of the University of 
Maryland School of Law. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Completion of this book would not have been possible without 
the active interest and the time and effort so willingly given by so 
many persons, only a few of whom I can acknowledge here. 
I am grateful to Dr. Oran R. Young for helping my intellectual 
development and evoking my initial interest in decision-making mod-
els, and to Professor Hungdah Chiu for his generous support and 
encouragement. 
I would like to express my deepest appreciation to the U.S. and 
R.O.C. former and current officials listed on pages ix-x who were par-
ticularly generous with their time for granting personal interviews. 
Professors Tung-hsun Sun, Parris Chang, Chun-tu Hsueh, Har-
old Hinton, Harry Harding, and Jonathan Pollack have my indebted-
ness for enriching my understanding of U.S.-China relations. I am 
also grateful to Dr. Stanley Heginbotham for broadening my under-
standing of the bureaucratic politics factor and its impact on normali-
zation decision-making processes. 
I owe, too, a special expression of thanks to Ambassador Harvey 
Feldman, former U.S. Alternate Representative to the United Nations 
and former Director of Republic of China Affairs, for reviewing the 
entire manuscript and suggesting detailed comments and further ideas. 
I am particularly grateful to Professor William W. Boyer for im-
parting to me many of my research and writing skills. 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Professor Karen 
Peste and Millie Van Wyke for making their valuable suggestions and 
editing the entire manuscript, and to Shaiw-chei Chuang for compiling 
the index. 
Finally, I thank my husband whose forbearance and encourage-
ment were essential to me. 
Despite all the help I have received from many sources, I alone 
am responsible for the contents and shortcomings of this book. 
To my parents 
Yu-hwa and Yu-feng Chyou 
To my family 
Eugene and Jennifer Chang 
WADE-GILES AND PINYIN SPELLINGS 
In 1978, the State Council of the People's Republic of China 
announced that it had decided to use the Chinese phonetic alphabet, 
called pinyin, to standardize the romanization of the names of people 
and places in China. The change went into effect on January 1, 1979. 
The new system poses problems and confusions for the reader 
unfamiliar with Chinese pronunciation. The older spelling (Wade-
Giles) is used in this dissertation because this study deals with the 
analysis of the pre-1979 period.* The names under the old spelling 
and the new system are listed as follows: 
Old 
Mao Tse-tung 
Chou En-lai 
Teng Hsiao-p'ing 
Hua Kuo-feng 
Huang Hua 
Chai Tse-min 
Huang Chen 
Ch'iao Kuan-hua 
Chang Wen-chin 
Chiang Ch'ing 
Wang Yu-p'ing 
Lei Yang 
Yao Wen-yiian 
Wang Hung-wen 
Chang Ch'un-ch'iao 
New 
Mao Zedong 
Zhou Enlai 
Deng Xiaoping 
Hua Guofeng 
Huang Hua 
Chai Zemin 
Huang Zhen 
Qiao Guanhua 
Zhang Wenjin 
Jiang Qing 
Wang Y ouping 
Lei Yang 
Yao Wenyuan 
Wang Hongwen 
Zhang Chunqiao 
* The capital city of China was spelled "Peiping" by the Chinese Nationalists, "Peking" by 
the Communists after they took power in 1949 and "Beijing" since 1979. To avoid 
confusion, this last spelling is used throughout this work. 
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PREFACE 
One of the most important United States foreign policy decisions of 
this century was normalizing its relations with the People's Republic 
of China (PRC). This was a momentous "watershed" decision, the 
ramifications of which are still unfolding. Few would dispute its im-
pact on world power configurations and its implications for interna-
tional relations within the Communist world and between the East 
and West. 
Though much has been written about United States-PRC rela-
tions both before and since normalization, the normalization process 
itself has yet to be subjected to systematic analysis in terms of relevant 
decision-making models constructed by contemporary international 
relations theorists. This is the purpose of this book. 
Part I reviews United States-PRC relations to provide the context 
for normalization. Part II evaluates the efficacy of decision-making 
models for a proper understanding of the normalization process. 
The main focus of this study is on the United States foreign policy 
decision-making process-not that of the PRC. It is hoped that this 
book will make a modest contribution to theories of international rela-
tions and to the efficacy of decision-making models in demystifying 
some of the complexity of international relations in the contemporary 
world. 
References are indicated in two ways: (1) sources cited in the 
bibliography are referenced in the text; and (2) explanatory notes are 
placed at the bottom of the page. 
3 
Jaw-ling Joanne Chang 
Lanham, Maryland 
September 1, 1986 
INTRODUCTION 
Since President Nixon's 1972 trip to the People's Republic of 
China (PRC), followed by President Ford's 1975 visit, normalization 
of relations with the PRC has been a U.S. foreign policy goal. The 
only question was: when, how, and on what terms. Beijing's three 
preconditions for normalization of relations with the United States 
were (1) withdrawal of recognition of the Republic of China (ROC), 
(2) withdrawal of U.S. troops from Taiwan, and (3) abrogation of the 
Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. During the Nixon and Ford ad-
ministrations, normalization of relations with the PRC was blocked by 
U.S. unwillingness to accept the three demands from Beijing without a 
firm pledge in return that the PRC would refrain from using military 
force to unite Taiwan with mainland China. 1 
On 15 December 1978, President Carter announced establish-
ment of full diplomatic relations with the PRC. The Carter adminis-
tration accepted China's three demands without a firm commitment 
from Beijing not to use military force to attack Taiwan. Instead, the 
United States declared unilaterally that "the United States continues 
to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and 
expects that the Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully by the Chinese 
themselves." The United States considered that Beijing had made 
three concessions to Washington: (1) the United States would termi-
nate the Mutual Defense Treaty in accordance with its terms rather 
than abrogating it as the PRC previously demanded; (2) the PRC did 
I. George Bush, "Our Deal With Peking: All Cost, No Benefit," Washiugtou Post. 24 
December 1978:D3-4. Ambassador Harvey Feldman wrote in a personal letter to the au-
thor, dated 4 January 1984: "You should not accept George Bush's contention at face 
value, inasmuch as he was hardly an objective observer (since he had already decided to 
seek the Republican nomination for 1980). In fact, normalization was blocked by a constel-
lation of events, most notably Watergate during the Nixon administration. and by Ford's 
unwillingness to hand an issue to Reagan and the Republican Right. It is my persoual view 
that. absent Watergate. Kissinger would have recognized the PRC during I 974. Please 
recall that during that time there was no offici;~! PRC statement setting forth those three 
conditions as a formal demand and formal precondition for e~ ·:hangc of diplom;~tic 
recognition." 
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not contradict the U.S. statement that the United States has an interest 
in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue; and (3) the United 
States would continue to sell "selected defensive weaponry" to Taiwan 
on a "restricted basis" in the postnormalization period after the de-
fense treaty expired at the end of December 1979. The PRC re-
sponded that Beijing "absolutely could not agree" to such arms sales; 
nonetheless, the Chinese leaders decided to go ahead with normaliza-
tion (Appendix C). 
This study probes two major issues: ()) why the United States 
made the normalization decision at the end of 1978 (why not before or 
after?), and (2) why the United States acceded to Beijing's three de-
mands without a firm commitment from the PRC not to use force to 
reunite Taiwan with mainland China. 
MODELS AND THEIR RELEVANCE 
Scholars seek to analyze how and why foreign policy decisions are 
made. Decision-making analysts emphasize that foreign policy is 
made by human beings and is not the determinant product of national 
power and interests. They believe decisions are influenced by factors 
such as international, domestic, bureaucratic, idiosyncratic, cyber-
netic, and cognitive elements. This study examines whether decision-
making models help us understand the normalization decision. 
Earlier decision-making scholars (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, 
~ 962) developed a check list to explain foreign policy outcomes. Si-
mon (1957) proposes a "satisficing model" to replace the so-called 
traditional "rational actor model." Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963) 
argue that most political decisions fall into categories of "disjointed 
incrementalism." Hilsman (1971), Huntington (1961), and Neustadt 
(1960) emphasize the political process of foreign policy decisionmak-
ing. Allison (1971) uses the rational actor model, the organizational 
model, and the bureaucratic politics model to analyze foreign policy 
decision making. George (1972) proposes a system of multiple advo-
cacy to make constructive use of Allison's bureaucratic politics model. 
Steinbruner's cognitive and cybernetic models have been considered 
by many analysts as another breakthrough. Barber ( 1977), George 
(1974), Holsti (1962, 1968), Jervis (1975), Axelrod (1976), and Her-
mann (1976) have tried to incorporate the factors of perception, belief 
system, personality, and cognitive processes into empirical foreign pol-
icy research. 
An examination of all decision-making factors is clearly beyond 
the scope of this study. The purpose here is to relate four decision-
making models to the timing, manner, and terms of the U.S. normali-
zation decision for the period 1969 to 1978. 
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Rational Actor Model 
The classical rational actor model tells us that decision making is a 
process of maximizing net gains. The decision maker, as an economi-
cal and rational person, is able to (1) identify and rank the goals and 
values to be sought, (2) gather all information relevant to the event, 
(3) consider and estimate the expected value of all possible alternatives 
systematically, and (4) choose only that alternative with potential 
maximum net gains. 
The rational actor model assumes that the nation or government, 
as a rational, unitary decision maker, will select the action that will 
maximize national goals and objectives. Foreign policy decisions can 
be explained by personifying rational actors and by examining their 
aims and choices. In other words, the analyst imitates the rational 
actor's process of decision making and explains how, in the given con-
text with certain objectives, the actor came to choose the action he did 
(Allison, 1971: 36). 
In the real world, however, most foreign policy decisions involve 
conflicting values and goals as well as inaccessibility to relevant infor-
mation. Normalization with the PRC was no exception. Global bal-
ance-of-power relationships, bilateral relationships, national security, 
legal issues, economic gains, and moral issues were only some of the 
important and complex elements. A rational choice evaluation of na-
tional security considerations, for example, would examine the effects 
of normalization not only upon the U.S.-PRC security relationship but 
also upon the relationship of the United States to all other 160-odd 
countries in the world. It would be nearly impossible to collect all 
relevant information, and the payoff may not justify the time and ef-
fort. Therefore, in this study only the most important elements of cal-
culations are examined. 
From the rational actor perspective, the United States would pre-
sumably select the timing and terms of normalization agreements with 
the PRC that would maximize net gains. One question is suggested: 
Would the United States have rationally chosen the optimal 
timing and terms to normalize relations with the PRC; that 
is, (1) could the United States have maximized bilateral rela-
tions with the PRC, (2) could the United States have nor-
malized relations with the PRC without sacrificing the 
detente relations with the Soviet Union, and (3) could the 
United States also have normalized relations with minimal 
costs of U.S.-Taiwan relations? 
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Bureaucratic Politics Model 
The bureaucratic politics model assumes that the government actor is 
not a unitary agent but a number of individual players. Governmental 
action is a political result "in the sense that what happens is not cho-
sen as a solution to a problem but rather results from compromise, 
conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal 
influence" (Allison, 1971: 162). Foreign policy is the end product of 
the "pulling and hauling" between players. Each player competes for 
power, promotion, and retention of his own position, and bases his 
stand on the stakes in the issue and his perception of "national secur-
ity interests, organizational interests, domestic interests, and personal 
interests" (Allison, 1971:167). 
The main players in Allison's bureaucratic politics model include 
"chiefs," "staffers," "Indians," and "ad hoc players": legislators, 
members of the press, and spokesmen for important interest groups 
(Allison, 1971:165). In this study, the bureaucratic model does not 
examine the "ad hoc players," which are dealt with separately in the 
domestic politics model. 
To explain the normalization decision, two bureaucratic politics 
questions are suggested: 
Could the timing and terms of the normalization decision 
have been best explained by the pulling and hauling of the 
bureaucratic players? 
Could each bureaucratic politics player's position on the nor-
malization issue have been predicted from his position in the 
bureaucracy? 
Domestic Politics Model 
The rational actor model's unit of analysis is governmental choice; na-
tional security and national interests are the principal categories in 
which strategic goals are conceived (Allison, 1971:33). Domestic 
political considerations and personal interests are set aside in the for-
mal analysis of decision making in the area of national security be-
cause, according to Halperin, there is a strong view in the United 
States that "it is immoral to let domestic political considerations influ-
ence decisions which may affect war and peace" (Halperin, 1974:63). 
In the United States, however, each president must consider congres-
sional support, public opinion, and various interest groups in the mak-
ing of foreign policy, for legitimacy reasons as well as for political 
reasons. As Quandt pointed out, "in a democratic polity, foreign pol-
icy is inevitably influenced by domestic realities" (Quandt, 1977:15). 
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The third model-the domestic politics perspective-attempts to 
deal with (1) the role of public opinion, (2) the role of Congress, 
(3) the impact of interest groups, and (4) the role of a presidential 
election. The main purpose is to examine the extent to which congres-
sional attitudes and public opinion influenced the normalization deci-
sion, and the extent to which a presidential election and interest 
groups affected that process. 
In order to assess the evolution of congressional attitudes toward 
the normalization issue between 1969 to 1978, the following matters 
are examined: congressional reactions on issues of Nixon's China trip, 
the admission of the PRC to the United Nations, gradual withdrawal 
of U.S. military presence in Taiwan, the removal of U.S.-PRC trade 
and travel restrictions, and repeal of the Formosa Resolution. 
The analysis of public opinion includes both the "mass public" 
and "opinion elites." The so-called "China Lobby," one of the most 
notable interest groups in U.S. foreign affairs during the 1950s and 
early 1960s, its decline of influence, and the increasing activities of the 
so-called "Red China Lobby"2-as well as their respective impact on 
the U.S. administration's China decision in the period 1969 to 1978-
are studied. 
In explaining the normalization decision, the following domestic 
political questions are posed: 
Did stronger public or elite opinion and interest groups 
against normalization with the PRC at the expense of Tai-
wan delay the normalization process and elicit tougher U.S. 
conditions for Taiwan's security guarantee, and vice versa? 
Did those members in Congress against normalization with 
the PRC at the expense of Taiwan delay the process of the 
normalization decision and toughen the United States' stand 
toward the question of Taiwan, and vice versa? 
Did the impact of a presidential election on the process of 
normalization depend on the strength of the existing admin-
istration? Did a weak administration that could not mobilize 
domestic opposition for normalization with the PRC tend to 
stall or delay the consideration of normalization decision in 
order to deny the potential opponent a major issue in the 
presidential election period? 
2. The term ''Red Chin:1 Lobby" was used in Forrest Davis and Robert A. Hunter, 
The Red China Lobby (New York: Fleet, 1963). 
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Idiosyncratic, Cognitive, and Cybernetic Models 
The idiosyncratic model stresses the importance of the impact of indi-
viduals on foreign policy. The cognitive model emphasizes the effect 
of a decision maker's perception of the decision environment on policy 
outcomes. Steinbruner's Cybernetic Theory of Decision has been re-
garded as another breakthrough following Allison's The Essence of 
Decision. How decision makers cope with uncertainty and conflict are 
Steinbruner's main foci. The decision maker does not maximize; in-
stead, he simplifies the complex world. The decision maker does not 
integrate values; instead, he separates them. Steinbruner finds that the 
cognitive and cybernetic perspectives "serve to illuminate some of the 
more troublesome underlying assumptions of rational theory" (Stein-
bruner, 1974:235). 
Since Nixon's 1972 trip to the PRC, Beijing repeatedly stressed 
that the PRC would never make a pledge on the settlement of the 
Taiwan question. Beijing also pointed out that the PRC would never 
permit arms sales to Taiwan after normalization with the United 
States. How the U.S. decision makers interpreted the PRC's messages 
on those so-called "non-negotiable conditions" was a very important 
factor in determining U.S. bids or counterbids during the bargaining 
process. 
During the formal negotiation period, it was disclosed that the 
Carter administration never asked Beijing for a pledge not to use force 
to regain Taiwan. Carter revealed at a press conference that a com-
mitment from the PRC to refrain from the use of force against Taiwan 
was not "possible to achieve"; accordingly, Carter did not ask for it. 
Why did the Carter administration think it was not possible to get 
such a pledge from the PRC? 
Normalization with the PRC involved not only conditions of un-
certainty but also conflicts in values. Steinbruner argues that under 
conditions of uncertainty and value conflict, the decision maker will 
tend to conceptualize his decision environment to avoid recognizing 
tradeoff's between his values (Steinbruner, 1974:348). The decision 
maker will suppress the tradeoff's by engaging various mechanisms for 
defensive avoidance, such as bolstering, wishful thinking, ~md 
procrastination. 
The combination of idiosyncratic, cognitive, and cybernetic per-
spectives raises the following questions: 
Did the personal characteristics of decision makers have an 
important impact on the normalization decision? 
Was the lowest level of acceptability on the terms of the Tai-
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wan question influenced by the U.S. decision makers' inter-
pretations and perceptions of (a) the PRC's military 
capabilities, (b) the PRC's intention toward the settlement of 
the Taiwan question, and (c) the PRC's stake on the issue of 
"sovereignty"? 
Given the assumption that any tradeoff between two equally 
important values violates the principle of cognitive consis-
tency, can it be said that the normalization agreement could 
have been reached only at the expense of the United States' 
integrity of defense commitments and the welfare of a long-
term ally, Taiwan, and that the U.S. decision makers then 
would have had to suppress their recognition of value trade-
offs by engaging various mechanisms for defensive 
avoidance? 
The main questions relating to each model are answered by reference 
to qualitative methods. Major sources for answering these questions 
are public or published .material-primarily statements of American 
and Chinese officials, congressional reports and hearings, memoirs, 
newspaper and scholarly articles, and references in books dealing with 
U.S.-China relations. Certain information, however, remains classi-
fied, and there are gaps and incorrect observations in this study be-
cause of the unavailability of the official record. Printed material, 
therefore, is supplemented with open-ended interviews of various deci-
sion-making actors. 
Part 1 concerns the historical background of the Sino-American 
normalization issue. Part 2 examines four decision-making models 
used as a theoretical framework to explain normalization decision 
making in the United States from 1969 to 1978. The conclusion as-
sesses the questions listed above. 
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PART 1 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 

1 
U.S.-PRC RELATIONS 
1949-1968 
U.S.-CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY RELATIONS PRIOR 
TO 1949 
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was established in Shanghai in 
1921. Prior to the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) 
on 1 October 1949, CCP leaders were mostly concerned with the sur-
vival of their party against the threat of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist 
Government. 
Formation of the CCP's policies toward the United States was 
conditioned by ideology and the CCP's assessment of American sup-
port for the communist movement in China. In the late 1920s and 
early 1930s, the United States was perceived negatively by CCP lead-
ers because of American imperialist ambitions in China and U.S. in-
volvement in Chiang's anti-communist extermination campaigns. 1 In 
October 1934, the Chinese Communists were forced to flee from their 
base in southern China to the northwest, the "long march" period of 
the Communists. During the Sino-Japanese War, the CCP changed its 
policy and tried to woo American newsmen who visited Yenan, the 
northwestern base of the Communists (Sutter, 1978: 12; Shewmaker, 
1971:70-85). This opening to United States journalists began to close, 
however, before the disintegration of the CCP-Nationalist Party 
united front in 1940. 
After the United States' entrance into the Pacific War, CCP lead-
ers initiated a more serious effort to win American support. The U.S. 
State Department in 1967 and 1969 published two volumes of previ-
ously classified documents on U.S. contacts with the Chinese Commu-
I. See Kan Sen, "The Sixth KMT Offensive and the Victory of the Chinese Red 
Army," The Communist International (January 1934): 24-28; and Warren I. Cohen, "The 
Development of Chinese Communist Policy Toward the U.S., 1922-1933," Orbis, II (1967), 
pp. 219-37, cited in Robert G. Sutter, China Watch (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1978), p. 124, notes 6 and 7. 
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nist leaders in 1944 and 1945.2 The documents disclosed the efforts by 
Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai to establish friendly relations with the 
United States in the postwar period. 
Some evidence exists that the U.S. considered the Communists to 
be stronger opponents to the Japanese forces than the Nationalists. 
(Tsou, 1963:150; Barrett, 1970:7; Diamond, 1971:1). In the summer 
of 1944, 18 U.S. observers, headed by John Stewart Service, a political 
officer, were invited to Y enan by the Communists to assess the 
strength of the Chinese Communist forces as potential military allies 
and as recipients of U.S. aid in the war against the Japanese. There 
were three objectives behind the CCP's invitation: establishment of a 
consulate in Washington, a personal visit by Mao and Chou to Wash-
ington for exploratory talks with President Roosevelt, and long-term 
U.S.-Chinese Communist economic cooperation. The American ob-
servers were favorably impressed by the Communists after talks with 
their leaders, and concluded that the Communists were a more effec-
tive force against the Japanese than the Nationalists. Service recom-
mended that the United States avoid taking sides in the impending 
civil war between the Communists and the Nationalists and remain 
flexible to accept the reality of Communist power (Diamond, 1971: 1 ). 
These views, however, were not supported by the U.S. Ambassa-
dor to China, Patrick J. Hurley, who was given dominant power by 
President Roosevelt in the conduct of American policy in China before 
Hurley's resignation in November 1945. Indeed, Hurley advocated 
Chiang's position of not sending U.S. aid to the Communists. By early 
1945, the CCP leaders began to see that the United States was strongly 
on the side of the Nationalists, and they no longer viewed the United 
States as a potential friend of the communist movement in China. The 
pace of civil war accelerated after presidential special representative 
General George Marshall's failed mission to mediate differences be-
tween the Communists and the Nationalists in 1946. By virtue of its 
military defeat by Communist forces, the Nationalist Government col-
lapsed and fled to Taiwan in 1949. 
U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE RECOGNITION OF THE PRC 
IN 1949 AND 1950 
The question of recognition of the PRC emerged after Nanking was 
captured by the Chinese Communists on 24 April1949. Several meet-
ings were held between U.S. Ambassador J. Leighton Stuart and 
2. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (1944) vol. 6 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967) and (1945) vol. 7 (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969). 
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Huang Hua, chief of the Communist Office of Alien Affairs, in May 
and June of 1949 to discuss U.S. relations with the new regime. (Stu-
art, 1954:236). Huang expressed much interest in the recognition of 
Communist China by the United States during his first meeting with 
Stuart on 13 May 1949 (Stuart, 1954:247). Stuart replied that the U.S. 
government could consider the recognition question only when there 
emerged a new government in China that "had the support of people" 
and "was able and willing to perform its international obligations. " 3 
After the second meeting on 6 June 1949, Stuart reported to 
Washington that the Communists were "extremely anxious" for the 
United States to break off relations with the Nationalist Government. 
Stuart pointed out to Huang that the Nationalists still retained nomi-
nal control of large amounts of Chinese territory and also stated that 
the "presence in Nanking of chiefs of diplomatic missions (with the 
exception of Soviet) after arrival of the People's Liberation Army 
(PLA) could be regarded as significant."4 
On 28 June, Stuart was invited to Beijing by Mao and Chou to 
visit Yenching University, of which Ambassador Stuart was former 
president. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, however, instructed Stu-
art that he should not visit Beijing on 1 July 1949, and referred to a 
decision reached at the "highest level."5 Four days before the invita-
tion, 16 Republican and six Democratic U.S. senators signed a letter 
to President Truman asking him not to recognize the Chinese Com-
munists. In response, Acheson sent a letter to Foreign Relations 
Committee Chairman Tom Connally on 1 July 1949, the same day 
that he rejected Stuart's trip to Beijing, giving assurances that he 
would consult the committee when the question of recognition would 
arise. 6 
On 1 July 1949, Mao coincidentally delivered his famous speech 
on the "People's Democratic Dictatorship." Mao denounced U.S. im-
perialistic power and America's supplying of arms to Chiang Kai-
shek. Mao announced that China would now "lean to the side of the 
Soviet Union."7 After July 1, there was nothing left to be discussed 
between Stuart and Huang, and Ambassador Stuart returned home. 
3. Ambassador Stuart to the Secretary of State, 14 May 1949, quoted in U.S. Con-
gress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The United States and Communist China in 
1949 and 1950: The Question of Rapprochement and Recognition, 93d Congress, 1st ses-
sion, January 1973, p.8. 
4. Ambassador Stuart to the Secretary of State, 8 June 1949, ibid., note 23. 
5. Ibid., p. 10. 
6. Ibid., p. II. 
7. "People's Democratic Dictatorship: Soviet Union Our Best Teacher," reprinted in 
Vital Speeches of the Day, I October 1949, p. 749, cited from ibid., note 34. 
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The State Department published a 1054-page White Paper on 
China, on 5 August, which placed responsibility for Chiang's defeat on 
the ineptitude of the Nationalist Government. Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson declared that "the only alternative open to the U.S. was full-
scale intervention in behalf of a Government which had lost the confi-
dence of its own troops and its own people."8 But intervention 
"would have been resented by the mass of the Chinese people, would 
have diametrically reversed our historic policy, and would have been 
condemned by the American people."9 Acheson justified the U.S. pol-
icy of nonintervention by stating that: 
The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous 
result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the 
government of the United States. Nothing that this country 
did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its 
capabilities could have changed that result; nothing that was 
left undone by this country has contributed to it. It was the 
product of internal Chinese forces, forces which this country 
tried to influence but could not. A decision was arrived at 
within China, if only a decision by default. 10 
The White Paper was cited by the communists as evidence of 
American interference in Chinese domestic politics. Mao launched a 
propaganda campaign in People's Daily, the official communist news-
paper, to educate the Chinese people about the U.S. imperialists' inter-
vention in China (People's Daily, 19 August 1949:2). 
The White Paper was also criticized in Washington by the so-
called China Lobby. Senators Bridges, Knowland, McCarran, and 
Wherry issued a memorandum calling the White Paper "a 1054-page 
Whitewash of a wishful, do-nothing policy which has succeeded only 
in placing Asia in danger of Soviet conquest." 11 General Patrick J. 
Hurley assailed the White Paper as "a smooth alibi for the pro-Com-
munists in the State Department who had engineered the overthrow of 
our ally, the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China and 
aided in the Communist conquest of China." 12 
The Truman administration in late 1949 adopted a dual Ameri-
can China policy of disengagement from the Nationalists and a "wait-
8. U. S. Department of State, United States Relations with China with Special Refer-
ence to the Period /944-1949 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Public Affairs, Division of Pub-
lication, 1949), p. XV. 
9. Ibid., p. XVI. 
10. Ibid. 
II. U.S. Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 1st session, 1949, XCV, pp. A5451-54. 
12. Ibid., p. 10941. 
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and-see" approach concerning recognition of the PRC. Meanwhile, 
the administration hoped to see the development of a Chinese "Tito-
ism." Acheson anticipated in the White Paper that "ultimately the 
profound civilization and the democratic individualism of China will 
reassert themselves and she will throw off the foreign yoke. I consider 
that we should encourage all developments in China which now and in 
the future work toward this end." 13 Acheson also stated in National 
Security Council (NSC) 48/2, on 30 December 1949, that: 
The United States should exploit, through appropriate 
political, psychological and economic means, any rifts be-
tween the Chinese Communists and the USSR and between 
the Stalinists and other elements in China, while scrupu-
lously avoiding the appearance of intervention. Where ap-
propriate, covert as well as overt means should be utilized to 
achieve these objectives. 14 
Disengagement from the Nationalists was one way to avoid fur-
ther hatred from the PRC. Although the United States still provided 
economic aid to the Nationalists, the fall of Taiwan was expected by 
the Truman administration. An October 1949 Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) report predicted that without American military "occu-
pation and control," Taiwan would "probably ... succumb to the 
Chinese Communists by the end of 1950."15 
Acheson stated to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that 
the fall of Formosa was "probably ... inevitable." "Under present 
circumstances, the Communists would be criminally crazy if they did 
not put an end to it just as soon as possible." 16 President Truman 
announced in a statement concerning American policy toward Tai-
wan, on 5 January 1950: 
The United States has no desire to obtain special rights or 
privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa at this 
time. Nor does it have any intention of utilizing its armed 
forces to interfere in the present situation. The U.S. will not 
pursue a course, which will lead to involvement in the civil 
conflict in China. Similarly, the U.S. Government will not 
provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on 
13. U.S. Department of State, United States Relations with China, 1949, p. XVI. 
14. U.S. National Security Council, "The Position of the United States with Respect to 
Asia." NSC 41!/2, 30 Deccmber 1949, printed in U.S. Congress. House. Committee on 
Armed Services, United States- Vh•tnam Relations 1945-1967. vol. R (Washington. D.C.: 
Govcrnrncnt Printing Oflicc, 1971). p. 270. 
15. Ibid .. p. 245. 
16. Ibid. 
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Formosa. 17 
In a conference with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 
10 January 1950, Acheson drew a defensive perimeter in the western 
Pacific which must and would be held by the United States. This 
defensive perimeter ran along the Aleutians through Japan and the 
Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands (Kuhn, 1950:1). Taiwan and South 
Korea were left outside of this line. 
Besides this "hands-off-Formosa" policy, the Truman administra-
tion began a series of debates on the question of recognition of the 
PRC as a means to gain some leverage in Sino-Soviet relations. In 
October, 24 leading scholars, businessmen, and missionaries interested 
in China attended a meeting chaired by Phillip C. Jessup, a key adviser 
to the Truman administration. Most participants agreed that the Na-
tionalists' cause was lost and urged the administration to extend de 
jure recognition to the new regime in China and to do so fairly soon. 18 
In October 1951, Time magazine, which was then pro-National-
ist, revealed that two years earlier a "high State Department source" 
told one of its reporters that: 
Acheson had been steadily arguing with Truman to go along 
on an early recognition of Communist China. Just before 
Truman left for Key West, Acheson got him to admit the 
logic of early recognition. Truman said that Acheson made 
a forceful case. The trouble now is not with Truman, but in 
persuading him to override the pressure from congressional 
and other groups not to recognize. 19 
Apart from the domestic political difficulty, other problems pre-
vented the Truman administration from recognizing the PRC. On 1 
February 1947, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party announced that it considered invalid all the treaties, agreements, 
and loans that the Nationalist Government had concluded with for-
eign countries during the civil war. Furthermore, American diplo-
mats in China were mistreated by the Communists. On 24 October 
1949, Angus Ward, American consul general in Mukden, and four of 
his staff were jailed for a month after being held under house arrest for 
17. Department of State Bulletin, !6 January 1950, p. 79, quoted from Tang Tsou, 
America's Failure in China, 1941-50 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 531. 
18. See Professor Edwin 0. Reischauer's remark in "Transcript of the Round Table 
Conference" as reproduced in the U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, The Institute of 
Pacific Relations, Hearing, 82d Congress, 1st and 2d sessions (1951-1952), p. 1667, cited 
from Tsou, America's Failure in China, p. 515. 
19. See Time, 15 October 1951, pp. 22-23, and Time, 21 November 1949, pp. 29-30, 
quoted in U.S. Senate, The United States and Communist China in 1949 and 1950, p. 2. 
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nearly a year. They were tried, found guilty of spying, and deported 
from China. This action was considered by the United States to be "in 
clear violation of established principles of international comity and 
practice respecting the treatment of consular officials. " 20 
In a press conference on 12 October 1949, Secretary Acheson 
stated three main criteria in recognizing a new government: (1) that it 
effectively control the area it claimed to govern; (2) that it recognize 
its international obligations; and (3) that it govern with the consent of 
the people (Westerfield, 1955:360). Acheson also gave the following 
statement on recognition of China before an executive session of the 
Foreign Relations Committee on the same day: 
We of the executive branch stated to this committee and 
stated in public that any action which is taken along this line 
will be taken after consultation with the committee, if that is 
possible, or if the Congress is not in session, with the Chair-
man or such members of the Committee as are available. We 
could not anticipate that there will be any imminent reason 
for dealing with this matter, but on the other hand, I do not 
want to give you the impression that such an event might not 
arise. 21 
Acheson apparently did not rule out the possibility of recognition 
of the Chinese Communist regime, which depended upon whether the 
PRC met the three conditions Acheson outlined. Had these condi-
tions been met by the PRC, it would have been politically less painful 
for the Truman administration to establish diplomatic relations with 
Beijing. 
Acheson elaborated on the reason for establishing diplomatic re-
lations in a speech on relations with Latin America in September 1949: 
We do not establish an embassy or legation in a foreign 
country to show approval of its government. I do so to have 
a channel through which we conduct essential government 
relations and to protect legitimate United States interests.22 
Acheson reiterated the distinction between recognition and ap-
proval of a government: 
20. Department of State Bulletin, 21 November 1949, p. 760, cited from Tsou, p. 517, 
note 119. 
21. Transcript of hearing held in Executive Session, 12 October 1949. pp. 51-52, quoted 
in U.S. Senate, The United States and Communist China in /949 and 1950, p. 13. 
22. U.S. Department of State, A Decade of Foreign Policy. /941-1949 (Washington, 
D.C., 1950), p. 449, quoted in Gaddis Smith, Dean Acheson (New York: Cooper, 1972), p. 
122. 
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One of the important factors is the one we have been 
talking about in relation to Spain. Do not get this thing 
mixed up with approval or disapproval. The failure to recog-
nize in itself isn't going to change anything. On the other 
hand, the only really important fact about recognition is that 
you exchange representatives. That is what follows from 
it. 23 
One of the reasons the United States did not want to exchange 
representatives with the PRC was because the Communists did not 
treat American diplomats with decency. Acheson stated that "we do 
not want to recognize a country and send people there only to have 
them thrown into jail and kept in compounds for a year."24 
The Chinese Communists, however, were not interested in Amer-
ican recognition. On 14 January 1950, the Communists seized build-
ings in Beijing that the State Department considered to be American 
property. The State Department immediately decided to recall all 
American official personnel from China. 
On 14 February 1950, the PRC announced the conclusion of a 
Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance. The Chinese Communists leaned fur-
ther toward the Soviet Union and became increasingly anti-American 
in their propaganda. The American hope of Chinese "Titoism" had 
diminished considerably. 
THE KOREAN WAR AND U.S. CHINA POLICY 
On 25 June 1950, North Korea attacked South Korea. The outbreak 
of the Korean War brought an abrupt end to the American "hands-
off" policy toward Taiwan. On 27 June 1950, President Truman de-
clared that "the attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubts 
that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer 
independent nations and now uses armed invasion and war. . . . In 
these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces 
would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area .... " 
(George, 1955:229-230). President Truman therefore dispatched the 
Seventh Fleet to neutralize the Formosa Strait. Mao Tse-tung imme-
diately attacked this decision as an "open exposure by the U.S. of its 
true imperialist face. " 25 Mao also warned that the actions of the 
American Navy in the Taiwan Strait "constitute armed aggression 
23. Transcript of hearing held in Executive Session, January 1950, pp. 65-67, quoted in 
U.S. Senate, The United States and Communist China in 1949 and 1950, p. 14. 
24. Ibid. 
25. Chairman Mao Tse-tung's comment on President Truman's statement of June 27, a 
brief talk given on 28 June 1950, at the eighth meeting of the Central People's Government 
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against the territory of China and total violation of the United Nations 
Charter. " 26 
The neutralization of the Formosa Strait was a reversal of U.S. 
policy of not defending Formosa by military force, a policy inferred in 
Acheson's "perimeter" statement less than six months before. The 
dispatch of the Seventh Fleet, however, was thought to be a temporary 
action to deny Formosa to a hostile power. President Truman did not 
have a definitive policy for the future status of Formosa (Truman, 
1956:339). Beijing's decision to enter the Korean War in November 
1950, however, cemented U.S. support for the Nationalists in Taiwan. 
The United States rapidly increased military aid to Taiwan. The U.S. 
consulate in Taipei was upgraded to an embassy in late 1950. Recog-
nition of the PRC was now out of the question. The Chinese Commu-
nist regime was further pushed by the United States into the arms of 
the Soviet Union. 
In May 1951, the State Department announced a decision not to 
recognize the PRC. On 18 May 1951, Dean Rusk, then assistant sec-
retary of state for Far Eastern Affairs, declared in a speech before the 
China Institute at a dinner in New York that: 
We can tell our friends in China that the U.S. will not 
acquiesce in the degradation which is being forced upon 
them. We do not recognize the authorities in Peiping for 
what they pretend to be. The Peiping regime may be a colo-
nial Russian government-a Slavic Manchukuo on a larger 
scale. It is not the Government of China. It does not pass 
the first test. It is not Chinese. 27 
THE McCARTHY ERA AND THE RECOGNITION ISSUE 
Senator Joseph R. McCarthy delivered a speech on 9 February 1950, 
charging that Communists were knowingly infiltrated into the State 
Department and were directing its policies, especially with respect to 
the Far East. A special subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee was set up to investigate McCarthy's charge. 
During the McCarthy era, the "soft-on-communism" attack often 
centered on the so-called "loss" of China. The "old China hands" 
were major targets. John S. Service was charged as "a known associ-
Council, in Chang Tao-li, Why China Help~ Korea (Bombay: People's Publishing House, 
1951), pp. 31-32, quoted from Tsou, America's Failure in China, p. 561, note 30. 
26. Ibid., note 32. 
27. Dean Rusk, "Chinese-American Friendship," Vital Speeches of the Day, vol. 17, 15 
June 1951:515. 
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ate and collaborator with Communists and pro-Communists."28 Phil-
lip C. Jessup was accused of having "unusual affinity for Communist 
causes."29 As a result of these charges, according to James C. Thom-
son, Jr., an East Asian specialist in the State Department's Bureau of 
Far Eastern Affairs from January 1961 to July 1964, this Department 
was "purged of its best China expertise, and of farsighted, dispassion-
ate men" (Thomson, 1968:47). Only those who were committed to the 
containment and isolation of China remained in the State Department 
(Thomson, 1968:47). Officials favoring improved relations with the 
Chinese Communist regime became reluctant to speak out. 
With the outbreak of the Korean War and China's involvement in 
the war in late 1950, and the developments relating to McCarthyism, 
anti-Communist sentiment reached a peak during the early 1950s. 
The Democrats were openly blamed by Republicans for the "loss" of 
China and Beijing's invasion of South Korea. 
During the 1952 election campaign, General Dwight Eisenhower 
accused President Truman of allowing the nation to become militarily 
weak and of announcing "to all the world that it had written off most 
of the Far East as beyond our direct concern" (Diamond, 1971 :48). 
Richard Nixon, running as a vice presidential candidate, declared 
that "China would not have gone Communist if the Truman Adminis-
tration had had backbone" (Diamond, 1971:2). U.S. policy toward 
the PRC during the Eisenhower years focused on containing Chinese 
Communist aggression, opposing the seating of Beijing in the United 
Nations, strengthening U.S. commitment to Taiwan, and continuing 
the nonrecognition policy. 
In December 1954, the United States and the Republic of China 
in Taiwan signed a mutual defense treaty, pledging separately and 
jointly to "maintain and develop their individual and collective capac-
ity to resist armed attack and Communist subversive activities." They 
agreed that an armed attack on either of them would endanger the 
peace and safety of the other, and each country declared "it would act 
to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional 
I 
processes." "Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a re-
sult thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of 
the United Nations." Though the treaty guaranteed only Taiwan and 
the Pescadores against attack from the PRC, it specifically provided 
that the agreement could be extended to other areas by consent of both 
sides. The Chinese Nationalists agreed not to attack the mainland 
28. U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, State Department Employee Loyalty 
Investigation hearings, 8lst Congress, 2d session, 1950, p. 140, quoted in Tsou, p. 541. 
29. U.S. Senate, State Department Loyalty Investigation, p. 28, quoted in ibid. 
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without U.S. approval. The treaty had no expiration date, although it 
could be terminated by either party on one year's notice (see Appendix 
A). 
The U.S. Senate ratified the treaty by a 64-6 vote on 9 February 
1955, and it took effect on 3 March 1955. Conclusion of the mutual 
defense treaty underscored American support of, and defense commit-
ment to, Taiwan, viewed as a vital link in the chain of U.S. bases or 
potential bases in the western Pacific. 
The PRC bitterly assailed the defense treaty as an attempt by the 
United States to legalize the occupation of Taiwan. On 18 January 
1955, Communist forces seized the offshore island of Yikiang (Yiki-
angshan), 210 miles north of Taiwan. The next day, more than 200 
Communist planes bombed the Tachen Islands, eight miles from Yiki-
ang. Although the Eisenhower administration did not consider either 
Yikiang or the Tachens essential to the defense of Taiwan, President 
Eisenhower sent a message to Congress on 24 July 1955 requesting 
emergency authorization to use American forces to protect Taiwan, 
the adjoining Pescadores Islands, and "related positions and territo-
ries." The House adopted this "Formosa Resolution" by a 410-3 vote 
after only three hours of debate, and the Senate by a 85-3 vote. Presi-
dent Eisenhower indicated at a news conference on 2 February that 
the emergency authorization was sought to prevent war. Years later, 
Eisenhower reiterated in his memoirs that the defense treaty and the 
Formosa Resolution "left no doubt of the United States' intention re-
garding Formosa and the Pescadores; in that region we would not be 
in the situation we had faced in the 1950 Korean crisis" (Eisenhower, 
1963:469). 
In his memoirs, Eisenhower quoted Mao's writing on the strategy 
of war: "Enemy advance, we retreat; enemy halts, we harass; enemy 
tires, we attack; enemy retreats, we pursue." Eisenhower stated that 
in the Formosa Strait in 1955 the United States refused to retreat and 
the Chinese Communist, "true to his formula, for a while tried harass-
ment but refused to attack" (Eisenhower, 1963:483). The crisis in the 
Taiwan Strait cooled down until 1958. 
THE AMBASSADORIAL TALKS IN GENEVA, 1955-57 
In the spring of 1955, the Communists once again adopted a policy of 
accommodation with the United States in an attempt to improve rela-
tions with the United States and weaken U.S.-Taiwan relations. Pre-
mier-Foreign Minister Chou En-lai proposed U.S.-PRC talks in April 
1955. Hoping to obtain the release of the 11 airmen and 41 American 
civilians imprisoned in China and to reduce the risk of war with the 
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PRC, the Eisenhower administration showed interest in opening diplo-
matic negotiations with Beijing. 
On 31 July 1955, one day before the ambassadorial talks, Beijing 
announced the release of the 11 U.S. fliers held since November 1954, 
as a friendly gesture to the United States. Secretary of State Dulles 
was pleased with Beijing's action. Both sides voiced optimism con-
cerning ambassadorial talks in Geneva. Hard negotiation for five 
weeks produced an agreement on the return of the civilians, but when 
the PRC failed to release all the civilians held, the talks made no fur-
ther progress. Beijing rejected Washington's demands to renounce the 
use of force on Taiwan. The United States rebuffed the PRC's propos-
als for a bilateral foreign minister's conference for removal of the U.S. 
embargo on trade with China and for an exchange of journalists. 
Meanwhile, the United States adhered steadfastly to its nonrecog-
nition policy toward the PRC. On 12 March 1957, Dulles held that 
U.S. recognition or U.N. membership for Communist China "would 
serve no national purpose" but instead would "encourage influences 
hostile to us and to our allies" (Yim, 1973:64). Diplomatic recogni-
tion of the PRC, Dulles declared, would 
1. "immensely" discourage mainland Chinese from seeking 
a change in their government, 
2. cause "millions of overseas Chinese in free Asian coun-
tries" to accept Communist Chinese leadership, 
3. break U.S. treaty pledges to the Nationalist Chinese gov-
ernment, and 
4. "gravely" perplex other free Asians (Yim, 1973:65). 
The ambassadorial talks in Geneva were suspended in December 
1957. Nine months later, Beijing started a massive bombardment of 
Quemoy, trying to counter American strength in the Taiwan Strait 
areas with Soviet strategic power. The American rapid deployment of 
naval and air forces nearby, and the Soviet failure to provide effective 
support for Beijing during the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis forced the 
Chinese Communists to retreat and seek a resumption of the ambassa-
dorial talks, to which President Eisenhower promptly agreed. 
The U.S.-PRC ambassadorial talks resumed on 15 September 
1958 in Warsaw. Although no official records of the Warsaw talks 
were given out, the United States apparently proposed a number of 
possible formulas to reduce tensions, ranging from the reduction of 
armed forces on the offshore islands to some form of demilitarization, 
neutralization, trusteeship, or judicial settlement through the World 
Court (Young, 1968:179). The PRC never responded to any of these 
proposals. An impasse developed in the Warsaw talks when the PRC 
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rejected the U.S. proposal for a cease-fire as a precondition for negotia-
tions. No agreement was reached in resolving the status of the off-
shore islands throughout the talks. Bombardment of Quemoy, 
however, gradually diminished, and the PRC finally scaled down its 
artillery bombardments to an every-other-day exercise of no military 
significance. 
On 4 December 1958, Secretary of State Dulles reiterated the 
U.S. policy of nonrecognition, stating that Communist bombardment 
of offshore islands had made it "ever more clear" that U.S. recognition 
of the PRC would deal "a well-nigh mortal blow to the survival of the 
non-Communist governments of the Far East" (Yim, 1973:114). 
The Taiwan Strait crisis in 1958 passed the most serious confron-
tation between Washington and Beijing after the Korean War. The 
Nationalists reduced the size of their forces on the offshore islands by 
15,000 after the United States promised to increase the supply of fire-
power to Taiwan. 
U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE PRC DURING THE KENNEDY 
AND JOHNSON YEARS 
During the 1960 presidential election debates, Democratic candidate 
John F. Kennedy strongly disagreed with Republican candidate Rich-
ard Nixon on U.S. policy toward the defense of the offshore islands. 
Kennedy believed that it was unwise "to take the chance of being 
dragged into a war which may lead to a world war over two islands 
which are not strategically defensible ... (or) essential to the defense 
of Formosa" (Yim, 1973:138). Nixon, on the other hand, declared 
that: 
(T]he question is not these two little pieces of real estate-
they are unimportant. It is not the few people who live on 
them-they are not too important. It is the principle in-
volved. These two islands are in the area of freedom. . . . 
We should not force our Nationalist allies to get off them 
and give them to the Communists ... (lest) we start a chain 
reaction, because the Communists are not after Quemoy and 
Matsu. They are after Formosa .... This is the same kind of 
woolly thinking that led to disaster for America in Ko-
rea. . . . I would never tolerate it as President. . . . (Yim, 
1973:138). 
Kennedy took office in January 1961. According to Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr., President Kennedy considered the state of U.S. rela-
tions with the PRC as irrational and did not exclude the possibility of 
making some changes during his administration (Schlesinger, 
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1965:4 79). But because of his slim majority of election votes, Kennedy 
felt that he could not take on the China problem immediately (Schles-
inger, 1965:479). The Kennedy administration did not bring any sig-
nificant change in U.S.-PRC relations. Eisenhower had warned 
Kennedy shortly before the inauguration, Schlesinger said, that Eisen-
hower would consider it necessary to return to public life if Commu-
nist China threatened to enter the United Nations (Schlesinger, 
1965:479). The Kennedy administration continued the nonrecogni-
tion policy toward the PRC. 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to 
defend Taiwan, at a news conference on 6 February 1961. In response 
to troop movements by the PRC in mainland areas near Taiwan, Pres-
ident Kennedy on 27 June 1962 reiterated the policy established by 
Eisenhower that the United States would take all actions necessary to 
ensure the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores. 
Meanwhile, disappointed by the lack of Soviet support during the 
Taiwan Strait crisis and by the Soviet decision to withdraw its techni-
cians, the PRC decided to become more self-reliant. Gradually, the 
PRC became preoccupied with internal problems, such as the Great 
Leap Forward Movement of the late 1950s, the Tibetan rebellion in 
1959, and the Cultural Revolution of the mid-1960s. 
The United States was well aware of the gradual breakup of the 
Sino-Soviet alliance in the 1960s. In December 1963, Assistant Secre-
tary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Roger Hitsman urged Americans 
to take a realistic view of the PRC, asserting that the Communist re-
gime was here to stay and recognizing the possibility that the PRC 
would evolve into a more moderate state. 30 
Marshall Green, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs during the Nixon administration, revealed in an inter-
view that he, as the U.S. consul general in Hong Kong in the early 
1960s, had recommended major modifications of travel and trade re-
strictions for Americans in their relations with China. In September 
1963, Green was called back to Washington, D.C. to undertake are-
view of U.S. policy toward China. Green said that a real break-
through seemed in prospect by the end of 1963, but the tragic event of 
Kennedy's assassination in November 1963 intervened.31 
The Johnson administration did not take immediate steps to im-
30. For further analysis of the making of the Hilsman speech see James C. Thomson, 
Jr., "On the Making of U.S. China Policy, 1961-69: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics," The 
China Quarterly, no. 50 (April/June 1972), pp. 226-32. 
31. Interview with Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary for State Department Bureau 
of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 1969-1972. 16 July 1985. Washington, D.C. 
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prove relations with China; the atmosphere, however, began to 
change. In December 1965, the United States announced that the ban 
on travel to the PRC was being lifted. During 1966, the United States 
eased restrictions on the travel of scholars and writers to communist 
countries. On 14 February 1966, the United States offered to let jour-
nalists from the PRC enter the country. President Johnson said in a 
televised speech that eventual reconciliation with China was necessary 
(Diamond, 1971 :5). A deepening of American involvement in the 
Vietnam war during the Johnson years created more tensions with the 
PRC. 
By the late 1960s, the PRC, recovering from the turbulent Cul-
tural Revolution and suffering a growing hostility with the Soviet 
Union, began to reassess its hostile relations with the United States. 
The Sino-Soviet border clashes in March 1969 demonstrated to the 
United States that the balance of power in East Asia was undergoing a 
great deal of change. The Nixon administration took the initiative 
that ended nearly two decades' containment and U.S. isolation policy 
toward the PRC. 
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2 
U.S.-PRC RELATIONS: 1969-1978 
THE OPENING OF CHINA 
Richard Nixon raised the issue of the importance of improving Sino-
American relations in an article in Foreign Affairs in October 1967. 
Unlike his previous anticommunist stand, Nixon questioned the utility 
of the decades-old U.S. policy of containment and isolation toward the 
PRC. Nixon stated: 
Any American policy toward Asia must come urgently 
to grips with the reality of China. This does not mean, as 
many would simplistically have it, rushing to grant recogni-
tion to Peking, to admit it to the United Nations and ply it 
with offers of trade-all of which would serve to confirm its 
rulers in their present course. It does mean recognizing the 
present and potential danger from Communist China and 
taking measures designed to meet that danger. It also means 
distinguishing carefully between long-range and short-range 
policies, and fashioning short-range programs so as to ad-
vance our long-range goals .... 
Taking the long view, we simply can not afford to leave 
China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture 
its fantasies, cherish its hate and threaten its neighbors. 
There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its po-
tentially most able people to live in angry isolation. 
For the short run, then, this means a policy of firm re-
straint, of no reward, of a creative counterpressure designed 
to persuade Peking that its interests can be served only by 
accepting the basic rules of international civility. For the 
long run, it means pulling China back into the world com-
munity-but as a great and progressive nation, not as the 
epicenter of world revolution (Nixon, 1967:121, 123). 
Nixon recommended a positive policy of "pressure and persua-
sion" together with the policy of "containment without isolation" to-
ward the PRC (Nixon, 1967:123). 
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On 1 February 1969, less than two weeks after his inauguration, 
Nixon wrote a memorandum to Henry Kissinger, then national secur-
ity council adviser, urging that "we give every encouragement to the 
attitude that the administration was exploring possibilities of rap-
proachement with the Chinese." "This, of course, should be done pri-
vately and should under no circumstances get into the public prints 
[sic] from this direction (Nixon, 1979, v.2:8). 
This memorandum was meant for the Soviet Union. Kissinger 
was asked to create the impression among East Europeans that the 
United States was exploring a move toward China (Kissinger, 
1979: 169). President Nixon believed that a rapproachement with the 
PRC would give the United States a great strategic opportunity for 
diplomatic maneuver. He also thought that an opening to China 
would provide an incentive for the Soviet Union to help the United 
States end the war in Vietnam" (Kissinger, 1979:169). 
The growing tension between the Soviet Union and the Chinese 
Communists convinced the Nixon administration that the United 
States was in the best position to develop a triangular Washington-
Beijing-Moscow relationship. Sino-Soviet relations had deteriorated 
after Khrushchev's failure to support China more resolutely during 
the 1958 Quemoy crisis. In 1960, the Soviets had pulled out their 
technical advisers and ended all economic aid to China. The Soviet 
Union also withdrew its promise to assist China in developing Chinese 
nuclear weapons. 
Border incidents had begun around 1959. The Soviet Union in-
creased the number of troops stationed along the 4000-mile border 
with China after signing a 20-year "Treaty of Friendship, Coopera-
tion, and Mutual Aid" with Mongolia in January 1966 (Kissinger, 
1979:167). The treaty allowed the Soviet Union to station troops and 
to maintain bases in Mongolia. In 1964, the Soviet Union had about 
12 understrength divisions along the Chinese border, but by the late 
1960s, more than 40 modernized divisions were in place (Kissinger, 
1979:167). The problem of how to deal with Soviet aggression and 
hostility emerged as the primary Chinese foreign policy concern of the 
late 1960s. 
On 26 November 1968, three months after the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia and just after the U.S. presidential election, the PRC 
proposed to resume Warsaw talks with the United States beginning in 
February 1969. From 1954 to 1968, 134 ambassadorial meetings be-
tween Washington and Beijing were held. Only one agreement was 
produced in September 1955 on repatriation of some U.S. nationals. 
On 18 February 1969, two days before a scheduled meeting with U.S. 
representatives in Warsaw, the PRC decided to cancel this meeting 
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because of the U.S. government's decision to grant political asylum to 
a diplomat who had defected from the PRC. 
Two weeks later, on 2 March 1969, the highly publicized Sino-
Soviet border incidents drew the world's attention. The Sino-Soviet 
armed clashes along the disputed Ussuri River boundary and the ru-
mor of a Soviet attack on Chinese nuclear facilities reinforced Nixon's 
belief that Communist China might be ready to reenter the diplomatic 
arena. Both Nixon and Kissinger believed that the United States 
should expand its contacts with the PRC as a means of leverage 
against the Soviet Union (Kissinger, 1979:182; see also Nixon, 1979, 
v.2:8). 
The Nixon administration took several initiatives in 1969 toward 
establishing a dialogue with Beijing. On 21 July 1969, the United 
States announced it would allow American tourists and residents 
abroad to purchase up to $100 worth of goods originating in China 
and would permit automatic validation of passports for American citi-
zens wishing to travel to China. In December 1969, the United States 
further allowed foreign subsidiaries of American-owned firms to trade 
with China in nonstrategic items. The United States also removed the 
$100 limit on purchases of Chinese goods by Americans for noncom-
mercial use. 
The Nixon administration also took initiatives to open communi-
cation channels with the PRC. Walter Stoessel, U.S. ambassador to 
Poland, was instructed by Kissinger to "walk up to the Ambassador of 
the PRC at the next social function they both attended and tell him 
that we were prepared for serious talks" (Kissinger, 1979: 188). Stoes-
sel delivered the message and, on 11 December 1969, Chou En-lai in-
vited Stoessel to the Chinese embassy through the "front door," the 
first such invitation since 1949. On 8 January 1970, the United States 
and the PRC agreed to resume formal ambassadorial meetings in War-
saw. The talks began in January, were called off briefly by the PRC in 
May because of the American attack against North Vietnamese forces 
in Cambodia, but resumed in July 1970. 
Meanwhile, the Nixon administration took the first serious public 
step toward recognizing the Chinese Communists in February 1970 
when President Nixon sent the first Foreign Policy Report to Con-
gress. Nixon stated in the section on China: 
The Chinese are a great and vital people who should not 
remain isolated from the international community. . . . 
It is certainly in our interest and in the interest of peace 
and stability in Asia and the world, that we take what steps 
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we can toward improved practical relations with Peking 
(Nixon, 1979,v.2:8). 
Apart from using the Warsaw talks connection, President Nixon 
had also used French, Romanian, and Pakistani channels to convey 
his wish to improve relations with the PRC (Nixon, 1979, v.2:9-11). 
The so-called Pakistan "Yahya Channel" turned out to be the most 
successful. After a two-year exchange of messages through Pakistani 
President Yahya Khan, President Nixon finally received this most im-
portant mesage from the PRC on 2 June 1971: 
Premier Chou En-lai has seriously studied President 
Nixon's messages of April 29, May 17, and May 22, 1971, 
and has reported with much pleasure to Chairman Mao Tse-
tung that President Nixon is prepared to accept his sugges-
tion to visit Peking for direct conversations with .the leaders 
of the PRC. Chairman Mao Tse-tung has indicated that he 
welcomes President Nixon's visit and looks forward to that 
occasion when he may have direct conversations with His 
Excellency the President, in which each side would be free to 
raise the principal issue of concern to it. . . . 
Premier Chou En-lai welcomes Dr. Kissinger to China 
as the U.S. representative who will come in advance for a 
preliminary secret meeting with high level Chinese officials 
to prepare and make necessary arrangements for President 
Nixon's visit to Peking (Nixon, 1979, v.2: 17). 
Kissinger told President Nixon that "this is the most important com-
munication that has come to an American President since the end of 
World War II" (Nixon, 1979, v.2:16-17). 
Other signs indicated that the Sino-American rapprochement was 
warming up. On 15 March 1971, the United States lifted all further 
restrictions on travel to the PRC. In April 1971, the U.S. table-tennis 
team competing in the world championship in Japan was invited to 
visit the PRC. The Nixon administration immediately granted per-
mission to accept the invitation. 
Kissinger secretly flew from Pakistan's capital, Islamabad, to Bei-
jing on 9 July 1971 to arrange Nixon's visit. Kissinger spent most of 
his two days there discussing various world issues with Premier Chou 
En-lai. A joint announcement on Nixon's visit was finally agreed 
upon after some bargaining between Kissinger and Huang Hua. Kis-
singer rejected the original Chinese draft because it suggested that 
President Nixon had solicited the invitation and that Taiwan would be 
the first agenda item discussed, before the topic of normalization of 
relations (Kissinger, 1979:751-52). The final announcement by Presi-
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dent Nixon, delivered on 15 July on nationwide television, read as 
follows: 
Premier Chou En-lai and Dr. Henry Kissinger, Presi-
dent Nixon's Assistant for National Security Affairs, held 
talks in Peking from July 9 to 11, 1971. Knowing of Presi-
dent Nixon's expressed desire to visit the PRC, Premier 
Chou En-lai, on behalf of the Government of the PRC, has 
extended an invitation to President Nixon to visit China at 
an appropriate date before May 1972. President Nixon has 
accepted the invitation with pleasure. 
The meeting between the leaders of China and the U.S. 
is to seek the normalization of relations between the two 
countries and also to exchange views on questions of concern 
to the two sides. . . . 
Our action in seeking a new relationship with the PRC 
will not be at the expense of our old friends. It is not di-
rected against any other nation. We seek friendly relations 
with all nations. Any nation can be our friend without being 
any other nation's enemy (Kissinger, 1979: 759-60). 
Nixon's China announcement was generally welcomed in the 
United States. Most of the serious criticism came from the conserva-
tives, as President Nixon expected (Nixon, 1979, v. 2:20). 
Kissinger returned to China in October 1971 to arrange the 
agenda for Nixon's visit, set for 20 October 1971, five days before the 
U.N. General Assembly met to vote on admitting the PRC as a mem-
ber nation. On 2 August 1971, U.S. Secretary of State Rogers had 
announced that the United States "will support action at the General 
Assembly this fall calling for seating the PRC. At the same time, the 
U.S. will oppose any action to expel the Republic of China or other-
wise deprive it of representation in the U.N." This "two Chinas" ap-
proach was unacceptable to both Beijing and Taipei. Although 
George Bush, American ambassador to the United Nations, tried to 
rally votes to keep Taiwan's seat in the General Assembly, Kissinger's 
second visit to Beijing gave the other countries an obvious signal about 
American intentions on this issue. The PRC was voted in and Taiwan 
was expelled from the United Nations on 25 October 1971 by a vote of 
76 to 35, with 17 abstentions. 1 
I. Ambassador Harvey Feldman wrote in a personal letter to the author, dated 4 Jan. 
1984: 
"Actually, the key vote was on the "Important Question," which was defeated by 
a vote of 55(US) - 59 - 15. That is to say, we lost on the Important Question by 
just four votes. and on a day on which Kissinger was in Beijing! I remain con-
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PRESIDENT NIXON'S VISIT TO CHINA IN 1972 AND THE 
SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE 
President Nixon concluded his spectacular eight-day visit to China by 
signing the "Shanghai Communique" on 28 February 1972. The com-
munique was the product of many hours' hard bargaining between 
Kissinger and Chou En-lai. Most of the context had been worked out 
during Kissinger's second trip to China in October 1971. This joint 
declaration broke diplomatic ground by stating each party's conflict-
ing points of view, rather than obscuring differences with platitudinous 
generalizations. (See Appendix B.) 
The Chinese expressed firm support to Vietnam, Laos, and Cam-
bodia in their efforts to attain their goals and supported the seven-
point proposal put forward by the Vietcong in February 1972. The 
United States stressed its support for the eight-point peace plan pro-
posed by the United States and South Vietnam in Paris on 27 January 
1972. The United States also proclaimed support for South Korea and 
Japan; the Chinese endorsed North Korea's plan for unification of the 
Korean peninsula, and stated its opposition to the revival and outward 
expansion of Japanese militarism. 
Another important section of the communique provided that 
neither nation "should seek hegemony in the Asia Pacific region and 
each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries 
to establish hegemony." The provision was clearly aimed at the Soviet 
Union. 
Taiwan was the most controversial issue during the negotiation 
processes. In the Shanghai Communique, Beijing claimed to be the 
sole legal government of China and that Taiwan was a province of 
China. The PRC stressed that the liberation of Taiwan was China's 
internal affair in which no country had a right to interfere, and de-
manded that all U.S. forces and military installations be withdrawn 
from Taiwan. Beijing also firmly opposed any activities aimed at the 
creation of "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," 
vinced that had K's visit been delayed, we would have passed the Important 
Question, which would have meant defeat for the Albanian Resolution, and the 
ROC would have remained in the General Assembly that year. How long that 
position could have been retained, we will never know. Nor can we know if Bei-
jing would have altered its position that it would not enter the UN while the ROC 
remained. I argued at the time that the lure of the Security Council seat could 
have brought Chou to accept dual representation. Kissinger thought dual repre-
sentation a disaster for his China policy, because he was convinced Beijing would 
not accept it and would regard it as an obstacle to better US-PRC relations. See 
his memoirs, vol. one. I am far from convinced K is right. In any case, he con-
trived numerous obstacles to our successfully putting dual representation across 
-including the timing of his second visit to Beijing." 
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"two Chinas," and an "independent Taiwan," or which advocated 
that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined." The United 
States declared its position on the question of Taiwan: 
The U.S. acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the 
Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Tai-
wan is a part of China. The U.S. Government does not chal-
lenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful 
settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese them-
selves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate 
objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military 
installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progres-
sively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan 
as the tension in the area diminishes. 
The Taiwan question was the crucial issue obstructing the estab-
lishment of diplomatic relations between Washington and Beijing in 
1972. President Nixon felt that the United States "could not and 
should not abandon the Taiwanese" because the United States was 
"committed to Taiwan's right to exist as an independent nation" 
(Nixon, 1979, v. 2:40). The Nixon administration was unable to make 
further concessions to the Taiwan issue because of domestic political 
considerations. Kissinger stated this point in his White House Years: 
For different reasons Taiwan involved issues of principle for 
both countries. And to suggest that principles have a price 
can be offensive. This is why the two sides conducted them-
selves as if we had to solve a common problem not by a 
sharp bargain but by a joint understanding. We took pains 
to explain our domestic necessities to each other with great 
frankness, because we knew that the communique would not 
survive if negotiated through trickery or found unacceptable 
at home (Kissinger, 1979:1075-1076). 
The absence of any mention of Beijing's opposition to both Wash-
ington's diplomatic relations and the defense treaty with Taiwan in the 
communique was considered Beijing's concession to the United States. 
Another concession was Beijing's willingness to begin the process of 
normalization of relations with the United States before the Taiwan 
question had been resolved. In return, the United States conceded 
that it would "progressively reduce its forces and military installations 
on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes." This document pro-
vided the basic framework for the conduct of Sino-American relations 
before the completion of normalization six years later in 1978. 
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TOWARD NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS, 1973-1977 
The Shanghai Communique did not specify any timetable or terms 
regarding "progress toward the normalization of relations." President 
Nixon was reported to have assured the Chinese that he would estab-
lish full diplomatic relations if elected to a second term (Gwertzman, 
1977a:1,5). 
Although there was no apparent solution to the major stumbling 
block to normalization-the Taiwan question-the momentum gained 
by improved Sino-American relations was high in 1972-1973. Sino-
American trade jumped from $5 million in 1971 to $95.9 million in 
1972, $805 million in 1973, and $933.8 million in 1974 (Barnett, 
1977a:224). Various exchange programs were expanded rapidly. 
Although the PRC was not happy with Nixon's decision to mine and 
bomb Haiphong in December 1972, the signing of the Vietnam peace 
agreement in Paris in January 1973 improved Sino-American rela-
tions. America's withdrawal of combat forces from South Vietnam 
further removed one of the Sino-American disagreements in the 
Shanghai Communique. Less than a month after the Paris accords on 
Indochina, the United States and the PRC reached an agreement in 
February 1973 to establish liaison offices in Washington and Beijing. 
In March 1973, David Bruce, a distinguished diplomat of ambas-
sadorial rank, was appointed to head the U.S. liaison office in Beijing, 
and Huang Chen, China's former ambassador to France, was selected 
to be in charge of the PRC liaison office in Washington. The liaison 
offices were formally in operation by May 1973, assuming most func-
tions of regular embassies. 
The PRC had for years strongly opposed the idea of maintaining 
diplomatic representation in the capital of any country that recognized 
the Republic of China in Taiwan. The establishment of liaison offices 
represented an important compromise by Communist China. Beijing's 
agreement to the formation of liaison offices, however, was based on 
an understanding that it would soon be upgraded to full diplomatic 
status (Choudhury, 1976:606). To Beijing's disappointment, there 
would be no visible progress made toward establishment of full diplo-
matic relations until 1978. 
From mid-1973, and particularly by mid-1974, there were signs 
that the momentum had begun to slow. Huang Chen returned to 
China for several months in November 1973 (Gelb, 1974:2). David 
Bruce was absent from his post for eight weeks in January-March 
1974 (New York Times, 23 March 1974:7. See also Gelb, 1974:2). 
Secretary of State Kissinger's trips to Beijing in 1973, 1974, and 1975 
were not as successful as his earlier trips. Sino-American trade fell to 
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$462 million in 1975 and $336 million in 1976 (Luhman, 1978:201). 
Many Americans involved in the intellectual exchange programs be-
came frustrated with the many restrictions imposed on them by their 
Chinese hosts. The U.S. liaison office staff in Beijing found access to 
Chinese officials more difficult than before (Hinton, 1976:62). 
Sino-American relations deteriorated during 1974 and 1975 be-
cause of China's unhappiness over the lack of progress toward normal-
ization, due in part to domestic problems in each country, and over 
U.S. agreements with the Soviet Union at summit meetings at Vladi-
vostok in November 1974 and Helsinki in August 1975. 
In late 1973, a "mini-cultural revolution," representing another 
battle between moderate forces and the radicals, was launched in 
China. In Washington, President Nixon's political demise prevented 
him from fulfilling his "tacit understanding" with the Chinese con-
cerning the establishment of full diplomatic relations. Saigon's fall 
early in 1975 and the 1976 presidential election precluded President 
Ford from making any controversial decisions, such as the normaliza-
tion of relations with the PRC. Ronald Reagan, in his 1976 presiden-
tial nomination campaign, repeatedly emphasized that the interests of 
Taiwan should not be sacrificed in the process of normalization with 
the PRC (Christian Science Monitor, 24 August 1976:28; 19 August 
1976:1, 9). The Ford administration, therefore, adopted a "wait-and-
see" policy toward the normalization decision. President Ford's De-
cember 1975 trip to China produced no significant changes in U.S.-
China relations, and no joint communique was issued during his visit. 
Detente between Washington and Moscow also contributed to the 
deterioration of relations between Washington and Beijing. Beijing 
condemned detente as Soviet-American "collusion" against Chinese 
interests. Beijing launched a campaign between November 1974 and 
August 1975 against U.S. "appeasement" policies toward the Soviets 
in response to Soviet-American summit meetings. 2 
American defeats in Indochina increased Chinese doubts about 
American strength and willingness to confront Soviet encroachment in 
East Asia. The original U.S.-PRC rapprochement had been possible 
because both sides were willing to put the Taiwan question temporar-
ily aside. The PRC did so because of Soviet threats. Now that Ameri-
can usefulness as a strong partner against Soviet aggression was in 
question, there was less justification to leave the Taiwan problem 
alone. The PRC reiterated that normalization of relations could be 
2. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asian and 
Pacific Affairs, Playing the China Card: Implications for the U.S.-Soviet-Chinese Relations. 
a report prepared by the Congressional Research Service, October 1979, p. 2. 
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realized "only on the basis of confirming the principle of one China." 
Beijing was annoyed when the United States appointed Leonard Un-
ger ambassador to Taipei in 1974, instead of allowing the post to go 
unfilled, and when it authorized the government of the Republic of 
China to open three new consulates in the United States. The Sino-
American relationship entered a stagnant period. 
U.S.-Taiwan trade rose from $1.61 billion in 1971 to $4.8 billion 
in 1976. At the same time, the United States gradually withdrew its 
combat units and military personnel from Taiwan in partial fulfillment 
of the Shanghai Communique. On 9 October 1974, the U.S. Senate 
with the acquiescence of the State Department, voted to repeal the 
1955 Formosa Resolution. President Chiang Kai-shek died at the age 
of 87 on 4 April 1975. The government in Taipei took a realistic step 
toward strengthening its defense program by purchasing from the 
United States two disarmed submarines, additional destroyers, heli-
copters, F-104 fighters, and C-123 aircraft. 
In 1976, while the United States was preoccupied with the presi-
dential election, the PRC was predominantly concerned with its suc-
cession problem. Premier Chou En-lai had died on 8 January 1976. 
In April, the Politburo named Hua Kuo-feng as first vice chairman of 
the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and premier 
of the PRC. Teng Hsiao-p'ing was thereafter removed from his posts 
as vice premier, vice chairman of the Central Committee of the Chi-
nese Communist Party, and chief of staff of the armed forces. Leftist 
leaders temporarily had regained influence in the conduct of Chinese 
policy. 
The radical leaders adopted a more militant line on Taiwan and 
Sino-American relationships. One month after the death of Chairman 
Mao on 9 September 1976, Chiang Ch'ing (Mao's widow) and three 
other radical members of the Chinese Politburo-Wang Hung-wen, 
Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, and Yao Wen-yiian-were purged and put under 
house arrest in October 1976. In July 1977, Teng was finally restored 
to the party-government posts he had lost. 
THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION AND THE 
NORMALIZATION DECISION 
As a presidential candidate, Carter pledged to honor the commitment 
to Taiwan. After entering office, President Carter endorsed the Shang-
hai Communique and stated that normalization was the goal of U.S. 
policy. However, normalization with the PRC was not among 
Carter's foreign policy priorities during his first year in office. The 
new administration was preoccupied with problems in the Middle 
East, SALT II negotiations, Africa, and the Panama Canal Treaties. 
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In August 1977, Secretary of State Vance went to Beijing for explora-
tory talks on normalization with the PRC. Vance reportedly proposed 
to switch the U.S. embassy from Taipei to Beijing and the liaison office 
from Beijing to Taipei. Teng Hsiao-p'ing rejected Vance's suggestion 
and stated that Vance's visit was a step back from normalization 
(Karnow, 1979: 598). 
Two major events in the spring of 1978 changed the prospect of 
Sino-American normalization. U.S.-Soviet relations deteriorated in 
1977 because of Carter's human rights policy toward the Soviet Union 
and his administration's concern over the buildup of conventional 
forces by the Soviet Union. The United States was further disturbed 
by Soviet and Cuban military activities in Africa and the growth of 
Soviet military power in the spring of 1978. In June, President Carter 
challenged the Soviets to "choose either confrontation or 
cooperation." 
Meanwhile, the Senate approved the Panama Canal Treaties, and 
this victory strengthened Carter's confidence in dealing with Congress. 
Passage of the Panama Canal Treaties freed Carter to deal with the 
normalization issue. 
It was within these international and domestic contexts that 
Brzezinski, the leading advocate of a hard-line approach toward the 
Soviet Union, was scheduled in May 1978 to visit the PRC. Brzezin-
ski told Teng that "the President has made up his mind to normalize 
relations with the PRC" (Brzezinski, 1983:208, 214). 
Negotiation between the two governments was lifted to a new 
level on 19 September, when Carter met with Chinese Liaison Office 
Chief, Chai Tse-min, at the White House. The U.S. conditions for 
normalization with the PRC set by President Carter were: 
1. unofficial American presence m Taiwan after 
normalization, 
2. the continuation of American commercial, cultural, and 
other relations with Taiwan, 
3. selected defensive arms sales to Taiwan after 
normalization, 
4. a public U.S. statement expressing hope for a peaceful 
solution to the Taiwan problem, and 
5. termination of the defense treaty with Taiwan in accord-
ance with the terms of the treaty, which provided for 
termination upon one year's notice by either party.3 
3. U.S. Department of State, "Diplomatic Relations with the People's Republic of 
China and Future Relations with Taiwan," News Release (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of 
Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication, December 1978), p. 2. 
39 
In early November 1978, Ambassador Woodcock gave Huang 
Hua a draft of the joint normalization communique (Brzezinski, 
1983:230). In late November, President Carter suggested a target date 
of 1 January 1979 for normalization (Carter, 1982:197). Carter ex-
tended an invitation to either Teng or Hua to visit Washington in Jan-
uary. The invitation was accepted by Teng, who met with 
Ambassador Woodcock on 13 December. 
Negotiations between the United States and the PRC were held 
secretly and participants were limited to the Carter administration's 
inner cabinet: Vance, Brzezinski, Brown, and Jordan (Brzezinski, 
1983:224). They were supported by Richard Holbrooke, assistant sec-
retary of state for East Asia, and Michel Oksenberg, a Michigan Uni-
versity professor on the National Security Council staff. Brzezinski 
was the dominant force in wrapping up the agreement for President 
Carter (Brzezinski, 1983 :233). Since mid-August 1978, Brzezinski 
had met many times with Ambassador Chai Tse-min to discuss nor-
malization (Brzezinski, 1983:226). 
Ambassador Woodcock revealed in an interview that during the 
meeting with Teng on 13 December 1978, Teng told him that, instead 
of the PRC's prior insistence that the United States abrogate its De-
fense Treaty with Taiwan, the PRC now acquiesces to its termination 
in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty calling for one year's 
notice prior to termination. Teng then asked that while the Treaty is 
still in force, would the United States agree not to make any new com-
mitments meanwhile to sell arms to Taiwan? The United States 
agreed on a one-year moratorium not to make any new commitment 
of arms sales to Taiwan.4 
Despite this seeming understanding, the White House still har-
bored the intention to sell certain carefully selected defensive weapons 
to Taiwan after the moratorium and Treaty termination. Accord-
ingly, two days after the Woodcock-Teng meetings, Woodcock re-
ceived a White House cable asking him to make certain that the PRC 
clearly understood Washington's position on this matter. Although 
Ambassador Woodcock preferred to forego such clarification, he met 
with Teng again to explain the U.S. position. Teng, according to 
Woodcock, was furious and stated that the United States knew that 
the PRC would never agree with Washington's intention. Neverthe-
less, Teng said that to complete the normalization process was the first 
4. Interview with Ambassador Leonard Woodcock, U.S. Representative of the Liai-
son Office in Beijing, 1977-1978, and U.S. Ambassador to the PRC, 1979-1981. July 29, 
1985. Ann Arbor, Michigan. 
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priority. 5 
For two days intensive negotiations took place in both Beijing 
and Washington on the issue of arms sales to Taiwan, and on the set-
tling of remaining details. A normalization agreement was concluded 
and announced on 15 December (Brzezinski, 1983:230-31 ). 6 
The Carter administration informed congressional leaders only 
hours prior to the formal normalization announcement, which oc-
curred during a congressional recess. Thus, an effective and timely 
congressional opposition movement was successfully precluded by the 
Carter administration. In July 1978, the U.S. Senate had passed an 
amendment to the International Security Assistance Act by a unani-
mous 94-0 roll call vote that called on the president to consult with the 
Senate before taking any action to terminate the 1954 Defense Treaty 
with the Republic of China (Gayner, 1979:334). This Dole-Stone 
amendment was later approved in a House-Senate conference commit-
tee, making it a resolution of the full Congress. However, Congress 
was not consulted in the normalization agreement. 
Questions arose concerning the sudden rush for normalization, 
and the timing, terms, and the manner in which President Carter han-
dled the China decision: 
1. Kissinger commented two days after the normalization 
announcement that the normalization process could 
have been consummated several years earlier had the 
Republican administration been willing to accept the 
terms Carter accepted. Why did the Carter administra-
tion find the PRC's three demands acceptable without a 
5. Ibid. 
6. It should be noted that there was a clear discrepancy between the word used in the 
English text and the Chinese text of the normalization communique, that is Chengren and 
renshihdao. Professor Michel Oksenberg claimed in an interview with a Japanese Professor 
Shigeru Usami that this discrepancy was inaccurate. "First of all, the negotiation was con-
ducted in English and the sense of meaning was established by the English language. Sec-
ondly, we noted the alternation in Chinese. The U.S. had asked the Chinese whether this 
change is stylistic or substantive in its meaning. The Chinese said that it is a stylistic 
change and adds no change in its meaning and the English remains the same. This conver-
sation was carried out by Stapleton Roy with the Chinese counterpart. In addition one can 
check on normalization agreements reached by a number of other countries and the phrase, 
chengren and renshihdao and one other phrase I do not remember was used variously in 
different normalization agreements and the translations were not totally consistent. In 
other words, I am confident that this is insignificant change and that those who sought to 
cast aspersions on the negotiating process were searching for rocks to throw," Oksenberg 
explained. Oksenberg was a staff member of the NSC, 1977-1980. Translated from The 
Asia Quarterly (Japan), 15, no. 4 (April 1985):70. 
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firm commitment from the PRC not to use military 
force to reunite Taiwan with mainland China? 
2. Why did the Carter administration press the PRC to ac-
cept selected arms sales to Taiwan after normalization? 
3. Did public opinion and Congressional support for the 
U.S.-PRC normalization increase to the extent that the 
administration was confident it could withstand domes-
tic opposition? 
4. Did the final phase of the normalization process occur 
because the U.S. played the China card, or the PRC 
played the American card, against the USSR? 
5. What impact did international events (1969 Sino-Soviet 
border incidents, U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, 
U.S.-Soviet detente, the fall of South Vietnam, SALT I 
and SALT II negotiations, Camp David Accords, So-
viet-Vietnam Friendship Treaty, Sino-Japanese Friend-
ship Treaty and the U.S.-Panama Canal Treaties) and 
domestic events (U.S. 1972, 1976, 1980 presidential elec-
tions, Watergate, deaths of Mao and Chou, "Moderniza-
tion Programs," U.S. trade deficits) have on the process 
of normalization of relations between the U.S. and the 
PRC from 1969-1978? 
6. Why was Congress not consulted by the Carter adminis-
tration regarding Carter's decision to terminate unilater-
ally diplomatic relations and the Mutual Defense Treaty 
with the Republic of China? 
THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL NATURE OF THE 
NORMALIZATION DECISION 
Before analyzing the timing and terms of the U.S.-PRC normalization 
decision, it is important to understand the meaning of normalization 
itself. Normalization of relations between the United States and the 
PRC involved two important issues: mutual recognition of each 
other's state and government, and inauguration of diplomatic rela-
tions. Granting of recognition and acknowledgment of diplomatic re-
lations do not necessarily go hand in hand. For example, the United 
States recognizes the government of Fidel Castro as the government of 
Cuba but does not maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba. 
Recognition means "a formal acknowledgment or declaration by 
the government of an existing state that it intends to attach certain 
customary legal consequences to an existing set of facts which, in its 
view, justify it (and other states) in doing so" (Kaplan and Katzen-
bach, 1961:109). Normally the question of recognition of a foreign 
42 
government does not arise unless the change of government occurred 
through extraconstitutional means. The change of government of 
China in 1949 did not occur in accordance with the domestic law of 
China. The Communist government of the PRC came to power 
through revolution rather than through free elections, and therefore 
raised the question of recognition of the new government and the state 
of the PRC. 
During the Truman administration, recognition of a new govern-
ment that seized power through extraconstitutional means was nor-
mally delayed in order to determine if the new government controlled 
the territory of the state and was willing to honor its international 
obligations. If the new government satisfied these criteria, the United 
States usually extended recognition within a month (Galloway, 
1978:36). 
Recognition of the Communist government of the PRC was one 
of the most controversial cases faced by the Truman administration. 
President Truman refused to recognize Mao's government on several 
grounds. First, the Chinese Communists had not completed their con-
quest of the entire country, because the Nationalist government re-
mained in control of Taiwan. Second, from the viewpoint of the 
American government, the government did not represent the substan-
tially declared will of the Chinese people. Third, the Communist gov-
ernment was not willing to honor its international obligations. 
Fourth, as a sovereign state the United States was free to withhold 
recognition from a government hostile to it (Whiteman, 1963:90-110). 
Recognition policy under Eisenhower was dominated by two 
main concerns: (1) the new government should be in effective control 
of the state; and (2) the new government should be anti-communist. 
The new government's willingness to honor international obligations 
was still a matter of inquiry by the Eisenhower administration, but in 
most cases this was only pro forma (Galloway, 1978:39). The Eisen-
hower administration supported the view that recognition should be 
looked on as "an instrument of national policy." According to the 
State Department, recognition was "a privilege and not a right" (Bar-
nett, 1961 :431 ). Dulles believed that "there is nothing automatic 
about it" (Barnett, 1961:543, note 4). The nonrecognition policy of 
the PRC continued throughout the Eisenhower years. 
The U.S. recognition policy changed under the Kennedy adminis-
tration. President Kennedy used recognition to promote constitu-
tional government, especially in Latin America. President Johnson 
took a more pragmatic view of coups d'etat. On 3 April 1964, Dean 
Rusk stated that the United States would support constitutional rule 
in Latin America, but would not "simply walk away" from states that 
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were under military rule. 7 Numerous coups d'etat occurred in Africa 
during the Johnson administration. The United States usually re-
sumed relations with whatever regime was in power. 
In 1969, the Senate passed Resolution 205 which indicated that 
recognition of a foreign government did not necessarily imply U.S. ap-
proval of the form, ideology, or policy of that foreign government.8 
This resolution did not, however, mention the criteria that should be 
used for recognition. 
During the presidencies of Nixon and Ford, the United States 
tended to resume relations with whatever regime was in control of the 
government and deemphasized the entire recognition process if vital 
U.S. national interests were not at stake. Recognition was withheld 
whenever the United States suffered significant setbacks because of the 
overthrow of the old governments. The most notable cases were the 
fall of South Vietnam and Cambodia in 1975 and the civil war in An-
gola in 1975-1976 (Galloway, 1978:103). 
In summary, the practice of U.S. recognition policy has been 
complex and inconsistent. Criteria used for recognition varied from 
one administration to another. 
It is within this historical context that the normalization of rela-
tions between the United States and the PRC is examined. 
After the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the Truman adminis-
tration took a "wait-and-see" position toward recognition of the new 
Chinese regime. In the Truman years, the U.S. recognition policy to-
ward a new government that achieved power through extraconstitu-
tional means was best illustrated by Dean Acheson's 1949 speech to 
the Pan American Society: 
Our policy with respect to recognizing new governments in 
· Latin America is not inconsistent with our encouragement of 
democracy. We maintain diplomatic relations with other 
countries primarily because we are all on the same planet 
and must do business with each other .... When a freely 
elected government is overthrown and a new and perhaps 
militaristic government takes over, we do not need to recog-
nize the new government automatically and immediately. 
We can wait to see if it really controls its territory and in-
tends to live up to its international commitments. We can 
consult with other governments, as we have often done. But 
7. U.S. Department of State, "News Conference of April 3, 1964 by Secretary Rusk," 
Bulletin, volume 50 (20 April 1964), p. 610, quoted from Galloway (1978:74, note 3). 
8. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Special Report 91-338, 
91 st Congress, I st session, 1969. 
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if and when we do recognize a government under these cir-
cumstances, our act of recognition need not be taken to im-
ply approval of it or its policy.9 
Had the PRC met the condition of honoring its international obli-
gations, the Truman administration would likely have recognized the 
PRC is order to encourage "Titoism" in China. The outbreak of the 
Korean War made President Truman believe that communism was 
monolithic. The U.S. Seventh Fleet was dispatched to neutralize the 
Taiwan Strait. President Truman did not want to see Taiwan fall to 
the PRC in part because this would have released more Chinese Com-
munist troops to aid the North Koreans. Recognition of the PRC was 
out of the question after Beijing entered the Korean War. Throughout 
the 1950s, nonrecognition of the PRC was used mainly as a political 
weapon ostensibly to halt the spread of communism. America's per-
ception of monolithic communism changed in the next decade (viz .. , 
the Sino-Soviet split), which finally led President Nixon to reconsider 
American nonrecognition policy toward the PRC in the late 1960s. 
Neither President Nixon's 1972 trip to China, nor the establish-
ment of the liaison offices, immediately led to recognition of Beijing. 
It took nearly seven years after Nixon's China trip in 1972 to conclude 
the process of normalization of relations between Washington and Bei-
jing. In the 1970s, the importance of recognition as a political tool to 
advance national interests was downplayed. With few exceptions, the 
United States was more concerned with continuing relations with the 
government currently in effective control than with its nature. One 
may wonder, then, why the United States took such a long time to 
extend recognition and establish diplomatic relations with the PRC. 
Why did not President Nixon recognize the PRC while he was in Bei-
jing in 1972 as Japan did in September of that year? What national 
interests were at stake when considering recognition of the PRC? 
From one perspective, U.S. recognition of the PRC was more a 
political question than a legal issue. Unlike crisis decision making, the 
recognition decision had few time constraints; the United States could 
choose the timing and terms. Conversely, PRC recognition of the U.S. 
may also be viewed as a political question. The PRC could also 
choose the best timing and terms to normalize relations with the 
United States. Although both perspectives may be considered equally 
important, logistical concerns and research constraints compel that 
the U.S. perspective be emphasized here. How well and to what extent 
9. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Historical Office, U.S. Policy 
Toward Latin America: Recognition and Nonrecognition of Governments and Interruptions 
in Diplomatic Relations, 1933-1974 (June 1975), p. 48, quoted from Galloway (1978:35-36). 
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the rational actor model explains the process of normalization of rela-
tions between the U.S. and the PRC from 1969 to 1978 is the focus of 
chapter 3. 
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PART2 
THE EFFICACY OF DECISION-MAKING MODELS 

3 
THE RATIONAL ACfOR MODEL 
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
The rational actor model assumes that decision making is a process of 
means-ends calculation. The nation as a rational, purposeful, and uni-
tary decision maker will select the action, among alternatives, that will 
maximize goals and national interests. 
Graham Allison believes that the rational actor model is the 
model most frequently used by analysts to explain foreign policy (Al-
lison, 1971: 10-13). Traditional foreign policy analysts use national in-
terests as the prime motivating factor for state interactions. Studies by 
Lasswell (1965), Morgenthau (1951), Palmer (1952), and Osgood 
(1953) contend that nations always behave rationally in their pursuit 
of wealth, power, prestige, territorial gains, and the like, under the veil 
of national interest. States are treated as the sole actors of interna-
tional politics. Foreign policy can be explained by recounting the aims 
and calculations of nations or governments. According to Downs 
(1951, 1967), a rational decision maker is one who seeks the most effi-
cient means to get what he wants. To Allison (1971), rationality refers 
to "consistent, value-maximizing choice within specified constraints" 
(Allison, 1971 :30). Action is chosen in response to the strategic prob-
lem the nation faces. The components of a rational choice model 
include: 
1. Goals and objectives. National security and national in-
terests are the principal categories in which strategic 
goals are conceived; 
2. Options. Various courses of action relevant to a strate-
gic problem provide the spectrum of options; 
3. Consequences. Enactment of each alternative course of 
action will produce a series of consequences. The rele-
vant consequences constitute benefits and costs in terms 
of strategic goals and objectives; 
4. Choice. Rational choice is value-maximizing. The ra-
tional agent selects the alternative whose consequences 
49 
rank highest in terms of his goals and objectives (Al-
lison, 1971:33). 
In real world politics, however, this "ideal" process of decision 
making falls short of its aims. Criticisms of this rational actor ap-
proach to decision-making analysis began to emerge in the early 
1960s. The main criticisms are (1) it is not possible to collect "perfect 
information," needed to identify alternatives and compare the conse-
quences of each alternative to the goals being sought; (2) it is not al-
ways possible to order conflicting values and goals of foreign policy. 
After identifying a problem, the decision maker is assumed to be able 
to order his or her values and goals. Yet, most foreign policy decisions 
involve a range of often conflicting values and goals; (3) governments 
are not monoliths. The rational actor model regards the state as the 
prime actor in international politics. But some challengers to this 
model believe that political action is undertaken by concrete human 
beings and that the decision-making process consists of spheres of 
competence, communication and information, and motivations. For-
eign policy emerges from the normal political process of bargaining, 
compromising, favor trading, and so on. 
In brief, the "state-as-the-sole-rational-actor" approach to analyz-
ing foreign policy decision making is no longer adequate. The rational 
actor model, however, is only a simplification of the decision-making 
process. The model, despite its limitations, may still be considered a 
useful tool to understand the making of foreign policy. Keeping in 
mind its limitations, the Sino-American normalization decision is ana-
lyzed in terms of the major components of this model. 
RECONSTRUCfiON OF U.S. CALCULATIONS 
In order to understand the timing and terms of the normalization deci-
sion, it is important to first examine American goals and objectives. 
Some pre-1978 speculations and concerns in the United States would 
prove ill-founded, but nevertheless merit analysis in the context of the 
rational choice model. Utilization of this model for explanatory pur-
poses, moreover, requires review of scholarship and analyses of the 
major options presumably considered by the main actors at the time. 
Goals and Objectives 
On the issue of normalization of relations with the PRC, the United 
States had three sets of goals and objectives: strategic, economic, and 
moral. 
Strategic. The first set of considerations concerned U.S. strategic in-
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terests. Normalization was likely to ease tensions and hostile feelings 
between the United States and the PRC, thus reducing the dangers of 
another military confrontation with the PRC, which represents nearly 
one-quarter of the world population. 
International politics had changed since 1950. The Soviet Union 
had risen to a position of global power. A shift in the nuclear balance 
between the United States and the Soviet Union occurred in the direc-
tion of parity. China itself had developed a nuclear capability. Ten-
sions that had developed between Moscow and Beijing since the late 
1950s led to an open break on the Sino-Soviet border by the spring of 
1969. China became a fully independent actor in world affairs. 
By the end of the 1960s, the United States realized that it could 
no longer afford to act as the world's policeman. The Nixon Doctrine 
in 1969 attempted to reduce America's international presence and gen-
eral overseas obligations in light of changed world conditions. The 
United States declared its intention to lead the world away from an 
"era of confrontation" into an "era of negotiation." 
From a rational actor model perspective, the world scene of the 
1970s had become politically multipolar and militarily bipolar. A 
multipolar world was assumed to be safer than a bipolar one. The end 
of bipolarity meant the end of the zero-sum game wherein a gain for 
one bloc is automatically regarded as a loss for the other. America's 
massive global involvement could be reduced under the multipolar in-
ternational system. The United States tried to bring China into this 
new structure; an accommodation with the PRC could enhance Amer-
ican strategic capability to counter Soviet influence and power. Nor-
malization of relations with Beijing could strengthen a stable balance 
of power in East Asia that would help prevent domination of the re-
gion by international "hegemony"-a euphemism denoting the Soviet 
Union. Improved relations between Washington and Beijing could 
also help prevent dangerous miscalculations by the emerging nuclear 
power in China. Beijing could also cooperate with the United States in 
settling such sensitive international problems as arms control and the 
military confrontation in Vietnam and Korea. There were, however, 
potential risks involved. If the United States accepted Beijing's three 
demands for normalization, American strategic interests, particularly 
in Taiwan, might be damaged. In the 1950s, Taiwan remained a key 
strategic base in the effort to contain the expansion of Chinese Com-
munism. In the late 1960s, the United States' perception of the strate-
gic importance of Taiwan altered as a result of changes in U.S. 
perceptions toward the PRC. Neither containment nor the "roll-
back" policy toward Beijing was compatible with changes that had 
taken place in the world over the past two decades. As tensions be-
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tween Washington and Beijing eased, Taiwan's strategic importance as 
a link in the chain of alliances designed to check the expansion of Bei-
jing's influence in Asia declined. Taiwan's importance as a logistics 
and communications center in support of U.S. military operations in 
Asia during the war in Vietnam was considerable. But as the United 
States attempted to reduce its involvement in Vietnam in the late 
1960s, the island of Taiwan gradually lost its strategic value to the 
United States. 
In the 1970s, the United States' principal security concerns in 
Northeast Asia centered around the gradual buildup of Soviet military 
power in Asia and the Pacific, and the danger of conflict in the Korean 
peninsula. In Southeast Asia, the United States was concerned about 
obtaining "peace with honor" in Indochina in the early 1970s. While 
U.S. bases on Taiwan could be useful for logistic support and refueling 
purposes in times of war, Taiwan was certainly less significant strategi-
cally than a closer U.S.-PRC relationship in terms of a successful de-
fense of Soviet ambitions in Asia and military withdrawal from South 
Vietnam. 
Although Taiwan was now less important strategically to the 
United States, a nonpeaceful resolution of the Taiwan question could 
threaten the peace and security balance of the western pacific area. 
Termination of the U.S. defense treaty with Taiwan could also call 
into question U.S. willingness to stand by its defense commitments 
elsewhere in Asia. An armed attack on Taiwan by the PRC after nor-
malization of relations with the United States would have an adverse 
impact on South Korea and on the noncommunist states in Asia. U.S. 
credibility and reliability could be severely damaged if the United 
States failed to respond firmly to such an attack. American with-
drawal from Taiwan could also be interpreted as presaging a broader 
American withdrawal from Asia, and therefore a changed balance-of-
power situation in Asia. 
Two potential benefits emerged from Sino-American normaliza-
tion vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. First, the establishment of U.S.-PRC 
diplomatic relations would help increase U.S. leverage against the So-
viet Union. Fears of Sino-American collusion might provide Moscow 
with an incentive to compromise with the United States on such im-
portant issues as SALT and disarmament in Europe. Second, normali-
zation with China might reduce the chances of Sino-Soviet 
rapprochement. Continuing Sino-Soviet hostility implied the continu-
ation of Soviet military stations on the Sino-Soviet border. In the 
1970s, the Soviet Union had deployed about 20-25 percent of its 
ground forces along the Sino-Soviet border and up to one-third of its 
naval forces in Pacific waters (Wang, 1981 :651 ). It was believed that 
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every Soviet division on the Sino-Soviet border was one less division 
facing NATO (Chyba, 1981:471). 
On the other hand, normalization with the PRC could risk the 
worsening of American-Soviet relations if Moscow perceived Sino-
American normalization as Washington's playing the "China card" 
against the Soviet Union. Should Washington fail to handle the sensi-
tive triangular relations properly, the Soviet Union might interpret 
Sino-American normalization as America's siding with Beijing against 
Moscow. Attainment of any agreements relating to SALT and other 
vital issues might be more difficult if not impossible. The Soviet Union 
might also retaliate against Sino-American collusion with a massive 
military buildup or with the formation of its own "second front" to 
China, such as allying with Vietnam, the PRC's enemy, or against 
Cambodia, the PRC's friend. Soviet formation of an anti-Chinese and 
an anti-American alliance with other Asian nations might destabilize 
the balance of power in Asia. The Soviet Union and the United States 
might reenter a cold war environment. 
If Taiwan were abandoned by the United States, the government 
in Taiwan might consider a Soviet option because of fears of invasion 
from the PRC. Were the Soviet Union to gain access to Taiwanese 
ports of Keelung and Kaoshiung, China would be encircled by Mos-
cow from Vladivostok and Soviet-aligned Vietnam to the south and 
Mongolia to the north (Kintner and Copper, 1979:13, note 8). 1 This 
possible scenario would definitely be against American strategic inter-
ests in Asia. 
In brief, American strategic goals and objectives concerning nor-
malization of relations with the PRC can be grouped into the follow-
ing categories: 
1. Maximize American diplomatic leverage vis-a-vis the 
Soviet Union and minimize Soviet suspicion of Sino-
American collusion against Moscow; 
2. Improve Sino-American bilateral relations without en-
dangering the security of Taiwan; 
3. Work out a solution that could satisfy Beijing's demands 
and minimize the damage to American credibility as a 
trustworthy ally in Asia as well as in other parts of the 
world. 
I. During his May 1978 trip to China, Brzezinski had pointed out to Teng Hsiao-
p'ing the danger that an insecure Taiwan, after normalization, might turn to the Soviet 
Union. Teng responded that "the Chinese had thought about this possibility, but since the 
United States would maintain economic relations with Taiwan, this would be less a prob-
lem (Brzezinski, 1983:218). 
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Economic. Economic factors were less important than strategic 
dimensions in determining America's efforts to achieve normalization 
of relations with the PRC. Nevertheless, an expanding economic rela-
tionship with the PRC, with a potential one billion customers, could 
be a powerful incentive. 
Potential economic gains following Sino-American normalization 
would include an increase in U.S.-PRC trade. China's foreign trade 
has often been influenced by economic factors. Japan's trade with the 
PRC jumped 63 percent in 1974 in response to Japan's decision to 
normalize relations with the PRC under Beijing's terms in 1972.2 
Sino-West German trade rose 73 percent in 1973, one year after the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC.3 Sino-American 
trade also increased sharply the first two years after Nixon's China 
trip. On the other hand, foreign trade could decline sharply following 
the deterioration of political relations. Sino-American trade dropped 
significantly in 1975 and 1976 when the PRC was upset with the lack 
of progress toward normalization and with Soviet-American detente 
relations. Sino-Soviet trade also dropped sharply in the 1960s when 
hostility increased between Moscow and Beijing. 
On 23 October 1977, Teng Hsiao-p'ing vividly explained the ma-
jor limitation to Sino-American trade before full diplomatic relations: 
Our relations with the U.S., compared to those with 
Britain and Europe, are limited because there is a political 
limitation. The reason for this is that Sino-American rela-
tions have not yet been normalized. There is a great differ-
ence between having and not having normalization. 
Certainly, we could have exchanges now, but there are lim-
its. For example, should we want to buy something abroad, 
we would prefer to do business with countries with which we 
maintain normal diplomatic relations; even if the price is 
higher. Such is the case with the United States. For exam-
ple, we once wanted to import computers from the United 
States. Your businessmen were interested in the deal but 
your government did not approve it. It does not matter that 
you do not sell these things to us; we will not die. The prob-
lem is whether relations have been normalized-it makes a 
2. Quoted from prepared statement of Dwight H. Perkins in U.S. Congress, House 
Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Nor-
malization of Relations with the PRC: Practical Implications hearings, 95th Congress, 1st 
session, September 20, 21, 28, 29; October II and 13, 1977, p. 289. 
3. Ibid. 
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great difference. 4 
The United States was treated by the Chinese as a residual sup-
plier of agricultural products from the beginning of Sino-American 
trade in the early 1970s. Grain imports from the United States in-
creased in 1973 and 1974 because of a poor Chinese harvest in 1972. 
When China's grain harvests improved, the PRC canceled contracts 
with U.S. suppliers while maintaining contracts with Canada and Aus-
tralia, countries that had diplomatic relations with Beijing. Unless 
U.S. products had been clearly superior as, for example, Boeing pas-
senger aircraft, and ammonia products, the Chinese would rather buy 
from other countries, presumably in an effort to increase pressure on 
the United States to normalize relations. 5 This evidence suggested 
that normalization was likely to lead to increased Sino-American 
trade. 
Normalization, however, was not likely to change Sino-American 
trade dramatically, because of China's self-reliance economic policy 
and its shortage of foreign exchanges to pay for imports. The "vast 
China market" proved to be exaggerated. Sino-American trade did 
not play an important role in the economy of either country. Trade 
with China is not likely to exceed one or two percent of total U.S. 
foreign trade in the near future (Barnett, 1977:36). 
Another economic consideration was the potential impact of 
U.S.-PRC normalization on U.S.-Taiwan economic relations. If the 
United States normalized relations with the PRC under Beijing's 
terms, U.S.-Taiwan trade might be adversely affected. 
Taiwan has been one of the world's best performers in economic 
growth. From 1955 to 1975, Taiwan's gross domestic product (GDP) 
grew at an average rate of eight percent.6 U.S. economic aid to Tai-
wan from 1950 to 1965 contributed a great deal to the successful 
growth of Taiwan's economy. The end of U.S. economic aid in 1965, 
however, did not stop its rapid and sustained economic growth and the 
growth of exports and imports. 
From 1952 to 1968, Taiwan's exports jumped from $111 million 
to $842 million, a compound growth rate of 11.1 percent (Koo, 
1973:418). Total Taiwan imports from the United States grew from 
$98 million in 1954 to $2,347 million in 1978. Taiwan exports to the 
4. Translated from "Teng Hsiao-p'ing's Talks with Charles Yost," The Seventies 
(Hong Kong) 98 (March 1978):20-21. 
5. Prepared statement of Dwight Perkins, U.S. Congress, Normalization with the 
PRC: Practical Implications, p. 288. 
6. lbid:287. 
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United States in the same period increased from $5 million to $5,010 
million (Chang, 1981:604). 
After 1966, the United States replaced Japan as Taiwan's top 
trading partner, to the extent that by 1977 the United States was tak-
ing 40 percent of Taiwan's exports (Far Eastern Economic Review, 
1978 :318). American private investment, moreover, amounted to 
$566.13 million by the end of 1978, which represented more than 25 
percent of all foreign investment in Taiwan (Chang, 1981:604). Tai-
wan was the Export-Import Bank's second largest customer after Bra-
zil, with loans and guarantees outstanding in the amount of more than 
$1.8 billion in 1978.7 Ranking twelfth among America's largest trad-
ing partners in 1976, Taiwan's two-way trade with the United States 
amounted to $4.8 billion, while the PRC's two-way trade with the 
United States was only $337 million in 1967.8 
Continuing economic stability, was crucial to insuring political 
viability in Taiwan. There was apprehension, therefore, that termina-
tion of the U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan might seriously 
disrupt economic stability on the island and that foreign investors 
might pull their investments out of Taiwan. It was feared, too, that 
U.S. economic losses would be considerable if Taiwan were to become 
one province under the control of the PRC. In Taiwan, U.S. business-
men could own 100 percent of their equity, whereas such freedom in 
the PRC was out of the question. The trend whereby U.S.-Taiwan 
trade each year exceeded several times the annual U.S.-PRC trade was 
likely to continue in the foreseeable future were there no serious secur-
ity doubts about Taiwan's stability. 
Moral. Morality is seldom mentioned as an ingredient in foreign pol-
icy goals. This omission does not, however, imply that foreign policy 
makers totally ignore ethics while making decisions. On the contrary, 
some policy makers, such as presidents Woodrow Wilson and Jimmy 
Carter, strongly emphasized morality in foreign relations. President 
Carter in 1977 declared that "human rights is the soul of American 
foreign policy." 
The keeping of promises, respect for international law, repudia-
tion of war as an instrument of national policy, protection of human 
7. U.S. Congress, Senate, Taiwan Enabling Act, Report of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, United States Senate, Together with Additional Views on S. 245. l March 1979, 
p. 22. 
8. Prepared statement of Marin us Van Gessel, President, American Chamber of Com-
merce in the Republic of China in U.S. Congress, Normalization of Relations with the PRC, 
p. 260. 
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rights, and fair dealings are some ethical precepts most often discussed 
by writers in international politics (Morganthau, 1978:236). 
Relating to the question of Sino-American normalization of rela-
tions, some moral restraints on the United States existed in making the 
normalization decision. The central problem was when and how to 
sever its relationship with Taiwan, a country that had been friendly for 
several decades. Taiwan had been a loyal friend to the United States 
since 1950; unilateral termination of the defense treaty and diplomatic 
relations with the United States might subject the 18 million people in 
a free society to political and economic harassment and possible mili-
tary attack from the PRC. If the United States severed diplomatic and 
military relations with Taiwan-not because of any perfidy by this 
small country, but only because the very nation the United States in-
tended to protect that country against demanded it-the whole world 
would question U.S. credibility as an ally. 9 
As it moved toward normalization of relations with China, the 
United States certainly wanted to avoid the charge of selling out Tai-
wan in exchange for its own political and strategic benefits. On the 
other hand, normalization between Washington and Beijing could be 
rationalized and encouraged in terms of another level of moral consid-
eration, that is, peace versus war. Normalization could ease tensions 
and hostility with a country having nearly one billion people, and thus 
reduce chances of a war between two nuclear powers. 
How to work out a solution to normalize relations with the PRC 
without endangering Taiwan's security was the main moral concern in 
the normalization decision for the United States. 
Options 
After identifying the goals and objectives of the normalization issue, a 
rational decision maker would then search various options and ex-
amine consequences of each alternative. A variety of options for nor-
malization were discussed widely in the United States before 
December 1978. 10 They can be briefly categorized in five formulas. 
The Japanese Formula. The United States would accept Beijing's 
three demands for normalization and set up "unofficial" offices in 
Taipei and Washington to conduct cultural and economic relations 
with Taiwan after normalization of relations with the PRC. 
9. See Senator William Roth, Jr., statements in congressional hearings on 13 October 
1977, U.S. Congress, Normalization of Relations with the PRC, pp. 341-51. 
10. See testimony of Donald Zagoria, 28 September 1977, U.S. Congress, Normaliza-
tion of Relations with the PRC, pp. 2-12. 
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On 29 September 1972, Japan accepted Beijing's three demands 
for normalization: (1) recognition of the PRC as the sole legitimate 
government of China, (2) acceptance of Taiwan as an integral part of 
China, and (3) abrogation of the "illegal" Taiwan-Japan Peace Treaty. 
On the question of Taiwan, Japan noted that it "fully understood" and 
respected Beijing's stand that Taiwan constituted an inalienable part 
of the PRC's territory. In conformity with the third condition set 
forth by the PRC, Foreign Minister Ohira declared that Japan would 
henceforth regard its treaty with Taiwan as invalid. Japan also an-
nounced that a "liaison organ" would be established to maintain 
"trade and other private level relations" (Kyodo, 6 November 1972, 
from China Quarterly, 1973:201). 
The PRC began referring to the Japanese model as a basis for 
normalization between the United States and the PRC. The Japanese 
formula, preferred by Beijing, presented Washington with a dilemma. 
Taiwan's relations with the United States were far more important 
than with Japan. The United States had a defense treaty with the gov-
ernment in Taiwan and Japan had no security commitment to that 
island. Should the United States recognize the PRC as the sole legal 
government of China and withdraw recognition of the Republic of 
China government in Taiwan, the United States would be in a poor 
legal position to provide any military, political, or economic aid to 
strengthen Taiwan's security position. Acceding to Beijing's three de-
mands would also raise the question of legitimacy of the other 59 gov-
ernment-to-government treaties and executive agreements between the 
United States and the Republic of China, such as the Treaty of Friend-
ship, Commerce, and Navigation. Were Taiwan considered part of the 
PRC, a Communist country, Taiwan's most-favored-nation standing 
and access to Export-Import Bank loans and guarantees could also be 
jeopardized. 
Acceptance of Beijing's three conditions might be rewarded with 
Beijing's more cooperative attitude toward the United States with re-
spect to other world problems, such as arms limitation talks and U.S.-
PRC blocked assets problems. Termination of the defense treaty 
could also relieve the United States of the obligation of assisting Tai-
wan in case of war between Taipei and Beijing, thus obviating U.S. 
involvement in another Asian civil war. On the other hand, Taiwan's 
security position and American credibility might be damaged under 
the Japanese formula. 
Various compromise proposals were suggested to substitute for 
the defense treaty. Both the PRC and the United States had condi-
tions for normalization; final agreement could be reached only 
through mutual concessions by both sides. A number of U.S. China 
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experts suggested that the United States accept Beijing's three condi-
tions for normalization, but that the United States should add a formal 
declaration voicing strong opposition to the settlement of the Taiwan 
question by other than peaceful means and that the U.S. should con-
tinue arms sales to Taiwan after normalization. 11 A U.S. declara-
tion-issued either in the name of Congress or the president, or both 
jointly-would reassure Taiwan and other U.S. allies that the United 
States would not abandon its friend, Taiwan. Continued arms sales 
would thus minimize the cost of normalization. Should the PRC re-
fuse to accept these conditions, the United States could then choose 
other less specific words in the declaration, by not referring to Taiwan 
directly. For example, it could use "the Western Pacific along the rim 
of East Asia"-a general formula that would clearly include Taiwan 
without affronting the PRC directly. 12 The United States could also 
issue the declaration after normalization of relations with Beijing; thus 
the PRC would be less likely to break diplomatic ties with the United 
States over the Taiwan issue. 
The German Formula. Some American China experts suggested that 
the United States maintain embassies in both China and Taiwan just 
as the United States did in both West and East Germany. 13 The Ger-
man formula would bring U.S. diplomatic relations with the two parts 
of China in line with the reality of the two governments currently ex-
isting in China. The United States could also continue its defense 
commitment to Taiwan while recognizing Beijing as the ruler of main-
land China. 
This alternative was very attractive to many Americans because it 
would require no sacrifice of U.S.-Taiwan relations. In the Shanghai 
Communique, however, the PRC reiterated its opposition to the crea-
tion of "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," and 
"two Chinas." The German formula clearly contradicted Beijing's po-
sition. If the United States were to propose the German formula for 
normalization, Sino-American relations would probably deteriorate. 
The United States might also run the risk of a military confrontation 
with the PRC. The strategic benefit, then, which the United States 
enjoyed since Nixon's opening of China, might cease to exist. 
Independent Taiwan Formula. Congressman Lester L. Wolff recom-
ll. Testimony of A. Doak Barnett, 20 September 1977, U.S. Congress, Normalization 
of Relations with the PRC, pp. XVIII, 2-3. See also testimony of Donald Zagoria. Septem-
ber 28, 1977, p. XVII, 154-160. 
12. Ibid:XVII. 
13. See testimony of Ray Cline, 29 September 1977, in ibid:l94-209. 
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mended that the United States could encourage the Taiwan govern-
ment to conduct a plebiscite in Taiwan as a prelude to declaring 
Taiwan an independent country. 14 The United States would then 
maintain diplomatic relations with Taipei as the popularly approved 
government of Taiwan, while recognizing the PRC as the legal govern-
ment of China on the mainland. 
The difficulty with this option was that neither Beijing nor cur-
rent leaders in Taipei would accept an independent Taiwan. Unless 
under extreme circumstances, such as military attack from the PRC, 
the Nationalist government would most likely oppose the independent 
Taiwan option. The PRC would certainly oppose any movement lead-
ing toward the independence of Taiwan. An independent Taiwan 
formula, would most likely preclude any possibility of normalizing re-
lations with China. 
One China, But Not Now, Formula. Proponents of this option sug-
gested that the United States should recognize there is only one China 
and Taiwan is part of China. The United States would not encourage 
the independent Taiwan movement. Taiwan's status would be decided 
between Beijing and Taipei through peaceful means. Meanwhile, the 
United States should honor its defense commitment to safeguard the 
security of Taiwan and the Pescadores (Abramowitz and Moorsteen, 
1971:19). 
Under this formula, the United States could terminate the defense 
treaty with Taiwan if the PRC would agree to formally renounce the 
use of force against Taiwan and allow the United States to continue 
arms sales to Taiwan after normalization. 15 The United States could 
also refuse explicitly to acknowledge the PRC claim to Taiwan, there-
fore leaving open the possibility of maintaining semi-official relations 
with Taiwan, such as in the form of a consulate or a liaison office 
(Lindsay, 1977:7-8). From 1950 to 1972, Britain had a consular office 
in Taiwan headed by a charge d'affaires, while maintaining a diplo-
matic mission in Beijing. Proponents of this formula argued that nor-
malization would be conceivable only through mutual concessions in 
each other's terms. 
The "one China, but not now" formula would satisfy part of Bei-
jing's demands by recognizing the territorial integrity of China regard-
ing Taiwan. The presence of U.S. consular or liaison officers in 
Taiwan, and the continuation of arms sales to Taiwan after normaliza-
14. Remarks of Congressman Lester L. Wolff, 20 September 1977, in ibid:VIII,XIX. 
15. See testimony of Robert Sca1apino, 20 September 1977, U.S. Congress, Normaliza-
tion of Relations with the PRC, pp. 24-78. 
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tion, would greatly facilitate economic and military ties between the 
United States and Taiwan. U.S. credibility as Taiwan's ally could per-
dure should the PRC pledge not to use military force against Taiwan. 
U.S. refusal to endorse the Chinese legal claim over Taiwan could 
leave open the unification issue for Taipei and Beijing. The U.S. could 
also not be blamed for "abandoning" Taiwan, since it would be main-
taining quasi-diplomatic military ties with Taiwan. A major difficulty, 
however, was that the PRC might not be willing to accept this 
formula. Negotiations of terms for normalization might be long and 
hard. Nevertheless, the United States would never be able to find out 
Beijing's room for compromise unless the United States kept explor-
ing, in a sustained effort, Beijing's intentions. 
Status-quo Formula. Proponents of keeping Sino-American relations 
at a status-quo level-having a liaison office in Beijing and an embassy 
in Taipei-argued that what really brings nations together is the con-
gruence of their national interests. If the United States and the PRC 
had a basic common interest, such as being against Soviet hegemony, 
Sino-American relations would continue to expand with or without 
normalization. On the other hand, if mutual interests were not strong 
enough to bind the two nations together, full diplomatic relations 
would not be enough to guarantee cooperation. The history of the 
Sino-Soviet relationship provided an excellent example. The Soviet 
Union was Beijing's best friend in the early 1950s when Moscow and 
Beijing perceived parallel interests in cooperating with each other. 
The Soviet Union, however, had become Beijing's number one enemy, 
even with continued diplomatic ties. 
If Chinese fears of the Soviet threat were real and Chinese needs 
for Western computers, machinery, and oil equipment were great, 
closer cooperation between Beijing and Washington could proceed 
with or without full diplomatic relations. 
Normalization on Beijing's terms might increase trade with the 
United States, but this favor could be withdrawn at any time (Lindsay, 
1977:8). If the United States acceded to Chinese demands regarding 
Taiwan, and abandoned its defense commitment to that island, it 
could also make the Chinese doubt U.S. reliability as a partner to 
stand up to the threat of Soviet hegemony. 
The PRC perceived the United States as a temporary ally against 
the Soviet Union. This thought was vividly demonstrated in the polit-
ical report of then CCP Chairman Hua Kuo-feng to the 11th Party 
Congress on 12 August 1977, as quoted by Robert A. Scalapino: 
The more powerful enemy (read the USSR) can be van-
quished only by exerting the utmost effort, and most thor-
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oughly, carefully, attentively and skillfully making use 
without fail of every, even the smallest, "rift" among the ene-
mies (read the USSR and the U.S.), of every antagonism of 
interest, among the bourgeoisie of the various countries and 
among the various groups or types of bourgeoisie within the 
various countries (read United States, Japan, and West Eu-
rope), and also by taking advantage of every, even the small-
est, opportunity of gaining a mass ally, even though this ally 
be temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable and condi-
tional (read the U.S.). 16 
Hua further discussed the Chinese attitude toward the United 
States in terms of the following themes: 
Soviet-United States contention extends to every corner 
of the world, but its focus is still Europe. 
The Soviet Union and the United States are the source 
of a new world war, and Soviet social-imperialism in particu-
lar presents the greater danger. 
The two hegemonic powers, the Soviet Union and the 
United States, are the biggest international exploiters and op-
pressors of today and the common enemies of the people of 
the world. . . }7 
Within the context of this Chinese attitude toward the Sino-
American detente relationship, opponents of normalization strongly 
recommended that the United States conduct Sino-American relations 
at the quasi-diplomatic level without sacrificing U.S.-Taiwan relations. 
Some also suggested that the United States could further enhance 
Sino-American economic and political relations, in the absence of full 
diplomatic relations, by passing an amendment to the U.S. Export-
Import Bank Charter to allow U.S. exporters credit for ventures in the 
PRC, or to reduce tariffs on imported silk fabric, an important prod-
uct of PRC cottage industries. 18 Partial measures like these could help 
break new ground in Sino-American relations and yet maintain U.S. 
credibility. The United States could also approve sales of high tech-
nology related materials to China as a means to improve Sino-Ameri-
can relations without normalizing relations with the PRC. 
Proponents of normalization, however, strongly disagreed with 
this point of view. Some American China experts warned that the 
16. Quoted from prepared statement of Robert A. Scalapino in U.S. Congress, Normal-
ization of Relations with the PRC, p. 36. 
17. Ibid. 
18. Statement of Congressman Les AuCoin, II October 1977, in ibid:XIX-XX. 
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PRC was unlikely to wait indefinitely for the United States to establish 
full diplomatic relations with Beijing. Failing to move forward toward 
normalization could risk moving backward. 19 
Timing was another consideration for normalization. Timing and 
terms were closely linked. There was no good time to break relations 
with a good and loyal friend; however, it was believed that if the 
United States chose optimal timing and normalization terms, Taipei's 
pain could be minimized. 
The best timing for normalization negotiation was endlessly de-
bated. In the mid-1970s, there was a strong sense among some that 
the United States normalize relations with the PRC prior to Mao's 
death, lest the momentum and advantageous timing for negotiations 
on the Taiwan question be lost. This argument assumed that Mao was 
the chief architect of Sino-American rapprochement, and that the 
post-Mao leadership might turn toward the Soviet Union for better 
relations and hence be less willing to compromise on the Taiwan issue. 
Choosing an optimal timing for normalization was difficult for 
U.S. decision makers. Normalization was a noncrisis decision with 
minimal time constraints. China's Vice Premier Teng told George 
Bush, former U.S. envoy to the PRC, during his 1977 visit to China, 
that "if you need time on the Taiwan problem, you have it" (Moritz, 
1977:4). Teng also indicated to Cyrus Vance in October 1975 that the 
PRC would be prepared to wait five, ten, or one hundred years to 
acquire Taiwan. 20 Mao was quoted in 1957 as saying that if the 
United States does not recognize the PRC in 100 years, it will surely 
do so in 101 years.21 Nevertheless, normalization of relations with the 
PRC was a prime goal of U.S. foreign policy of the Nixon, Ford, and 
Carter administrations. 
First, it would be advantageous for the United States to negotiate 
the Taiwan question before a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. Fears of the 
Soviet threat and Soviet-American collusion at the time of high hostil-
ity between Moscow and Beijing might encourage the PRC to compro-
mise on the Taiwan question. Nixon's opening of China in 1972 and 
the establishment of liaison offices in 1973 were possible because 
China's concern over the Soviet Union outweighed its apprehensions 
19. See testimony of A. Doak Barnett and Allen Whiting on 20 September 1977, in 
ibid: 9, 16; see also prepared statement of Harry Harding Jr. on 18 November 1975 in U.S. 
Congress, House Committee on International Relations, U.S.-China Relations: The Process 
of Normalization of Relations hearings, 94th Congress:l5. 
20. Cited from prepared statement of Allen S. Whiting, U.S. Congress Normalization 
of Relations with the PRC, p. 16. 
21. Remarks 27 January 1957 in Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, vol. 5:363 (Peking, 
1977). 
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over U.S.-Taiwan relations. A PRC detente with the Soviet Union or 
an easing of Sino-Soviet tensions would mean the United States would 
no longer be needed to counteract the Soviet Union. Thus, there 
would be less reason for Beijing to make concessions on the issue of 
Taiwan. The United States would then have fewer "bargaining chips" 
on the negotiation table. In other words, it would be good timing to 
negotiate with the PRC on normalization terms while the United 
States still occupied a favorable position in the strategic "triangle." 
Second, the United States would be in a better bargaining position 
over the Taiwan issue when moderate leadership was in control of 
power in the PRC. Mao's policy toward the United States in the early 
1970s had met with significant opposition from radical groups in 
China, particularly among the military. If radical groups in China 
were to regain power, Sino-American detente relations would be sub-
ject to reassessment and might be in jeopardy. The PRC might 
toughen its demands on Taiwan and be more impatient to settle the 
Taiwan question peacefully. 
Third, the United States would be in a better position to normal-
ize relations with Beijing while Taiwan was still strong and stable in 
political, military, and economic terms, so that Taiwan could with-
stand the shock of American derecognition. Normalization would 
most likely involve concessions from Washington on U.S.-Taiwan re-
lations. Since the early 1970s, Taiwan survived withdrawals of mem-
bership from the United Nations and various other international 
organizations and derecognitions from many countries. Political and 
economic stability, however, might not last indefinitely, even with con-
tinuing U.S. recognition of the island. Taiwan's economic prosperity 
could easily be disrupted in case of world-wide inflation or recession. 
During the world-wide recession of 1974-1975, Taiwan's real growth 
plunged to 1.1 percent in 1974 from 13 percent in 1973, and reached 
only 3.1 percent in 1975.22 If the United States completed normaliza-
tion with the PRC when Taiwan was still stable and strong, the PRC 
would be less likely to attack Taiwan, thus minimizing risks of an im-
mediate war between Taipei and Beijing after normalization, which 
would have a severe impact on U.S. credibility. 
Fourth, the United States would be in a better position to down-
grade military ties with Taiwan when tension in the Asian area dimin-
ished. Taiwan's strategic importance, which depended upon the 
overall U.S. assessment of the balance of power in Asia, changed over-
night when the Korean War broke out in 1950. When tension in the 
22. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, '"Review of Relations with 
Taiwan," Current Policy No. 190, II June 1980:3. 
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Asian area diminished, as indicated in the Shanghai Communique, the 
United States would be more willing to withdraw its forces and mili-
tary installations from Taiwan. 
Fifth, the United States would have more leverage over Beijing on 
the issue of Taiwan when U.S.-Soviet relations were improved. Should 
the establishment of Sino-American diplomatic relations occur when 
U.S.-Soviet detente relations were firm, Soviet fears of Sino-American 
encirclement against Moscow would be minimized. The United States 
could then continue to occupy the most favorable position of the trian-
gular relationships after normalization, and let China and the Soviet 
Union compete against each other for improved relations with the 
United States. On the other hand, if normalization took place when 
U.S.-Soviet relations were strained, Washington's needs for Beijing 
would be more urgent, and the PRC would then be in a better position 
to bargain over the Taiwan question. 
It is within the context of U.S. options of terms and timing that 
we proceed to explain why the United States decided to normalize re-
lations with the PRC in late 1978 mainly on Beijing's terms. 
THE RATIONAL EXPLANATION 
Strategic Explanation 
There were three levels of strategic considerations in the normalization 
decision. At the global level, the main concern was to maximize the 
U.S. strategic position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. At the regional 
level, the United States would hope to enhance its diplomatic leverage 
by soliciting help from the PRC, after normalization, in finding solu-
tions to sensitive problems in such places as Korea, Taiwan, and Indo-
China. At the bilateral level, the United States would like to eliminate 
tensions with the PRC while maintaining meaningful relations with 
Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea as well as with other friendly Asian 
countries. Another important concern was to minimize the cost of 
U.S. credibility as a trustworthy ally. 
The Washington-Beijing-Moscow Triangle Explanation. Three com-
peting schools of thought on American triangular policy toward the 
Soviet Union and China emerged in the 1970s. First, the "low impact" 
school has argued that closer U.S.-China ties have had, and are likely 
to have, little effect on Soviet foreign policy. Second, the "manipula-
tion" school advocates that playing the China card does have an im-
pact on the Soviet Union. The United States should build closer 
relations with China in order to gain leverage against the Soviet 
Union. There were two different approaches within this school of 
thought, however. One subgroup maintained that an evenhanded pol-
65 
icy toward China and the Soviet Union could best secure U.S. strate-
gic interests. The other subgroup stressed the need for the United 
States to tilt China against the Soviet Union. Third, the "nonmanipu-
lation" school argued that although U.S. policy toward China does 
have a substantial influence on Soviet actions, the United States should 
not exploit its China policy in a manner adverse to Moscow.23 
"Playing the China card" was a loosely defined concept that re-
fers to "building closer U.S. political, economic, military, or techno-
logical ties with the PRC for the purpose of gaining greater U.S. 
leverage against the Soviet Union. " 24 
Which of the three schools of thought regarding the "China 
card" could best serve U.S. interests was debatable. Calculating po-
tential gains and costs of playing the China card against Moscow was 
extremely difficult. Judging gains and costs on their merits alone, 
without considering whether they might lead to other uncalculated 
and unexpected side-effects, could have had disastrous results. The 
most common risks in playing the China card can be summarized as 
follows: 
1. Overt U.S.-China political, economic, and military ties 
might cause Soviet policy to tum to a hard line, endan-
gering U.S.-Soviet detente relations and returning the 
two superpowers to a renewed cold war; 
2. Manipulation of the Sino-Soviet rivalry for U.S. advan-
tages might risk involving the United States in a major 
Sino-Soviet military confrontation; 
3. Military aid to China might one day be counterproduc-
tive to U.S. interests because of domestic political uncer-
tainties and complexities in China. 
Given the complexity of international politics and the difficulty of 
obtaining complete information, it was not possible for the U.S. to de-
velop an optimal strategy toward Moscow and Beijing under the ideal 
rules of the rational actor model. Instead, the policy toward these two 
super communist countries would be based on U.S. decision makers' 
own wisdom and their perception and assessment of international 
politics. 
During the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger years, U.S. policy toward Bei-
23. U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Playing the China Card: 
Implications/or the U.S.-Soviet-Chinese Relations, a report prepared for the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. House of Representa-
tives, 96th Congress, 1st session, p. 2. 
24. Ibid.: I. 
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jing and Moscow was based on the "Realpolitik" approach with 
"evenhanded" practices. 
Kissinger believed that the relative permanency of the Sino-Soviet 
split put the United States in the most favorable position of the trian-
gular superpower relationships. The Soviet preoccupation with its 
Chinese problem, and Chinese concern over the Soviet threat, together 
with their common desire for U.S. technology to reduce their domestic 
economic problems, had motivated China and the Soviet Union to 
compete against each other for improved relations with the United 
States. 
Another factor that motivated the U.S. to reassess Sino-American 
relations in the late 1960s was the Vietnam war. The United States 
gradually realized that Washington could no longer afford a policy of 
simultaneous confrontation with Moscow and Beijing. Kissinger indi-
cated that "history suggested that it was usually more advantageous to 
align oneself with the weaker of two antagonistic partners, because 
this acted as a restraint on the stronger" (Kissinger, 1979: 178). 
Kissinger also believed that an evenhanded policy designed to im-
prove political, economic, and technological ties with both Moscow 
and Beijing would best assure the United States the most advanta-
geous position vis-a-vis China and the Soviet Union. Normalization of 
relations with the PRC was viewed in this context. 
In February 1972, Nixon and Kissinger consolidated Sino-Ameri-
can rapprochement by signing the Shanghai Communique, with an 
anti-hegemony clause. Three months later, Nixon signed the first 
SALT agreement with the Soviet Union. One month after the January 
1973 Paris Peace Agreement, the United States and China agreed to 
establish liaison offices in Beijing and Washington. The United States 
further signed two detente agreements with the Soviet Union during 
the summit meetings at Vladivostok in November 1974 and at Hel-
sinki in August 1975. In Helsinki, the heads of 35 nations signed a 
declaration to "broaden and deepen" the process of detente. The Hel-
sinki accord reportedly also ratified the principle of permanent spheres 
of influence in Europe for the Soviet Union and the United States 
(Stoessinger, 1978:195). Three months after the Soviet-American Hel-
sinki meeting, President Ford went to China for a second Sino-Ameri-
can summit meeting. 
Both Washington and Beijing had hoped that further progress to-
ward normalization might be feasible during President Ford's return 
visit to China in 1975. The collapse of Vietnam and Cambodia in 
early 1975, however, had created considerable instability in Asia. The 
United States was now unwilling to further compromise on the Tai-
wan question. Another often cited factor for delay was the Watergate 
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scandal of 1972-1974, which turned the Nixon administration toward 
internal politics. Major international crises such as the oil crisis of 
1973-1974 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973 also left the United 
States in no position to deal with the less urgent issue of establishment 
of full diplomatic relations with Beijing. 
These domestic and international crises, however, provided only 
partial explanation for the delay of full normalization of relations be-
tween Beijing and Washington during the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger 
years. Another reason was that the United States could wait for better 
timing to negotiate the normalization issue. The United States chose 
the "status-quo" option during this period with its own rationale that 
keeping Sino-American relations at the quasi-diplomatic level was the 
optimal choice at this time. 
Kissinger firmly believed that the PRC was then more concerned 
about the military threat from the Soviet Union than the solution of 
the Taiwan question or the completion of the normalization of rela-
tions with the United States. The overwhelming fears of a possible 
Russian attack prompted Beijing to welcome President Nixon to visit 
China in 1972 without forcing Washington to break ties with Taiwan. 
That same fear motivated Beijing to establish liaison offices with the 
United States in 1973 while the embassy of the Republic of China was 
still in Washington. 
The United States had enjoyed a great deal of diplomatic leverage 
since the opening of China in the early 1970s. In Korea, the PRC 
discouraged Kim 11-sung's more belligerent posture toward South Ko-
rea and stressed the need for peaceful reunification, manifested by 
North-South talks in 1972-1973. Beijing also welcomed strengthening 
of the NATO alliance and a continuing U.S. military presence in Asia. 
The PRC since 1972 not only felt reluctant to attack the U.S.-Japan 
alliance but encouraged the United States to strengthen ties with Ja-
pan. Moreover, PRC leaders gave quiet support for U.S. diplomacy 
on issues concerning the Middle East, Africa, South Asia and North-
east Asia. The United States was no longer the main target of Bei-
jing's propaganda in the United Nations or in other international 
forums (Solomon, 1978:335). The PRC also showed no objection to 
continued American bases in the Philippines, Thailand, or on Diego 
Garcia (Solomon, 1978:335). 
In its relations with the Soviet Union, the United States also 
gained diplomatic benefits from the evenhanded policy toward Beijing 
and Moscow. The opening of China in 1972 added new momentum to 
Soviet-American relations. Kissinger believed that Sino-American 
rapprochement did cause the Soviets to speed up efforts to reach 
agreements on SALT I (Kissinger, 1979:766-67; 770; 836-38). U.S. 
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detente relations with both China and the Soviet Union also contrib-
uted to the isolation of Hanoi in 1972 and facilitated ultimate Ameri-
can disengagement from Vietnam.25 
In other words, the United States before the mid-1970s worked 
both sides of the triangle to its advantage. More important, the 
United States during this period enjoyed strategic and political benefits 
with only limited costs in its relations with Taiwan, thus minimizing 
damage to the credibility of American commitments abroad. 
Although Taiwan suffered from derecognition from many countries 
and from withdrawal of membership in international organizations 
since the Sino-American rapprochement in the early 1970s, the U.S.-
Taiwan defense treaty continued to remain in force during the Nixon-
Ford-Kissinger years. The United States on various occasions had 
given Taiwan 50 to 60 reassurances of its commitment to their mutual 
defense treaty since 1972 (Chiu, 1978:53). 
Domestic and international crises during the Nixon and Ford 
years, and the presidential elections of 1972 and 1976, were all good 
reasons to prevent the United States from moving toward full diplo-
matic relations with the PRC. The real reason, however, was that the 
United States realized that "indecision" toward full normalization 
with Beijing was the optimal choice at that time. Holding the China 
card without playing it could minimize Soviet suspicion of Sino-Amer-
ican collusion against Moscow's interests. As Kissinger put it, the 
United States enjoyed "diplomatic ties with the PRC in all but name" 
(Kissinger, 1979: 1092). 
Many partial measures, however, were taken by the United States 
to facilitate Sino-American relations during this period. The United 
States relaxed controls on U.S. exports to China and lifted a 22-year 
ban on travel in 1972. Washington also extended diplomatic privileges 
and immunities to the liaison office of the PRC in 1973. The Formosa 
Resolution was repealed by the U.S. Congress in 1974. The United 
States also gradually withdrew military personnel and equipment from 
Taiwan. 
Beijing enjoyed tremendous political, strategic, and diplomatic 
benefits from detente relations with the United States, including gain-
ing membership in the United Nations' Security Council in 1971. Ja-
pan established full diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1972 under 
Beijing's terms. By 1976 more than 100 countries recognized the 
PRC, while Taiwan suffered enormously from diplomatic setbacks (see 
tables 10 and 11 in chapter 6). No country was able to maintain full 
25. See prepared statement of Allen Whiting, 2 February 1976, U.S. Congress, U.S.-
China Relations: The Process of Normalization of Relations, p. 143. 
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diplomatic ties with both the PRC and the Republic of China in Tai-
wan. Even the United States did not challenge the Chinese position 
that "there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China." The 
United States also agreed in the Shanghai Communique that one of its 
ultimate objectives was to withdraw all U.S. forces and military instal-
lations from Taiwan. A potential attack from a U.S. backed Taiwan 
against the PRC was eliminated. Sino-American detente relations also 
gave Moscow warning that a Soviet attack on China might risk a two-
front war (in the East and West). The United States realized as early 
as 1969 that it was against American interests to let China be 
"smashed" in a Sino-Soviet war (Kissinger, 1979: 182). Any Soviet at-
tack on China would bring strong opposition from the United States. 
In short, both Washington and Beijing enjoyed strategic and dip-
lomatic benefits from the Sino-American rapprochement. The 
favorable triangular position the United States enjoyed since the late 
1960s, however, gradually changed in the mid-1970s, when the possi-
bility of a Sino-Soviet war lessened. On the other hand, Soviet-Ameri-
can detente relations deteriorated, because of, for example, Soviet 
involvement in Africa. As the military threat from the Soviet Union 
diminished, the PRC began to show signs of impatience on the lack of 
progress toward full normalization with the United States. Further 
movement toward full diplomatic relations with the PRC gradually 
emerged not only as a necessary step to keep the momentum of Sino-
American relations but also as a useful card to play vis-a-vis the Soviet 
Union. 
In 1975, the Soviet Union and Cuba gave considerable support to 
one of three political groups competing for the control of Angola. So-
viet intervention in Angola demonstrated the limits of detente and So-
viet determination to influence Third World countries. The Soviet 
Union also had shown no restraint in the buildup of strategic and con-
ventional arms. Professor Donald Zagoria described in 1977 the 
growth of Soviet military forces in the Pacific, as follows: 
Nowhere is the growth of Soviet military power more 
evident than in the Pacific. The Soviet submarine fleet is al-
ready the largest in the world. The production rate of nu-
clear powered subs has been stepped up to two a month 
rather than three a year. In the course of worldwide exercies 
in 1975, Soviet naval activity extended throughout the entire 
Pacific. In 1976, the Soviet Navy sent its first aircraft carrier 
to sea and six such carriers are projected. Although tradi-
tionally the military modernization of Soviet forces in the 
East have lagged behind the modernization of Soviet forces 
in the West, this lag is now being eliminated. MIG-23's, 
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MIG-25's, and SU-19's are now being deployed on the East-
ern front and the Pacific fleet is being equipped with Delta 
class submarines. It seems evident that the Soviet Union is 
intent on challenging American naval dominance in the 
Pacific.26 
It was no accident that President Ford announced in a television 
interview on 2 March 1976 that the term "detente" would be replaced 
with "peace through strength" (Morrison, 1977:532). Negotiations of 
SALT II had stagnated in 1976 because of Soviet intervention in An-
gola and disagreements over the American cruise missile (Wolfe, 
1979:201, 216). Soviet-American trade relations were also affected by 
deterioration of political relations between Moscow and Washington. 
The Ford administration no longer opposed the Jackson-Vanik 
Amendment, which demanded a substantial increase in Soviet emigra-
tion of Jews before granting the most-favored-nation tariff treatment 
to the Soviet Union, nor would it oppose the Stevenson Amendment 
which limited the USSR to $300 million in credits over four years 
(Talbott, 1979:74). 
It was within the context of these chilled Soviet-American rela-
tions that President Carter took office in 1977. President Carter hoped 
to improve Soviet-American relations and to continue an evenhanded 
policy toward Moscow and Beijing. Secretary of State Vance was sent 
to Moscow with multiple SALT plans in March 1977, but his SALT II 
mission to Moscow ended in failure. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei 
Gromyko publicly denounced Carter's SALT proposals as a "cheap 
and shady maneuver," aimed at achieving for the United States "uni-
lateral advantages.'m Gromyko also called for a ban on the U.S. B-1 
bomber and the Trident submarine (Labrie, 1979:438), and stated that 
Carter's human rights policy poisoned the atmosphere and aggravated 
the political climate. 
After Vance's disastrous experience in Moscow, there were in-
creasing indications that the United States was turning more attention 
to China. In a speech to the United Nations on 17 March 1977, 
Carter stated that "we will continue our efforts to develop our rela-
tionship with the PRC. We recognize our parallel strategic interests in 
maintaining stability in Asia and will act in the spirit of the Shanghai 
Communique. " 28 
26. Prepared statement of Donald S. Zagoria, U.S. Congress, Normalization of Rela-
tions with the PRC, p. 156. 
27. Pravda, I April 1977 (translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press 29, no. 13:5-
9). 
28. See the text of President Carter's address at the United Nations on 17 March 1977. 
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The National Security Council reviewed Sino-American relations 
in April 1977, including the issue of sales of military-related technol-
ogy to Beijing (Garrett, 1979:238). The initial draft of the NSC secret 
review, Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) 24, was leaked to 
the New York Times on 24 June 1977. In three sections, the "broad 
options" of Chinese-American relations, the withdrawal of American 
troops from Taiwan and the "sale of defense-related technology," 
PRM 24 opposed the sale of military technology to China and dis-
cussed the "range of Soviet reactions" to a potential transfer of mili-
tary technology to China: 
Soviet reactions to a U.S. decision to facilitate transfers 
of military-related material to the PRC would range from 
intense lobbying to reverse the decision to a serious rethink-
ing of fundamental Soviet policies toward the U.S. 
At the mild end of the spectrum, Soviet officials would 
certainly make strong representations to get the decision re-
versed on the grounds that China is a dangerous and unsta-
ble country and that Moscow regards this sort of assistance 
as anti-Soviet. Such efforts could well be accompanied by a 
less cooperative attitude on various issues. 
The severity of Soviet reactions would increase with the 
perceived threat to Soviet interests. At some undefined point 
Soviet perceptions of the threat of U.S.-China military col-
laboration would stiffen Soviet positions on even the major 
issues of U.S.-Soviet relations such as SALT, especially if ini-
tial Soviet efforts to reverse the trend has failed. The Soviets 
might also increase tensions with China. 
Since the desire to head off Chinese-Western collabora-
tion was a major impetus to the present leadership's policy of 
detente, there is presumably a point at which the present So-
viet leadership or its successors would conclude that this pol-
icy is not achieving the desired objective. . . . 
Despite the difficulties for other Soviet objectives, Mos-
cow would then be compelled to make a fundamental reas-
sessment of its policies toward the U.S. The likelihood of a 
strong Soviet reaction to a relaxation of U.S. policy on de-
fense-related transfers to China is further demonstrated by 
the authoritative May 14 Pravda article by I. Aleksandrov 
which denounces Chinese militarism and warns the West 
against diverting Chinese expansion toward others 
(Weinraub, 1977:A3). 
Although the conclusion of PRM 24 was against a "tilt" toward 
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China in the transfer of military-related technology, the draft docu-
ment gave Moscow a clear warning that further deterioration of rela-
tions between Washington and Moscow could result in growing Sino-
American security ties. PRM 24 also indicated the possibility of a 
Sino-Soviet detente, unless the United States cut Taiwan out of its 
"current presence baseline" and accommodated the PRC (Satire, 
1977:23). 
At Notre Dame University on 22 May 1977, President Carter 
stated that "we see the American-Chinese relationship as a central ele-
ment of our global policy, and China as a key force for global peace" 
(Garrett, 1979:259-60). This was the first time the United States 
viewed Sino-American relations to be a central element in U.S. global, 
rather than regional, policy (Garrett, 1979:259-60). 
Secretary of State Vance emphasized American commitment to 
move toward full normalization of relations with China, in late June 
1977. Vance also stated that a constructive Sino-American relation-
ship "will threaten no one." "It will serve only peace" (Garrett, 
1979:239). 
Despite the rhetoric toward China, the United States continued 
to pursue an evenhanded policy toward Moscow and Beijing during 
the summer of 1977. NSC Presidential Review Memorandum 10, a 
major interagency review of the global balance of power and U.S. 
strategy, was also leaked to the press in the summer of 1977. PRM 10 
concluded that growth in Soviet military and economic power was 
slowing down and that long-term trends favored the United States. 
This NSC study also indicated that "the U.S.-Soviet military balance 
was roughly equal at present, but contrasted the strength and capabil-
ity for technological innovation with forecasts of impending Soviet 
capital and labor shortages" (Garrett, 1979:239). 
Meanwhile, the Carter administration began to "adjust" Ameri-
can policies in order to ease tensions with the Soviet Union. In May 
1977, an agreement had been reached on a new framework for negotia-
tions of SALT II between Washington and Moscow. On 30 June 
1977, the United States announced cancellation of B-1 bomber pro-
duction. Moscow was pleased with this decision. In June, President 
Carter also decided not to meet the wife of prominent Soviet dissident 
Anatoly Sharansky who was then touring the United States, even 
though he had met with Vladimir Bukovsky earlier that month. 
President Carter stated in late June that "an atmosphere of peace-
ful cooperation is far more conducive to an increased respect for 
human rights than an atmosphere of belligerence or hatred or warlike 
confrontation." He called for enlarging the areas of cooperation be-
tween Moscow and Washington "on a basis of equality and mutual 
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respect." He also wanted to see the Soviets "further engaged in the 
growing pattern of international activities designed to deal with 
human problems-not only because they can be of real help, but be-
cause we both should be seeking for a greater stake in the creation of a 
constructive and peaceful world order" (Labrie, 1979:475-78). 
Washington's obvious desire to improve relations with Moscow 
disappointed Beijing. Secretary of State Vance briefed the Chinese on 
American global strategic assessments and U.S. policy intentions em-
bodied in the NSC PRM 10 during a trip to China in late August. 
Beijing, however, disagreed with PRM's assessment of the global bal-
ance of power and feared Soviet-American collusion against the 
PRC. 29 According to Chairman Hua, the current strategic situation 
was that "Soviet social imperialism is on the offensive and U.S. imperi-
alism on the defensive" (Garrett, 1979:261, note 39). In his political 
report to the 11th National Congress of the Communist Party of 
China in August 1977, Hua charged that "there is a trend toward ap-
peasement among those people in the West who cherish the illusion 
that peace can be maintained through compromises and concessions, 
and some even want to follow in Chamberlain's footsteps and try to 
divert the peril of the new tsars to the East in order to preserve them-
selves at the expense of others" (Garrett, 1979:260, note 38). 
The PRC was upset with Carter's soft-line approach toward the 
Soviets. Vance's mission to China was later regarded by Teng Hsiao-
p'ing as a "setback" in U.S.-China relations (Boccardi, 1977:A1, 21). 
The Chinese continued to view the United States as a declining power 
and the Soviet Union as the superpower on the ascendancy. The PRC 
did not believe Vance's claims of U.S. military superiority over the 
Soviet Union. 
The failure of the Vance mission to Beijing, however, was fol-
lowed by a "September breakthrough" on SALT II during Andrei 
Gromyko's visit to Washington in the fall of 1977. Both Washington 
and Moscow had made some significant concessions during negotia-
tions in September (Talbot, 1979: 131; Labrie, 1979:388-89; Wolfe, 
29. One month before Vance's trip to China, Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua 
allegedly delivered a secret speech to a large group of party and army cadres gathered for a 
party congress on 30 July 1977. Huang's 42,000-word presentation was recorded and 
smuggled out by his opponents in Taiwan. Huang Hua predicted Vance's trip would bring 
no progress toward full normalization: "it is rather unlikely that there will be any new 
proposals in the nature of a breakthrough." Vance was nevertheless invited to China be-
cause Vance's visit would upset the Soviet Union and Taiwan. Huang said, "Who would be 
most worried and nervous concerning the Vance visit? I would say first, Soviet revisionism 
and after that, Taiwan." (Satire, 1977:23). See also Issues and Studies (Taipei) January 
1978: 109-16). 
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1979:227). Despite the considerable September progress, however, a 
number of important issues were left unresolved. In early 1978, fur-
ther involvement of Soviet and Cuban forces in Ethiopia's war with 
Somalia over the Ogaden desert complicated SALT II negotiations 
with the Soviet Union. In March 1978, President Carter warned the 
Soviets that the common social, scientific and economic goals both 
countries supported will "certainly erode" if Moscow "failed to 
demonstrate restraint in missile programs and other force levels and in 
the projection of Soviet or proxy forces into other lands and conti-
nents."30 President Carter also stated that the United States would 
continue to modernize its strategic system and revitalize its conven-
tional forces while simultaneously searching for arms control agree-
ments with Moscow. 
In the spring of 1978, the Carter administration gradually 
adopted a tougher stand toward Soviet adventurism in Africa and its 
buildups of conventional forces. One of the ways to show American 
displeasure about Soviet aggression was to revive the long-delayed ac-
tion to normalize relations with the PRC. Brzezinski's trip to China 
on May 20-23 should be viewed in this context. Brzezinski told the 
Chinese in Beijing that President Carter "is determined to join you in 
overcoming the remaining obstacles in the way to full normalization of 
our relations within the framework of the Shanghai Communique" 
(Garrett, 1979:244). In a banquet toast, Brzezinski said that "only 
those aspiring to dominate others have any reason to fear further de-
velopment of American-Chinese relations" (Garrett, 1979:244). This 
statement was a clear warning aimed at the Soviet Union. Brzezinski 
also briefed Chinese leaders in detail on the SALT II negotiations, 
which irritated the Soviets. During his Washington trip at the end of 
May, Gromyko protested to Vance that the Chinese had "no legiti-
mate interest" in SALT II and therefore should not be given an official 
briefing from the United States (Talbott, 1979:153). Gromyko's trip in 
May did not produce any significant progress toward concluding 
SALT II. 
Sino-American relations expanded rapidly after Brzezinski's visit 
to China in May. Joint projects in energy, space, medicine, agriculture 
and other fields were begun. At least six U.S. oil firms were negotiat-
ing with the PRC for cooperative exploration of China's off-shore oil 
reserves. 31 Trade with the PRC tripled in one year, with total values 
30. The text of the speech is in President Carter: 1978 (Washington, D.C.: Congres-
sional Quarterly 1979:139-A-141-A). 
31. "China," Background Report by Office of Media Liaison, The White House Press 
Office, 4 January 1979, Washington, D.C., p. 3. 
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of more than $1 billion in 1978. The United States also strengthened 
government-to-government relations with the PRC. Secretary of En-
ergy James Schlesinger and Agriculture Secretary Robert Bergland 
visited China in the fall of 1978. 
Apart from warming up relations with the U.S., the PRC also 
signed a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with Japan on 12 August 
1978, which contained an "anti-hegemony" article aimed at the Soviet 
Union. Furthermore, Beijing concluded economic agreements with 
the European Community. Chinese Premier Hua Kuo-feng's visits to 
Romania, Yugoslavia, and Iran added to Soviet suspicions of Chinese 
intentions of meddling in "Russia's backyard." 
In response to further Soviet involvement in the invasion of 
Zaire's Shaba Province by Katangese rebels in early May, President 
Carter in June 1978 challenged the Soviets to "choose either confron-
tation or cooperation," and that "the United States is adequately pre-
pared to meet either choice" (Garrett, 1979:245). The Soviet Union, 
on the other hand, was more and more convinced that the United 
States was playing the China card against Moscow. Pravda warned 
the United States against playing the China card on 17 June 1978: 
Washington's latest intrigues, or to be more exact, "petty in-
trigues" with China do not in the least serve to strengthen 
confidence. In and of itself, the desire to play the "China 
card" in the global game is nothing new for American politi-
cians. But until now, it seemed that U.S. leaders were aware 
that they could not play that card without endangering the 
cause of peace and indeed, without danger to themselves and 
to the United States' own national interest. 32 
The trials of Soviet dissidents Anatoly Sharansky and Alexander 
Ginsberg in July further complicated the scheduled Vance-Gromyko 
meeting in Geneva the same month. In response to the outpouring of 
bipartisan criticism from Capitol Hill over the trials, President Carter 
decided to cancel the sale of a $7 million Sperry Rand Univac com-
puter system to Tass of the Soviet Union, but allowed a Sperry Rand 
sale to Beijing of two Univac 1110 series computers similar to those 
denied Moscow (Garrett, 1979:262-63, note 57). Carter also canceled 
a Moscow visit by his science adviser, Frank Press, and American par-
ticipation in the scheduled sixth session of the joint Soviet-American 
commission on scientific and technological cooperation (Garrett, 
1979:247). Press, however, went to Beijing in July to discuss with the 
32. Translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press 30, no. 24: I. 
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Chinese future scientific and technical cooperation between the United 
States and the PRC. 
In order to counterbalance Chinese global strategy, the Soviet 
Union began to take more constructive actions in its SALT II negotia-
tions with the United States and in its dealing with Japan and Viet-
nam. Soviet efforts to sign a cooperation treaty with Japan was 
unsuccessful because of Japanese insistence on regaining the four small 
islands north of Japan which the USSR had seized at the end of World 
War II. Moscow, instead, signed a 25-year Treaty of Friendship with 
Vietnam on 3 November 1978. 
Significant progress was made on SALT II in September in Wash-
ington. Paul C. Warnke, chief SALT II negotiator and head of the 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, indicated after Gromyko's 
September visit that "95 percent" of a SALT II agreement had been 
completed (Oberdorfer, 1978a:A1,14). Although Vance failed to work 
out remaining differences with the Soviet Union in October, in early 
December Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin indicated that the next 
Vance-Gromyko meeting in Geneva before Christmas might wrap up 
a SALT II agreement (Talbott, 1979:225). Senior administration offi-
cials had also leaked a message to the press that tentative plans were 
under way for the Brezhnev-Carter summit meeting in Washington for 
a SALT II signing in mid-January (Talbott, 1979:229). 
It was a great surprise to the Soviet Union when President Carter 
announced normalization of diplomatic relations between the United 
States and the PRC on 15 December 1978, just days before the Vance-
Gromyko meeting in Geneva. The Soviet Union was further disturbed 
that Vice Premier Teng would be coming to Washington at the end of 
January. Although President Carter publicly declared that normaliza-
tion with the PRC was a major goal of American foreign policy soon 
after he took office in 1977, it was understood that he would normalize 
relations with Beijing after the signing of SALT II (Talbott, 1979:229). 
The Soviet Union once strongly advocated the establishment of diplo-
matic relations between Washington and Beijing when Sino-Soviet re-
lations were on good terms. Still, the timing of the normalization 
announcement surprised the Soviets. The Soviets also blamed Wash-
ington for the press leak and for the timing ofTeng's visit to Washing-
ton. If Brezhnev were to come to Washington in mid-January, the 
Soviets would probably be under pressure from "world public opin-
ion" to conclude the SALT II agreement by the January deadline 
(Talbott, 1979:247). Teng's visit at the end of January could also up-
stage Brezhnev's because of the historic nature of Teng's visit. 
From a Soviet perspective, it is not surprising that Moscow de-
cided to delay conclusion of SALT II and therefore to postpone 
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Brezhnev's summit meeting in Washington. The Vance-Gromyko 
meeting in Geneva on December 21-23 did not resolve remaining is-
sues for a SALT II agreement. Moscow decided to wait and see the 
outcome of Teng's trip to Washington and then to reassess the trian-
gular relations among Beijing, Moscow, and Washington as well as the 
SALT II negotiations. 
The Carter administration had not expected normalization of re-
lations with the PRC to complicate SALT II negotiations. On the 
contrary, President Carter and Brzezinski, the main actor in the nor-
malization negotiations, had hoped that the normalization announce-
ment would positively affect the conclusion of SALT II. Brzezinski 
believed that normalization could be to U.S. advantage in "helping 
Moscow understand the value of restraint and reciprocity" (Brzezin-
ski, 1983:196). In his memoirs, Power and Principle, Brzezinski indi-
cated that "perhaps if the Soviets worry a little more about our policy 
toward China, we will have less cause to worry about our relations 
with the Soviets "(Brzezinski, 1983:200). Brzezinski further revealed 
that the timing of normalization was "definitely influenced by the So-
viet dimension" (Brzezinski, 1983:197). The deterioration of Soviet-
American detente relations during 1977-1978 made Sino-American 
normalization useful as a way to counterbalance Soviet military build-
ups and interventions in the Third World-from Angola in 1975, 
through Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Yemen in 1977-1978, to sup-
port for the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in late 1978. The 
need to gain geopolitical leverage against the Soviet Union influenced 
the United States' decision to accede to Beijing's demands on U.S.-
Taiwan relations. 
Important international events, such as the Camp David Accord 
on 17 September 1978, also shaped the process of negotiations on nor-
malization. President Carter gained personal confidence in making 
controversial foreign policy decisions after the Camp David Summit, 
which was the greatest triumph of Carter's foreign policy at that time. 
One of Carter's senior advisers later recalled that President Carter 
hoped to "convert the force for peace-making we have unleashed here 
into something that will finally give us SALT" (Talbott, 1979:205). 
President Carter hoped for a chain reaction; two days later, he met 
with Ambassador Chai and told him that the United States would ac-
cept Beijing's three demands if the PRC would accept America's con-
ditions for normalization. 
It was no coincidence that President Carter made 1 January 1979 
the target date for normalization. President Carter hoped to conclude 
SALT II before the end of 1978. Another deadline, 17 December 
1978, was set for a final peace agreement between Egypt and Israel. 
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The successful conclusions of SALT II, the Israeli-Egyptian peace 
treaty, together with normalization with the PRC, would be spectacu-
lar successes in America's foreign policy. 
CHINESE CALCULATIONS 
Chinese leaders, on the other hand, had their own calculations con-
cerning the timing of normalization. In a meeting with a delegation of 
the Japanese Komeito party in Beijing on 29 November 1978, Vice 
Premier Teng told the Japanese visitors that normalization of China-
U.S. relations depended on President Carter. Teng said that the situa-
tion was the same as that concerning the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty 
that had depended on the Japanese government. Teng said that he 
had always believed that the Peace Treaty could be concluded "in one 
second" once Japan decided to have it. Teng added that "Sino-Ameri-
can relations also can be normalized in two seconds" if the United 
States decides to do so. 33 
Negotiations of the terms of normalization should be viewed as a 
process of mutual modifications of goals. Each side's bids or 
counterbids depended on the other side's actions. When the United 
States would accept Beijing's three conditions, provided that the PRC 
would set forth its bottom line of normalization terms (namely that 
the United States allow continuing sales of selected arms to Taiwan; 
that the United States terminate the defense treaty with Taiwan rather 
than abrogate it; and that the United States would issue a unilateral 
statement of its interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue), 
it would then be up to the PRC to make up its mind with respect to 
the U.S. position. 
Of the three American conditions, the PRC was concerned most 
with the arms sales issue. The PRC preferred to see the United States 
cut all military ties with Taiwan after normalization. Unification be-
tween the mainland and Taiwan could be delayed were Taiwan to ob-
tain enough arms from the United States. On the other hand, delay of 
normalization with the United States could only give the United States 
a legitimate reason to sell arms to Taiwan. There was nothing to be 
gained by the PRC in delaying the normalization process. Once U.S.-
PRC relations became normalized, Beijing would have more leverage 
to bargain the arms sales issue since the United States by then would 
have recognized the PRC government as the only legitimate govern-
ment in China, and hence Taiwan would be considered a part of 
33. "Teng Hsiao p'ing: Normalization of PRC-U.S. Ties Depends on Carter," Kyodo, 
29 November 1978, cited from Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), People's Re-
public of China, vol. I, no. 230 (29 November 1977):A3. 
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China. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan would then constitute an interfer-
ence in Chinese internal affairs, according to international law. 
Another Chinese consideration was, of course, the Soviet Union. 
Throughout the 1970s, the dominant theme in Sino-American rela-
tions had been their mutual concern about Soviet hegemony. Beijing's 
main concern was how to curb Soviet power through better Sino-
American ties. The immediate fear of Soviet aggression toward China 
in late 1978 was linked to the joint hostility from both the Soviet 
Union and Vietnam. Vietnam, in China's backyard, used to be as 
close as "lips to teeth" to the PRC. Sino-Vietnamese relations, how-
ever, gradually deteriorated in the 1970s as Vietnam moved closer to 
the Soviet Union for military and economic support and as the PRC 
started playing its American card to counter Soviet threats. 
Beijing and Hanoi drifted further apart in 1977-1978 because of 
Hanoi's ambition to control Kampuchea, Beijing's friend, and Hanoi's 
mistreatment of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam. By 30 May 1978, the 
PRC had terminated all joint projects with Vietnam. On 17 June 
1978, Beijing ordered the Vietnamese to close its consulates in the 
PRC. Vietnam was described by Teng Hsiao-p'ing as the "Cuba of 
Asia" (Pye, 1981:234). In the summer of 1978, the PRC took several 
diplomatic initiatives to improve relations with Japan, India, Eastern 
Europe, the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) coun-
tries, and the United States in order to strengthen its geopolitical posi-
tion vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and Vietnam. Besides signing the Sino-
Japanese treaty in August, Chairman Hua visited Romania, Yugosla-
via, and Iran. In November 1978, Vice Premier Teng visited several 
ASEAN countries, including Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore. 
Meanwhile, Beijing had also begun serious negotiations with Washing-
ton on normalization. On 26 September 1978, one week after the 
Carter-Chai meeting in Washington on the normalization issue, the 
PRC unilaterally terminated border negotiations with Vietnam and 
launched a strong propaganda campaign against Hanoi (Pye, 
1981:239). 
In response to Beijing's moves, Hanoi began to push the process 
of normalization with Washington. Hanoi's initiative, however, was 
thwarted by Brzezinski who perceived that normalization with Hanoi 
should await completion of Sino-American normalization (Pye, 
1981 :239). 34 Hanoi, instead, signed a Treaty of Friendship with the 
34. Ambassador Harvey Feldman indicated in a personal letter that some State De-
partment officials were in favor of establishing relations with Hanoi prior to Beijing and in 
fact ··a negotiation with Hanoi took place in some spasmodic fashion over the months 
between August 1977 and the North Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia."' Ambassador 
Feldman's letter to the author was dated 4 January 1984. 
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Soviet Union on 3 November 1978. Two days after the announcement 
of the treaty, the United States notified all members of the U.N. Secur-
ity Council that American intelligence sources showed that a 
Vietnamese attack on Kampuchea was imminent (Pye, 1981:241). 
It was within the context of this international environment in In-
dochina that the PRC sensed an urgent need to conclude the normali-
zation agreement with the United States. As soon as he came back 
from his Southeast Asian trip, Teng Hsiao-p'ing joined normalization 
negotiations and finally produced the December breakthrough. The 
PRC accepted the formula of "agree to disagree" on the arms sales 
issue. 
On 25 December 1978, Vietnam invaded Kampuchea. The PRC 
decided to "teach a lesson" to Vietnam. During his historic visit to 
the United States in January 1979, Teng had told President Carter 
about Beijing's plan to make a punitive strike across China's border 
into Vietnam (Carter, 1982:206). President Carter had tried to "dis-
courage" Teng (Carter, 1982:206). The PRC, however, launched its 
forces against Vietnam on 17 February 1979, immediately after Teng 
returned from his trip to the United States. 
Besides the Vietnam factor, Beijing's calculations of the timing of 
the normalization announcement and Teng's visit to Washington were 
also influenced by the consideration of Soviet-American detente rela-
tions. In December 1978, Brzezinski had told Chai Tse-min that the 
U.S. had resolved all the major SALT II issues with the Soviet Union 
and would soon be deciding on a date for a summit meeting between 
President Carter and Brezhnev (Carter, 1982:198). The delay of the 
SALT II agreement and the cancelation of Brezhnev's visit to Wash-
ington surely were considered favorably by Beijing (Talbott, 1981 :86). 
There was a widespread impression in the United States that President 
Carter had been "outfoxed" by Teng Hsiao-p'ing in the final stage of 
the normalization negotiations (Talbott, 1981 :87). 
The degree of rapidity of Chinese responses toward normalization 
in December surprised the Carter administration. In a congressional 
hearing, Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State, remarked 
that Chinese leaders "had not responded sequentially; they responded 
to the overall presentation and then Vice Premier Deng [Teng in 
Wade-Giles] came into the matter."35 
The United States was surely the initiator to renew the normali-
zation negotiations. The PRC, however, pushed the secret negotia-
tions to the final stage. 
35. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Taiwan Legislation hearings, 
96th Congress, 1st session, February 7 and 8, 1979, p. 24. 
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Regional and Bilateral Relations Explanation 
At the regional level, the United States in 1978 was eager to 
strengthen its strategic position in East Asia through normalization of 
relations with the PRC. The United States was pleased to see the sign-
ing of the Sino-Japanese treaty in August 1978. This was the first time 
in decades that the United States was able to improve relations with 
both Japan and China without having to worry about possible revenge 
from one or the other. An emergence of a friendly Beijing-Tokyo-
Washington triangular relationship could greatly enhance the U.S. 
strategic position in East Asia vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. 
The fall of Vietnam in 1975 and the total withdrawal of U.S. mili-
tary involvement in Indochina significantly reduced Taiwan's strategic 
importance as a military base for the United States. The decline of 
U.S. political, economic, and military capabilities as a result of Water-
gate, the oil crisis, and its defeat in Vietnam put the United States in a 
weaker bargaining position in 1978, compared to 1972 when President 
Nixon first visited Beijing. The "lesson of Vietnam" also made the 
United States more reluctant to get involved in another civil war, such 
as the one between Taiwan and China. This was another reason why 
the United States decided to normalize relations with the PRC under 
Beijing's three conditions. 
Another level of explanation of the normalization decision, from 
the rational choice perspective, concerns bilateral relations of the 
United States with the PRC. Ideal timing for normalization negotia-
tions on the Taiwan issue would be when U.S.-PRC and U.S.-Soviet 
Union relations were on good terms while Beijing-Moscow relations 
were deteriorating. Under such circumstances, the United States 
could derive the best bargaining position over the Taiwan question be-
cause Beijing's need for Washington would be more urgent; the PRC 
would then be more willing to make concessions on the Taiwan issue. 
Such circumstances certainly did not occur when the United States 
finally decided to move toward full normalization of relations with the 
PRC in 1978. On the contrary, in early 1978 Sino-American and 
American-Soviet relations were both in limbo. Sino-American rela-
tions had deteriorated to an extent that the PRC even began to rethink 
its "Russian card" in 1977-1978. Only then did the United States per-
ceive it urgent to improve relations with the PRC. The timing of the 
normalization decision provided a partial explanation why the United 
States could only normalize relations with the PRC under the Japa-
nese model. 
In 1975 Beijing began to publicly express its dissatisfaction with 
American policy. Low-level media coverage likened President Ford's 
detente policy toward Moscow to British Prime Minister Neville 
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Chamberlain's policy toward Hitler at the Munich conference before 
World War II (Sutter, 1978:114). The Chinese media also accused the 
U.S. of violating the Shanghai Communique because of American sup-
port for movements favoring Tibet's independence from the PRC and 
the U.S. appointment of Leonard Unger as an ambassador to succeed 
Walter McConaughy in Taipei (Sutter, 1978:115, see also 135, note 
26). During Secretary of State Kissinger's October 1975 visit to 
China, the PRC Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua warned the 
United States that detente was an illusion that should not blind the 
world to Soviet hegemonism (Sutter, 1978:115). In December 1975, 
three weeks after President Ford's visit to China, the PRC released 
three Soviet helicopter pilots held as alleged spies since March 1974 to 
show Chinese displeasure over U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union 
and normalization. 
After the death of Mao Tse-tung in September 1976, the Soviet 
Union launched a major peace campaign toward Beijing. Although 
the PRC did not respond positively toward Moscow's overtures at that 
time, there were signs that indicated Beijing had begun to reevaluate 
its strategy toward Moscow and Washington. According to Gottlieb 
(1979:4), Teng Hsiao-p'ing, reemerging from his third purge in July 
1977, began to reciprocate Moscow's overtures because of deep frus-
trations over the lack of progress toward normalization with the 
United States, the stagnation of the Sino-Japanese peace treaty negoti-
ation, and the Soviet-American detente relation. First, Moscow and 
Beijing resumed talks on Sino-Soviet border river navigation issues in 
July 1977. Second, Beijing decided to withhold information about a 
serious border incident in Sinkiang in the late summer of 1977, which 
was provoked by armed Soviet troops. (This incident was not made 
public until one year later. The PRC, however, gave maximum pub-
licity to a border incident that occurred on the eve of Brzezinski's visit 
to China in May 1978.) Third, Beijing sent Ambassador Wang Yu-
p'ing to Moscow three days after Vance's August trip to China. This 
post had been vacant for 18 months. Fourth, the PRC tacitly recog-
nized Soviet sovereignty over the disputed channel near the Soviet port 
city of Khavarovsk by agreeing to "give the Soviet river traffic authori-
ties notice when passage through the confluence was intended," a con-
dition Beijing had refused to accept for 11 years. Fifth, Chinese 
Foreign Minister Huang Hua attended the Soviet National Day recep-
tion in November 1977 in Beijing. This was the first time for over a 
decade that the PRC had sent a representative higher than a deputy 
foreign minister to attend the Soviet embassy's annual reception (Got-
tlieb, 1979:6-9). 
According to Gottlieb, these events were clear signals that the 
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PRC was interested in improving Sino-Soviet relations in order to 
strengthen its strategic position internationally. The tilt-toward-the-
Soviet policy stopped during the winter of 1977-1978 when Soviet-
American and Soviet-Japanese relations deteriorated (Gottlieb, 
1979:9-10). Japan showed renewed interest in negotiating a peace 
treaty with the PRC in March 1978. The United States, on the other 
hand, adopted a tougher policy against Soviet interventions in Africa. 
The Carter administration also began to seriously deliberate on nor-
malization of relations with the PRC in the spring of 1978. Beijing 
then returned to its anti-Soviet position. 
China's "hundred-day thaw" toward the Soviet Union demon-
strated Chinese ability to manipulate triangular relations. The United 
States realized that Washington could not take for granted Beijing's 
fear and hatred toward Moscow and Beijing's patience on normaliza-
tion with the United States. Had the United States allowed Sino-
American relations to continue to deteriorate, the PRC could have 
chosen to move closer to the Soviet Union. 
From the perspective of a rational consideration of global, re-
gional, and bilateral relations, the United States in early 1978 was mo-
tivated to speed up the normalization process with the PRC in order 
to improve its gradually deteriorating strategic position in East Asia. 
The United States was not in a good bargaining position on the Tai-
wan issue because the United States in 1978 no longer occupied the 
most favorable position in the triangular relations. U.S. detente rela-
tions with Moscow and Beijing were both in limbo. Under these cir-
cumstances, the United States had few "bargaining chips" over the 
Taiwan question. The Japanese model became the most appropriate 
for normalization because the United States could not get a better deal 
from Beijing. The United States agreed to break diplomatic ties with 
Taiwan because no other country succeeded in maintaining an em-
bassy in both Taipei and Beijing. The United States agreed to termi-
nate the defense treaty with Taiwan because, after the fall of Vietnam, 
Taiwan no longer played an important role in the defense of U.S. stra-
tegic interests in Asia. 
Economic and Moral Explanation 
In March 1978, the Fifth National People's Congress approved the 
"Four Modernization Program"-a program to modernize Chinese 
agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology. 
This program was first announced by the late Premier Chou En-lai at 
the Fourth National People's Congress in January 1975. 
Although economic considerations were not primary reasons for 
the United States to normalize relations with the PRC in 1978, 
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China's Four Modernization Plan, which required imports of large 
amounts of western technology and capital goods, certainly gave the 
United States an extra incentive to speed up the normalization process. 
In February 1978, the PRC and Japan signed an eight-year trade 
agreement worth a record $20 billion. Under this agreement, Japan 
agreed to export whole plants, machinery and equipment, and technol-
ogy to China through 1985. China, in return, would increase sales of 
coal and crude oil to Japan. 
In April 1978, the PRC signed its first trade agreement with the 
European Economic Community (EEC). China and the EEC agreed 
to increase bilateral trade with reciprocal most-favored-nation treat-
ment. Scientific and technical cooperation agreements were signed by 
China with France, Kuwait, and the Philippines. The PRC also re-
portedly placed a $700 million purchase order with France for HOT 
and Milan antitank missiles and Crotale antiaircraft missiles, during 
French Prime Minister Raymond Barre's visit to China in January 
1978 (Garrett, 1979:261, note 44). 
For years the United States was treated by the PRC as a supplier 
of last resort. Trade priorities were given to countries with which the 
PRC had diplomatic relations. The PRC had favored Japan and 
Europe. 
Sino-American trade had been imbalanced, favoring the United 
States, throughout the 1970s. The United States faced a foreign trade 
deficit of $30 billion in 1978 and a grave national deficit. It was only 
natural that the United States, the most powerful capitalist country in 
the world, wanted a share in China's market. Normalization of rela-
tions between Washington and Beijing would be the first step toward 
improved trade relations. 
The Japanese model, which the PRC suggested as a foundation 
for Sino-American normalization, would allow the United States to 
continue economic relations with Taiwan after normalization. In 
1978, Japan's trade with Taiwan had increased more than two and 
one-halftimes since Japan severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 
1972 (Solomon, 1978:346). Japan's experience suggested that the 
United States could also increase trade with both Taipei and Beijing 
after normalization with Beijing, if there was no immediate danger to 
Taiwan's security. The United States perceived that there would be 
only a remote possibility that the PRC would launch an attack on 
Taiwan in the near future. It would be costly for Beijing to take over 
Taiwan because of Taiwan's strong military capability. An attack on 
Taiwan could make the PRC more vulnerable to Soviet attack and 
could risk ruining its relations with the United States and Japan, thus 
jeopardizing China's modernization program. Continuing arms sales 
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to Taiwan and the declaration of continued U.S. interests in peaceful 
solutions to the Taiwan issue could be considered sufficient for Tai-
wan's security after normalization between Washington and Beijing. 
The Japanese model, therefore, was considered by the United States 
from an economic perspective as a sound formula for normalization. 
An alliance is always a marriage of convenience. When the U.S.-
Taiwan alliance was no longer considered desirable to Washington, it 
became only a matter of time to dissolve this relationship. How to 
disengage from Taiwan smoothly and less painfully for the govern-
ment and the people of Taiwan was a main concern of Washington 
since President Nixon's trip to China in 1972. The United States 
adopted a policy to delay normalization with Beijing so that Taipei 
could have more time to prepare for a final divorce with Washington. 
Meanwhile, the United States tried to strengthen Taiwan's defense ca-
pability by increasing sales of arms to Taiwan in the early 1970s, on 
the assumption that the stronger and more stable Taiwan became, the 
easier it would be for the United States to withdraw from Taiwan. 
U.S. arms sales through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and commer-
cial channels to Taiwan increased significantly since the early 1970s, 
especially in air and naval defenses. The United States also authorized 
the coproduction of F-5E jet fighters with Taiwan. Washington, on 
the other hand, quietly reduced U.S. military personnel in Taiwan 
from ten thousand at the peak of the Vietnam war to 700 in 1978. 
The reasons the United States insisted on continuing arms sales to 
Taiwan after normalization were grounded on the following considera-
tions. First, arms sales to Taiwan would give Taiwan more confidence 
in its defense capability against the PRC. Thus, Taiwan would not 
panic or seek radical solutions, such as evoking Soviet friendship or 
reconsidering its nuclear option that would be contrary to U.S. inter-
ests. Second, continued arms sales to Taiwan could also reduce suspi-
cions and doubts from other U.S. allies about U.S. reliability in 
keeping its defense commitments. Third, if Taiwan remained strong 
militarily, the PRC would be less likely to launch an attack on Tai-
wan. A military attack on Taiwan after normalization would be a 
great embarrassment for the United States. In summary, U.S. contin-
uing arms sales to Taiwan after Sino-American normalization of rela-
tions could provide the United States with more leverage in its 
conduct of foreign policy. 36 
36. Ambassador Harvey Feldman, Director for Republic of China Affairs, State De-
partment, 1977-1979, indicated in a personal letter to the author dated 4 January 1984: 
"Your analysis . . . of the relevant military considerations, is exactly correct and in fact 
replicates in different words State Department analysis of the situation." 
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Table 1 
U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan from 1974 to 1978 
Foreign military sales Commercial export licenses 
Year ($ millions) ($ millions) 
FY 74 
Orders 88.7 8.1 
Deliveries 93.3 
FY 75 
Orders 144.8 45.0 
Deliveries 115.0 
FY 76 
Orders 324.0 42.5 
Deliveries 136.5 
FY 77 
Orders 153.0 46.1 
Deliveries 142.4 
FY 78 
Orders 346.3 174.5 
Deliveries 131.1 
Data source: Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, January 1979. 
If there existed no immediate danger to Taiwan's security and 
economic position after normalization, the United States could also 
reduce criticisms of being an immoral and unreliable ally. There is no 
permanent enemy just as there is no permanent alliance. Normaliza-
tion with Beijing, which could enhance peace and reduce the possibil-
ity of another war with a country of one billion population, could be 
justified by moral considerations, even at the expense of severing diplo-
matic relations with Taiwan with only 18 million people. 
From the U.S. perspective, Washington had given Taipei nearly 
seven years to prepare for the eventual separation of relations between 
Taipei and Washington. Sino-American normalization of relations, 
which the Shanghai Communique anticipated as the final goal between 
Washington and Beijing, should not come as a surprise to the Nation-
alist Government in Taiwan. Increased arms sales to Taiwan in the 
1970s had greatly strengthened Taiwan's military posture against the 
PRC. The United States believed that it had helped Taiwan's eco-
nomic, political, and military capabilities a great deal since 1950. It 
was time for the people and the government of Taiwan to now help 
themselves. 
The United States believed that it would make no sense to blame 
Washington on moral grounds because every nation in this world con-
siders its own national interests first. The United States should have 
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normalized relations long ago. By 1978, most of its major allies had 
already established diplomatic relations with the PRC on Chinese 
terms. The United States was the last major power to recognize the 
PRC. If other countries could normalize relations under Beijing's 
terms, why should the United States be blamed for doing so? 
CONCLUSION 
In retrospect, it is quite clear why the United States began to speed up 
the normalization process in 1978. From the rational actor perspec-
tive, the United States in 1978 did try to maximize its net gains when 
the Carter administration chose 1 January 1979 as the target date for 
normalization. It was also obvious why the PRC began to respond to 
the American position on normalization with such rapidity in Decem-
ber 1978. 
After normalization, Sino-American relations entered into a 
"honeymoon" period in 1979 with significant increases in trade and 
exchange programs. A Trade Agreement between the United States 
and the PRC was signed on 7 July 1979. Most-favored-nation treat-
ment was extended to the PRC on 1 February 1980. Claims of U.S. 
citizens against the PRC and frozen PRC assets in the United States 
were settled. In 1980, the United States relaxed controls on high tech-
nology exports to China and declared its willingness to permit the Chi-
nese to buy carefully selected military support equipment (but not 
weapons) from U.S. firms. Nonmilitary exports to China were eligible 
for support from the U.S. Export-Import Bank. 
The honeymoon period did not last long. After President Reagan 
took office in 1981, Sino-American relations gradually deteriorated 
over the issue of arms sales to Taiwan. By the end of 1981, Beijing 
even threatened to downgrade its diplomatic mission in Washington if 
the Reagan administration decided to sell Taiwan those highly sophis-
ticated aircraft items Taiwan wanted. The once deferred Taiwan ques-
tion emerged to haunt Sino-American relations. 
The rational choice model enabled us to see the central considera-
tions of the normalization decision more clearly and in their proper 
setting. Rationality did come into the normalization decision-making 
process. This "ideal" process of decision making, however, fell short 
of its aims because of uncertainty and human frailty inherent in inter-
national politics. The United States did not achieve every goal it had 
pursued from normalization. 
Professor Michel Oksenberg, a staff member of the National Se-
curity Council, 1977-1980, emphasized in an interview that the Carter 
administration inherited a negotiating record on the normalization is-
sue. The first task of the administration was to review the negotiating 
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record of the Nixon and Ford administrations. The next step was to 
assess the range of options within the context of this normalization 
record. Oksenberg revealed that the Carter administration felt 
"bound" by the previous negotiating record. So, the range of options 
available to the Carter Administration was rather narrow. 37 The 
Nixon and Ford administrations had not fixed the terms for normali-
zation because they had not come to a point of serious negotiation of 
normalization. But the record showed that when normalization was 
to occur, Beijing's three conditions for normalization would not prove 
to be an obstacle. In other words, according to Oksenberg, the U.S. 
had already promised the Chinese that the Japanese model would be 
the formula for normalization. 38 
Roger Sullivan, deputy assistant secretary for East Asian and Pa-
cific Affairs, 1978-1980, likewise revealed in an interview that the nor-
malization decision-making process was not very complex. Sullivan 
pointed out that by the time the United States reached the stage of 
negotiation, the real issue was: does the United States want normali-
zation on these terms or not? Sullivan revealed that President Ford 
accepted Beijing's three conditions for normalization when he visited 
China in 1975. Although President Ford denied that he had then 
promised the PRC to normalize relations with Beijing under the Japa-
nese formula, Sullivan believed that President Ford simply did not re-
member that he, indeed, had made this promise. Sullivan said that the 
real issues requiring negotiation at the time were: the projection of 
arms sales to Taiwan after normalization and what would be the na-
ture of U.S. relations with Taiwan after normalization.39 
One State Department official commented in an interview that the 
rational actor model is an ideal process of decision making. But in 
reality, there are many irrational factors that will influence decision 
makers' options, such as leader's preferences, bureaucratic politics, 
and domestic politics factors. He acknowledged, nevertheless, that the 
rational actor model sheds light on the normalization decision-making 
process. 
37. Interview with Professor Michel Oksenberg, a staff member of the National Secur-
ity Council, 1977-1980. 29 July 1985. Ann Arbor, MI. 
38. Ibid. 
39. Interview with Roger Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pa-
cific Affairs, State Department, 1978-1980. 9 August 1985. Washington, D.C. 
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4 
THE BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS MODEL 
THE ESSENCE OF THE BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS 
MODEL 
The bureaucratic politics model does not assume that a nation's for-
eign policy is made by a unitary, value-maximizing, nation-state actor. 
Instead, the bureaucratic politics model assumes that foreign policy is 
the end-product of intranational political results: 
Resultants in the sense that what happens is not chosen as a 
solution to a problem but rather results from compromise, 
conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and 
unequal influence; political in the sense that the activity from 
which decisions and actions emerge is best characterized as 
bargaining along regularized channels among individual 
members of the government (Allison, 1971:162). 
The governmental actor is not a unitary agent but a number of 
individual players with different positions, different responsibilities, 
different resources, different information sources, and different powers 
within the government (Snyder and Diesing, 1977:348-49). Decisions 
are outcomes of "pulling and hauling" between players, each possess-
ing different priorities, perceptions, goals, vested interests, and powers. 
Power is composed of at least three elements: "bargaining advantages, 
skill and will in using bargaining advantages, and other players' per-
ceptions of the first two ingredients"; power determines each player's 
impact on results (Allison, 1971: 168). 
Each player takes a stand on the basis of organizational role, per-
ceptions of goals and interests, and stakes in the issue involved. 
"Where you stand depends on where you sit" (Allison, 1971: 176). 
Constitutions, statutes, court interpretations, executive orders, con-
ventions, and culture determine the rules of the game. Bargaining, 
coalition building, persuasion, pulling and hauling, and politics are the 
mechanisms of choice (Allison, 1971: 171 ). Action channels, a regular-
ized means of taking governmental action on a specific kind of issue, 
structure the game by preselecting the major players, determining 
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their usual points of entrance into the game, and distributing particu-
lar advantages and disadvantages (Allison, 1971: 170). 
In Essence of Decision, Allison portrays the U.S. president as little 
more than another bureaucratic politics player: 
In status and formal powers the President is chief. 
Every other participant's business somehow involves him. 
But his authority guarantees only an extensive clerkship. If 
the President is to rule, he must squeeze from these formal 
powers a full array of bargaining advantages (Allison, 
1977:148). 
Halperin and Kanter give the president more weight in the deci-
sion-making process: 
The President stands at the center of the foreign policy 
process in the United States. His role and influence over de-
cisions are qualitatively different than those of any other par-
ticipants. In any foreign policy decision widely perceived at 
the time to be important, the President will be a principal if 
not the principal figure determining the general direction of 
actions (Halperin and Kanter, 1973:6-7). 
The bureaucratic politics perspective characterizes decision mak-
ing as a process of building a coalition among the major players: the 
president, chiefs, staffs, and the "indians." The major chiefs in the 
United States are the presidents, the secretaries of State, Defense, and 
Treasury, the director of the CIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the 
special assistant for National Security Affairs. Staffs include the im-
mediate staff of each chief. "Indians" are the political appointees and 
permanent government officials within each of the departments and 
agencies (Allison, 1971:164). Bureaucratic politics coalition building 
requires the participation of at least three people, or at least two differ-
ent bureaus or departments and a central decision maker (Snyder and 
Diesing, 1977:356). 
Applied to the U.S.-PRC normalization-of-relations decision 
making, two hypotheses emerge from the assumption of the bureau-
cratic politics model: (1) timing and terms of the normalization deci-
sion can best be explained by the pulling and hauling of the 
bureaucratic politics players, and (2) each bureaucratic politics 
player's stand on the normalization issue can be predicted from his 
position in the bureaucracy. 
The bureaucratic politics model's explanatory power is achieved 
by displaying the details of the game-the action channels, the posi-
tions, the players, their preferences, and the pulling and hauling (Al-
lison, 1977:173). The most serious problem of the bureaucratic 
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approach is the lack of information about the details of the bureau-
cratic game. There are no classified documents available at this time 
for a case study such as the normalization decision making from 1969 
to 1978. To piece together the game, the researcher has to rely on 
"unreliable" information sources, such as memoirs of former decision 
makers, interviews of participants, congressional hearing reports, pub-
lished papers or articles, and newspapers. It is no accident that bu-
reaucratic politics analysts are often accused of "imposing their theory 
on the data, rather than testing their theory on the basis of their data" 
(Caldwell, 1977: 1 00). 
The data problem, however, does not cripple the analysis of nor-
malization decision making from the bureaucratic politics perspective, 
for two reasons. First, U.S.-China normalization decision making 
from 1969 to 1978 showed that major decisions were made by the 
president or like-minded players. The bureaucratic politics model is 
not a very relevant factor, therefore, in explaining the timing and the 
terms of the normalization decision. The main pulling and hauling 
occurred not within the executive branch, but rather between the 
White House and Congress. Second, because of the extreme secrecy 
and the limited number of participants involved in the entire decision-
making process, there was no opportunity for middle or lower levels of 
bureaucrats to engage in bureaucratic fights. According to the presi-
dent's wishes, even key members of the cabinet were not aware of the 
secret decision to conclude normalization. The bureaucratic politics 
model has limited applicability for explaining the normalization issue. 
The lack of data to portray the bureaucratic politics game results not 
only from the unavailability of official documents but also from the 
limited engagement of bureaucratic politics during the normalization 
decision-making process. 
THE BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS EXPLANATION 
The normalization decision-making process is analyzed from the bu-
reaucratic politics perspective in four stages: (1) 1969-1972: the open-
ing of China; (2) 1972-1973: another step toward normalization-the 
establishment of the liaison offices; (3) 1974-1977: the stagnation pe-
riod; and (4) 1978: the year of the full normalization decision. 
1969-1972: The Opening of China 
The major players who participated in the process of the China initia-
tive from 1969 to 1972 were President Nixon, National Security Ad-
viser Kissinger, and the State Department. The State Department, 
while participating in early contacts between Washington and Beijing 
from 1969 to May 1970, was deliberately left out by the White House 
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after the aborted 137th Warsaw Meeting with the PRC in May 1970 
because of President Nixon's personal distrust and fears of leaks by the 
State Department. After Nixon's announcement of the China trip on 
15 July 1971, the State Department once again participated in the 
preparation of Nixon's trip to China. The State Department, however, 
did not directly negotiate with the Chinese for the Shanghai Commu-
nique-the most important document between Washington and Bei-
jing before the final normalization of relations in 1978-until the first 
draft was concluded by Kissinger and Premier Chou En-lai. The 
Shanghai Communique was the foundation upon which the negotia-
tions of the terms of normalization were based in 1978. The State 
Department did manage to make some changes on the first draft of the 
Communique (Kissinger, 1979:1082-85. See also Hersh, 1983:497-99). 
Those changes, however, did not touch the most important issue-the 
Taiwan question-which blocked Sino-American relations for two de-
cades. Accordingly, the impact of the State Department on the course 
of events pertaining to the opening of China was not significant. The 
White House, the National Security Council, and their staff members 
played the most important role in paving the way for Nixon's historic 
visit to China in February 1972. 
There were two levels of action channels in the process of opening 
the China door, namely, the international and the intragovernmental 
levels. At the international level, the United States had used the War-
saw talks channel, the Pakistani channel, the Romanian channel, and 
the Paris channel to communicate with leaders of the PRC about U.S. 
interests in improving relations with Beijing. At the intragovernmen-
tallevel, with the exception of the Warsaw channel, the White House 
was the only unit that had total control of secret China diplomacy 
before July 1971. 
The action channels determine "who's got the action" (Allison, 
1971: 170). Typically, issues are "recognized and determined within 
an established channel for producing action" (Allison, 1971: 170). For 
example, one action channel for producing the normalization of rela-
tions with China could include a recommendation by the Secretaries of 
State and Defense; an evaluation by the intelligence community of the 
strategic, political, military, and economic consequences of normaliza-
tion with the PRC; a recommendation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
the National Security Council; a presidential decision to negotiate with 
Beijing; the transmittal of the U.S. decision through a third country to 
the PRC; the response from the PRC about the conditions for normal-
ization; the feedback and recommendations from each department in-
volved about the terms for normalization; the presidential decision on 
the agreeable terms for normalization; the State Department's negoti-
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ating team to work out an agreement with the PRC; and the final an-
nouncement of normalization of relations with the PRC. 
The case of the opening of China, however, did not go through 
normal governmental action channels. President Nixon took the initi-
ative to change a policy that had been used for 20 years. There was no 
major movement in any of the departments to urge the president to 
change the China policy. The policy change was made by the presi-
dent, not from recommendations of various bureaus. President Nixon 
personally selected the action channels as well as the players. 
The selection of the action channels and players, however, was 
not deliberately made from the beginning of the China initiative. Nor 
was Nixon's new China policy a well-planned and carefully executed 
strategy. President Nixon decided to move China diplomacy into the 
White House after several frustrated bureaucratic battles with the 
State Department (Kissinger, 1979:190). The new China policy grad-
ually emerged when Nixon's concept of playing the China card against 
the Soviet Union encountered an opportunity-the Sino-Soviet border 
wars. 
Before the Chenpao border incident on 2 March 1969, President 
Nixon had a "notion" to improve relations with the PRC, but not yet 
a "strategy" to move toward the PRC (Kissinger, 1979:171). 
Although President Nixon had urged National Security Adviser Kis-
singer to explore "possibilities of rapprochement with the Chinese" as 
early as 1 February 1969, Kissinger's assignment was to create the 
"impression" that the United States was exploring a move toward 
China instead of moving directly toward the Chinese (Kissinger, 
1979:169). The border wars and the increased hostility between Mos-
cow and Beijing changed the whole picture of the global balance of 
power situation overnight. The opportunity for developing a favorable 
triangular relationship for the United States arose when the Soviet 
Union replaced the United States as the number one enemy of the 
PRC. President Nixon seized the opportunity and decided to move 
toward the Chinese directly. 
Apart from making a unilateral concession to ease the trade em-
bargo against the PRC in July 1966, President Nixon also sent out 
messages in August 1969 through President Yahya Khan of Pakistan 
and President Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania to the leaders of the 
PRC that the United States was interested in improving relations with 
Beijing (Kissinger, 1979:179-81 ). National Security Adviser Kissinger 
told Pakistan's ambassador in Washington, Agha Hilaly, that Presi-
dent Nixon preferred to use the Hilaly channel with Kissinger as "the 
single confidential point of contact for any further discussion of this 
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subject" (Kissinger, 1979:181). The State Department did not know 
of the Pakistani channel. 
The State Department was assigned another role in initiating 
communication with the PRC. As previously noted, the U.S. ambas-
sador to Poland, Walter Stoessel, was instructed to deliver the message 
of U.S. interests in serious talks with Beijing to the Chinese charge 
d'affaires in Poland, Lei Yang, in September 1969. This was the first 
operational involvement of the regular State Department machinery in 
the new China policy. Before then, the State Department made a sig-
nificant contribution to the various policy review studies done in the 
National Security Council (NSC) system and to the implementation of 
Nixon's order to ease trade restrictions toward the PRC. The State 
Department, however, had not been involved in the overall strategy 
toward China (Kissinger, 1979:181). 
The entrance of the State Department into the action channels 
from September 1969 fulfilled one of the preconditions of the bureau-
cratic politics game-the involvement of at least three players: the 
president, the National Security Council, and the State Department. 
Another precondition for bureaucratic coalition politics requires the 
existence of a conflict between at least two different units or depart-
ments (Snyder and Diesing, 1977:356). It did not take long to develop 
conflicts of views toward the new China policy between the State De-
partment and the White House. 
As early as June 1969, in response to the White House's decision 
to ease trade restrictions against the PRC, Soviet experts in the State 
Department, led by former ambassador to the Soviet Union Llewellyn 
Thompson and Charles (Chip) Bohlen, warned President Nixon 
against any attempt to "use" China against the Soviet Union. They 
believed that the superpower relationship was more important than a 
triangular relationship in solving problems of peace and war. This 
group saw more risks and few advantages in Sino-American rap-
prochement. They did not believe that better U.S.-PRC relations 
would induce better U.S.-Soviet relations. In a State Department pa-
per submitted to the NSC Review Group in September 1969, this 
group's thought was expressed as follows: 
Soviet tolerance of U.S. overtures to Peking [Beijing] 
may be substantial-but these overtures will nevertheless in-
troduce irritants into the U.S.-Soviet relationship. More-
over, if a significant improvement in the Sino-American 
relationship should come about, the Soviets might well adopt 
a harder line both at home and in international affairs. It is 
impossible to foresee the point at which the advantages in an 
improvement in Sino-U.S. relations might be counterbal-
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anced by a hardening in U.S.-Soviet relationships. The fact 
that such a point almost certainly exists argues for caution in 
making moves toward better relations with China. . . . 
(Kissinger, 1979: 189). 
Llewellyn Thompson further suggested that Soviet Ambassador 
Dobrynin be kept informed of all U.S. contacts with the PRC in the 
Warsaw talks. Secretary of State Rogers did not endorse this propo-
sal, nor did Kissinger. President Nixon formally rejected Thompson's 
proposal on 12 December 1969 (Kissinger, 1979:190). Besides fighting 
the battle with Soviet experts in the State Department on the China 
initiative, the White House also found itself battling with the enor-
mous bureaucratic communications machinery of the State Depart-
ment. President Nixon had no confidence in the State Department's 
way of making policy-receiving and sending cables (Kissinger, 
1979:27). On 11 December 1969, several days after Ambassador 
Stoessel successfully conveyed the message to the PRC, Stoessel was 
invited to the Chinese embassy in Poland. 1 The resumption of the 
Warsaw talks was proposed by the United States. Within days after 
learning of the imminent resumption of the Warsaw talks between 
Washington and Beijing, the State Department had sent accounts of 
the Warsaw meeting to U.S. embassies in Tokyo, Taipei, and Moscow. 
Friendly allies of the United States, such as the United Kingdom, Aus-
tralia, Canada, France, Italy, and New Zealand, had been briefed 
either before or after Stoessel's December meeting with the Chinese 
(Kissinger, 1979: 190). 
Another "tug-of-war" began between the White House and the 
State Department in January 1970 over the agenda of the 135th and 
136th Warsaw meetings and over President Nixon's proposal to send a 
representative to Beijing for direct discussions with PRC leaders. The 
main agenda for discussion in the previous 134 Warsaw meetings had 
been the U.S. relationship with Taiwan, and bilateral issues such as 
arms control, claims and assets questions, release of U.S. prisoners in 
China, and so on. Unaware of the messages that had been passed to 
the PRC through the secret Pakistani and Romanian channels, the 
State Department's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs saw no 
reason to change the contents of discussion for the 135th Warsaw 
meeting. The White House, however, hoped to use the 135th meeting 
to address new themes: that the United States wanted to make a fresh 
I. Ambassador Walter Stoessel, Jr. indicated in an interview on 21 June 1985 that he 
attached special significance to the fact that his meeting with the PRC officials was in the 
Chinese embassy in Warsaw instead of in other conference settings, which afforded frank 
and open discussion. 
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start; that the United States would not participate in a Soviet-Ameri-
can condominium; that the United States would proceed not on the 
basis of ideology but on the assessment of mutual interest (Kissinger, 
1979:686). Neither the Asian experts nor the Soviet experts in the 
State Department found these themes acceptable for Ambassador 
Stoessel to espouse at the 135th meeting on 20 January 1970 (Kis-
singer, 1979:686). 
After a bureaucratic fight, a compromise agreement was reached: 
National Security Adviser Kissinger conceded all of State's Warsaw 
agenda in return for the themes Kissinger considered most essential. 
At the January meeting, Ambassador Stoessel told the Chinese that 
the United States did not seek to "join in any condominium with the 
Soviet Union directed against China." Stoessel also told the Chinese 
that the United States "would be prepared to consider sending a repre-
sentative to Peking for direct discussions with your officials or receiv-
ing a representative from your government in Washington for more 
thorough exploration of any of the subjects I have mentioned in my 
remarks today or other matters on which we might agree" (Kissinger, 
1979:687). 
Debates over how to respond, should the PRC accept the U.S. 
proposal to send a representative to Beijing or to receive a Chinese 
emissary in Washington, produced another bureaucratic fight between 
the White House and the State Department. The State Department 
recommended to "simply note the Chinese reply without comments." 
Kissinger, on the other hand, wanted Stoessel to "indicate agreement 
in principle and refer the matter to Washington for a detailed reply" 
(Kissinger, 1979:688). President Nixon sided with Kissinger. Stoessel 
was instructed to respond positively by President Nixon. At the 136th 
Warsaw meeting, Ambassador Lei Yang conveyed the message that 
the PRC agreed to receive an American representative to Beijing. In 
response to Beijing's acceptance of the U.S. proposal, the East Asian 
Bureau of the State Department urged President Nixon not to hold 
high level talks in Beijing before making some progress on bilateral 
issues. Kissinger did not agree with the department's view. Kissinger 
believed that fears of a Soviet attack was the main reason for Beijing's 
positive response to the U.S. proposal. Beijing's immediate concern 
was not the Taiwan issue nor the bilateral issues, but the global bal-
ance-of-power question. 
On 10 March 1970, Secretary of State Rogers proposed the fol-
lowing projects for the 137th Warsaw meeting: "agreement in princi-
ple to peaceful settlement of the Taiwan problem and expansion of 
trade and mutual contacts; some unilateral Chinese gesture of good-
will, such as the release of Americans or the expansion of trade" (Kis-
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singer, 1979:690). Marshall Green, the assistant secretary of state for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, also summarized his view in a personal 
note to Kissinger on 17 March 1970, in which Green pressed for Chi-
nese willingness to meet U.S. concerns on bilateral issues before send-
ing a U.S. representative to Beijing: 
To go to Peking without such clarification poses serious 
risk of our being used by Peking for its own purposes in its 
relations with the Soviets without any compensating gains 
either in terms of our bilateral relations with the Chinese or 
in progress toward a relaxation of tensions elsewhere, partic-
ularly in Southeast Asia. For the same reason, I think we 
should not offer to discuss with the Chinese modalities of a 
meeting such as communications, personnel, timing, secur-
ity, etc., unless we have made a firm and final decision to go 
ahead with such a meeting. Our discussion of such modali-
ties will be interpreted as a firm commitment to a higher-
level meeting by Peking, and may reinforce the Chinese be-
lief they need not discuss "substance" with us until such a 
meeting takes place. To make such a commitment at this 
point would thus weaken our ability to press the Chinese 
now to commit themselves further on their own intentions 
and negotiating position at a higher-level meeting (Kissinger, 
1979:691). 
President Nixon once again shared Kissinger's view that geopolit-
ical benefits of an American emissary to Beijing was far greater than 
the risks involved. The 137th Warsaw meeting, originally scheduled 
for 20 May 1970, was canceled by the PRC because of the American 
invasion of Cambodia. The Warsaw talks never resumed. The end of 
the Warsaw talks marked the end of the State Department's opera-
tional involvement in the China initiative. 
President Nixon decided to rely on more confidential channels to 
communicate with the PRC leaders. As noted previously, the Pakis-
tani channel turned out to be the most successful. Details of Paki-
stan's role in arranging Kissinger's secret trip to Beijing have also been 
described previously. The arrangement was kept secret. Besides Pres-
ident Nixon and Kissinger, there were only a few staff members who 
knew of it. Kissinger chose three members of his NSC staff to go with 
him to Beijing: John Holdridge, Dick Smyser, and Winston Lord 
(Kissinger, 1979:730). The State Department did not know about Kis-
singer's trip to Beijing until 8 July 1971, hours before Kissinger's de-
parture from Pakistan to Beijing. Secretary of State Rogers was told 
by Nixon that the trip to Beijing was a last-minute decision in response 
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to an invitation Kissinger had received while in Pakistan (Kissinger, 
1979:739). By then, it was too late for the Secretary of State to present 
any opposing views. 
The State Department opposed Kissinger's second trip to China, 
to arrange President Nixon's February 1972 visit, on the ground that 
the timing of Kissinger's trip, October 20--a few days before the U.N. 
General Assembly's voting on the Chinese representative issue-
would interfere with American strategy on the China question. An-
other obvious reason for Rogers' objection was that the president 
should not send emissaries who were independent of the Secretary of 
State (Kissinger, 1979:775-76). Once again, President Nixon rejected 
Secretary of State Rogers' position. 
On his second trip to China, Kissinger finally had with him a 
China expert from the State Department, Alfred Jenkins. Jenkins was 
an expert on the bilateral issues between the United States and the 
PRC. Jenkins, however, was not allowed to actually participate in dis-
cussions of key geopolitical issues, particularly negotiations on the 
drafting of the communique (Kissinger, 1979:775). The same strategy 
was used during President Nixon's visit to China in 1972. Nixon 
wanted to keep Secretary of State Rogers and Assistant Secretary of 
State Marshall Green busy elsewhere while Nixon and Kissinger held 
talks with Mao and Chou on sensitive matters. Kissinger, however, 
managed to include his NSC staff member Winston Lord as a 
notetaker in the historic talks between the leaders of the United States 
and the PRC, while Secretary of State Rogers was absent (Kissinger, 
1979:1 057). 2 
President Nixon deliberately kept State Department officials from 
participating in negotiations about the Shanghai Communique. Nixon 
told Premier Chou that "our State Department leaks like a sieve" 
(Kissinger, 1979: 1070). The State Department delegation was finally 
given the draft of the communique on the plane from Beijing to 
Hangchou, one day before the communique was to be announced. As 
soon as the U.S. delegation arrived at Hangchou, Secretary Rogers 
informed President Nixon that the communique was unsatisfactory. 
2. Ambassador Harvey Feldman indicated in a personal letter that "Three qualified 
State Department interpreters went along as part of the entourage for Nixon"s February 
1972 visit. None of the three were used by Nixon or Kissinger in their substantive discus-
sions, and instead PRC-provided interpreters were used. One of the three, Charles Free-
man, was used by Nixon as interpreter at social functions. That was the extent of their 
participation. Secretary Rogers conducted the discussions with the Chinese on the mutual 
claim issues. Marshall Green, with Alfred Jenkins, conducted discussions on other essen-
tially minor issues. John Holdridge, I believe, participated in these as well." Ambassador 
Feldman's letter was dated 4 January 1984. 
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Rogers recommended a list of changes prepared by his State Depart-
ment staff. 
Marshall Green, assistant secretary for the State Department Bu-
reau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 1969-1972, said in an interview 
that the United States stated in the Shanghai Communique America's 
continued support for South Vietnam, South Korea, and Japan, with-
out mentioning Taiwan. Green believed that the omission of 
America's defense treaty with Taiwan in the Shanghai Communique 
was a serious mistake. 3 "Why mention the others when you don't 
mention this obligation?" "The implication was that we were going to 
abrogate or overlook" the defense obligation to Taiwan, Green re-
vealed (Hersh, 1983:497). Green also recalled that the omission in-
stantly reminded him of Dean Acheson's famous "mistake" in early 
1950 when Acheson defined American's "defensive perimeter" as ex-
tending from the Ryukyus Islands in the western Pacific to the Philip-
pines in Asia, without mentioning South Korea.4 Accordingly, Green 
tried to convince Rogers of the importance of reopening the negotia-
tions with the PRC on the Shanghai Communique. The defense treaty 
problem was finally resolved when Nixon and Kissinger decided that if 
the question of America's treaty commitment to Taiwan arose, Kis-
singer would orally reaffirm that commitment (Hersh, 1983:499). 
Nixon was not happy with the "numerous" and "trivial" amend-
ments submitted by the State Department. Nixon and Kissinger both 
knew that the PRC leaders would surely be reluctant to reopen negoti-
ations on the communique, with which President Nixon agreed less 
than a day before. On the other hand, President Nixon did not want 
to go home with a divided delegation (Hersh, 1983:498-99. See also 
Kissinger 1979: 1083). If the State Department was not happy with 
the communique, which the State Department had no part in negotiat-
ing, State's opposition would soon be leaked to the press. After recon-
sidering potential political damage at home, President Nixon finally 
decided to take the department's amendments to the Chinese. As ex-
pected, Ch'iao Kuan-hua, foreign minister of the PRC, was not happy 
with the last minute proposal by the United States. The Chinese, nev-
ertheless, agreed to consider changes on the parts of the communique 
not dealing with the Taiwan question (Kissinger, 1979:1084). The fi-
nal draft of the communique was concluded and announced on 28 
February 1972. The Chinese accepted much of the State Depart-
3. Interview with Ambassador Marshall Green, assistant secretary for State Depart-
ment Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 1969-1972. 16 July 1985. Washington, 
D.C. 
4. Interview with Ambassador Marshall Green. 16 July 1985. Washington, D.C. 
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ment's proposed amendments, but none dealing with the Taiwan ques-
tion (Kissinger, 1979: 1084). 5 
In brief, the new China policy from 1969 to 1972 was initiated 
and mainly implemented by the White House. Fear of leaks and bu-
reaucratic politics were the main cause for President Nixon to bypass 
his cabinet, particularly the State Department. The initial brief and 
unsatisfactory participation of the department in the new China diplo-
macy made President Nixon more than ever convinced of the necessity 
of keeping secret the opening of China. 
The new China policy was not made in a vacuum, however. Vari-
ous interagency studies concerning U.S.-China relations had been re-
quested by the National Security Council, which can order agency 
studies without revealing the real purpose. In this way, the White 
House could learn the views of the agencies as well as the necessary 
background information without formally "clearing" overall strategy 
with them. In White House Years, Kissinger described the contribu-
tion of interagency studies to the decision-making process of the new 
China policy, as follows: 
One advantage of the NSC system for the secret diplomacy 
in which we were now involved was that it enabled the Presi-
dent and me to obtain agency views and ideas without re-
vealing our tactical plan. Thus, as part of the study of our 
military posture in Asia, I requested a breakdown of which 
of our forces in Taiwan were needed for Indochina opera-
tions and which were required as part of the Mutual Security 
Treaty with Taipei. This gave me some idea of what it was 
possible to concede if we were to withdraw some forces as 
"tensions in the area diminished" (Kissinger, 1979:705. See 
also Hersh, 1983:496). 
The State Department, though not directly participating in the 
negotiations on the communique, had its imprint on the vital Taiwan 
question of the communique. Kissinger gave special credit to the State 
Department in his memoirs: 
Taiwan, as expected, provided the most difficult issue. 
We needed a formula acknowledging the unity of China, 
which was the one point on which Taipei and Peking agreed, 
without supporting the claim of either. I finally put forward 
the American position on Taiwan as follows: "The United 
States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the 
5. Kissinger did not specify which parts of the proposed amendments made by the 
State Department were accepted by the RPC. 
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Taiwan Straits maintain there is but one China. The United 
States Government does not challenge that position." I do 
not think anything I did or said impressed Chou as much as 
this ambiguous formula with which both sides were able to 
live for nearly a decade. (In fairness I must say that I 
adapted it from a State Department planning document for 
negotiations, which aborted in the Fifties.) (Kissinger, 
1979:783). 
Some State Department officials actually participated in the prep-
aration of the drafting of the Shanghai Communique in 1971-1972. In 
The Price of Power, Seymour M. Hersh described in detail how some 
State Department's China experts were involved in the drafting of the 
communique: 
In the months before the summit, Kissinger realized 
that the Asia experts on his NSC staff, headed by John Hol-
dridge, would be unable to produce all the papers needed, 
and he turned to an outsider, Alfred Jenkins of the State De-
partment. Jenkins was one of the few China hands who had 
escaped the purges of the "Who lost China?" lobby in the 
early 1950s, because he had been unrelentingly hostile to the 
Communist Chinese. Over the winter of 1971-72, Jenkins 
became a trusted insider and was provided with copies of the 
backchannel communications between Washington and Pe-
king and the transcripts of Kissinger's meetings with Chou 
En-lai. His basic assignment was to draft a communique to 
be made public at the close of the summit. Jenkins, unable 
to handle all Kissinger's demands, in turn recruited two 
other State Department Asia experts, Roger Sullivan and 
William A. Brown. The three men were given office space in 
a hideaway on the top floor of the State Department. It is 
not clear whether Kissinger realized that Sullivan and 
Brown were actually writing most of the papers, or indeed if 
he knew of the three-man operation. The secrecy extended 
everywhere. William Rogers and his top aides, Alexis John-
son and Marshall Green, knew of the special office, but they 
were not told that the Jenkins group had access to the 
backchannel messages and the transcripts of the Kissinger-
Chou meetings (Hersh, 1983:492-93). 
Roger Sullivan, deputy assistant secretary for East Asian and Pa-
cific Affairs, 1978-1980, revealed in an interview on 9 August 1985 
that he wrote five different drafts of the Shanghai Communique in 
1971-1972. Sullivan also indicated that the single issue that concerned 
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Kissinger most during the preparation of the Shanghai Communique 
period was the Vietnam question. 
The State Department had also been actively involved with the 
implementation of President Nixon's decisions to ease trade and travel 
restrictions against the PRC. The Defense, Commerce, and Treasury 
Departments also had participated in the implementation of some of 
the relaxation of trade and economic relations with the PRC through-
out this period (Hersh, 1983:697-98, 723). The director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), Richard Helms, and Admiral Elmo Zum-
walt, Jr., chief of naval operations, had helped Kissinger set up an 
effective "backchannel," an important factor for successful conduct of 
the secret China policy (Hersh, 1983:722-23). Those agencies, how-
ever, were not involved in formulation of the overall strategy toward 
China. 
1972-1973: Another Step Toward Normalization 
After Nixon's 1972 trip to China, day-to-day business between Wash-
ington and Beijing was conducted through two channels. Most busi-
ness had gone through the Paris channel. The PRC ambassador in 
Paris, Huang Chen, and U.S. Ambassador Arthur Watson, were in 
charge of communication between the two countries. Sensitive 
messages, however, were passed through the backchannel. The PRC 
mission to the United Nations was chosen by President Nixon as the 
backchannel (Kissinger, 1982:61). In his second volume of memoirs, 
Years of Upheaval, Kissinger stated how the Nixon administration 
communicated with the PRC through the backchannel: 
Initially Peking stressed that it preferred the Paris chan-
nel. The UN mission was to be used only for emergencies-
perhaps it did not want us to have the benefits of a Chinese 
embassy without diplomatic recognition. Soon the necessity 
of rapid communication and the importance of candid dis-
cussion had caused both sides to stretch the definition of 
"emergency" more and more widely. From November 1971 
until May 1973, I traveled secretly to New York on a score 
of occasions for face-to-face meetings with Huang Hua, usu-
ally in a CIA-provided "safe house" in mid-Manhattan, a 
seedy apartment whose mirrored walls suggested less prosaic 
purposes (Kissinger, 1982:61). 
The backchannel was totally controlled by the White House. The 
State Department was not aware of it. After Nixon's China trip, the 
increasing need for frequent exchange of views on global as well as 
bilateral issues had made the "clumsy means of communications" be-
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tween Washington and Beijing inadequate (Kissinger, 1982:60). Kis-
singer went to Beijing in February 1973 with no clear-cut plan to 
improve relations with the PRC but with an intention to propose some 
modest step, such as an American trade office in China. The Nixon 
administration at that time remained convinced that the PRC did not 
want to open any office in Washington so long as Taiwan's embassy 
was there (Kissinger, 1982:61). 
The idea of establishing liaison offices in each country's capital 
appeared to be a proposal made by the United States. In reality, "it 
was only 'marginally' true," stated Kissinger (Kissinger, 1982:61). He 
described in detail the way in which the idea of establishing de facto 
diplomatic relations emerged during his talks with Chou En-lai in 
February 1973: 
As we talked about bilateral relations, I mentioned the 
utility of a permanent point of contact. Zhou (Chou in 
Wade-Giles) allowed himself to seem mildly interested. He 
asked me whether I had any idea how to implement it. Con-
sular representation did not interest him; it was too techni-
cal. Neither did the idea of a trade office in any of its 
variations strike a spark. He obviously wanted to emphasize 
political and not commercial relationships. So I dusted off 
the idea of a liaison office, which had been prepared for Ha-
noi and peremptorily rejected there. We had not yet, in 
Pham Van Dong's view, earned the privilege of permanent 
association and regularized harassment. Zhou perked up. I 
was neither very specific nor did I presume to offer reciproc-
ity in Washington, so certain were we that Peking's envoys 
would never appear where Taiwan's representatives were 
established. 
Zhou said he would "consider" my "proposal" of a liai-
son office. It was not clear to me that I had formally made 
it. The next day he "accepted" it. He added a subtle wrin-
kle, however, China would insist on reciprocity: a Chinese 
liaison office should be established in Washington as well 
(Kissinger, 1982:61-62). 
Roger Sullivan claimed in an interview that he was the initiator of 
the idea for establishing liaison offices in the PRC and in the U.S., 
respectively. Kissinger initially was pessimistic, according to Sullivan, 
assuming that the PRC would react negatively. The idea, neverthe-
less, became one of several proposals submitted for Beijing's consider-
ation. Although Kissinger later surprisingly attributed the idea of 
liaison offices as having originated with the PRC, Sullivan in retro-
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spect believed that Kissinger did not remember that the idea already 
had been put forward by the United States. Regardless of who 
originated the idea, Sullivan claimed that no precedent existed in dip-
lomatic history for such offices and that their establishment underlines 
the uniqueness of U.S.-China relations.6 
Richard Solomon, a staff member of the National Security Coun-
cil, 1971-1976, revealed in an interview that the liaison offices proposal 
was made by the United States in October 1971. Beijing did not show 
any interest in this proposal at that time because of Beijing's concern 
over the Vietnam war. After the conclusion of the Paris Peace Agree-
ment in early 1973, the PRC then felt free to again raise the idea of 
establishing liaison offices. 7 
The liaison offices were actually "embassies in all but name." 
President Nixon decided to appoint David K.E. Bruce, a distinguished 
ambassador and public figure, to head the liaison office in Beijing. The 
selection of Bruce symbolized the importance the Nixon administra-
tion attached to the assignment. Bruce was one of the few people who 
knew the arrangement of Kissinger's first secret trip to Beijing (Kis-
singer, 1979:756). As a matter offact, Bruce was originally considered 
by President Nixon as the ideal emissary to take the secret trip to 
China (Kissinger, 1979:715). Later, President Nixon decided not to 
send Bruce to China because Bruce's role as head of the U.S. delega-
tion to the Paris peace talks on Vietnam might complicate the China 
mission. 
The U.S. decision to move toward de facto diplomatic relations 
with the PRC incurred very little bureaucratic hostility mainly be-
cause it was another China decision made by the highest authorities in 
Washington and Beijing. There was no public debate in any agency on 
this subject. Even Kissinger himself did not believe it would be possi-
ble for the PRC to accept a semi-official relationship with the United 
States prior to full normalization of relations. Accordingly, there was 
little opportunity for bureaucratic players to engage in countermove-
ments before Kissinger's trip. By the time the Chinese agreed to estab-
lish the liaison offices, it was too late for any player to propose 
negative views, if there were any. 
In February 1973, Kissinger was accompanied by State Depart-
ment officials Herbert G. Klein and Alfred Jenkins and members of 
his National Security staff: Winston Lord, Jonathan Howe, Richard 
6. Interview with Roger Sullivan, deputy assistant secretary for East Asian and Pa-
cific Affairs, 1978-1980. 9 August 1985. Washington, D.C. 
7. Interview with Richard Solomon, a staff member of the National Security Council, 
1971-1976. 13 September 1985. Santa Monica, California. 
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Solomon, and Peter Rodman. Once again, the White House was the 
center for making policy decisions and the State Department played 
only a supplementary role. Jenkins held several talks on technical sub-
jects with Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Chang Wen-chin.8 
Halperin believed that "complete and faithful implementation of 
a Presidential decision remains the exception rather than the rule" 
(Halperin and Kanter, 1973 :33). Successful implementation of a deci-
sion such as the establishment of liaison offices required the coopera-
tion of the State Department to work out the details of technical 
arrangements. But more important questions depended on the polit-
ical will of the highest authorities of Washington and Beijing. 
During the second stage of the U.S.-China normalization process, 
the major players and action channels followed the same pattern as 
during the period of the initial opening of China. President Nixon and 
Kissinger were again the dominant figures in determining the pace of 
normalization. Nixon wanted to improve relations with the PRC but 
short of full normalization. The PRC responded with the best possible 
solution the United States could expect-the liaison offices. The idea 
of liaison offices came from the State Department. But neither Kis-
singer nor Nixon gave enough credit to the department's original idea. 
The bureaucratic politics model's assumption-pulling and hauling 
among players-explains very little about the ways in which the deci-
sion of the establishment of the liaison offices was made. 
President Nixon's and Kissinger's decision to bypass the State 
Department on the most important issues concerning China did not 
imply that the State Department institutionally resisted the Nixon/ 
Kissinger China policy. Ambassador Harvey Feldman pointed out 
that opinions within the department's bureaucracy were actually quite 
divided: 
The "old guard"-and perhaps most especially then Under 
Secretary for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson, was abso-
lutely opposed to rapprochement with Beijing. Assistant 
Secretary Green was dubious but not completely opposed, 
although his principal deputy, Ambassador Win[throp] 
Brown, was. Below that level, however, there was much en-
thusiasm for the Nixon/Kissinger policy. Alfred Jenkins 
was completely committed to it at that time (he later came to 
oppose it), and Jenkins' deputy, Roger Sullivan, was if any-
thing even more eager than Jenkins. The details for the es-
8. U.S. Department of State, U.S. Policy Toward China, July 15, 1971-January 15, 
1979 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1979), 
Selected Document No. 9, p. 8. 
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tablishment of the liaison offices were handled by Jenkins 
and Sullivan.9 
1974-1977: The Stagnation Period 
After formal establishment of the liaison offices, Kissinger paid an-
other visit to Beijing in November 1973. This time, National Security 
Adviser Kissinger had another official title-U.S. Secretary of State. 
Kissinger was nominated as the Secretary of State by President Nixon 
in August 1973. 
Chairman Mao Tse-tung received Kissinger in November 1973. 
The two sides held a wide-ranging talk on international affairs as well 
as bilateral relations. A joint U.S.-PRC communique was issued at the 
conclusion of Kissinger's visit. The Chinese reiterated that normaliza-
tion of relations could be realized "only on the basis of confirming the 
principle of one China." According to Kissinger, the November 1973 
trip was the last visit in which Kissinger received a warm reception 
from the Chinese hosts. Kissinger's subsequent visits to China in 1974 
and 1975 were either "downright chilly or were holding actions" be-
cause of domestic crises in both Washington and Beijing (Kissinger, 
1982:698). U.S. credibility was drastically reduced with the evapora-
tion of presidential authority, partly due to the Watergate scandal. 
The PRC was also preoccupied with a minicultural revolution-the 
anti-Confucius campaign, which was aimed at Chou En-lai. 
It was important that the normalization decision be made at a 
time when the U.S. bargaining position vis-a-vis the PRC could be 
maximized and when the president felt politically strong enough to 
withstand domestic opposition. The post-Watergate period was surely 
not a prime time to move toward resolution of the normalization issue. 
Was the bureaucratic politics model relevant to explain the delay 
of the normalization decision from 1974-1977? The power struggle 
between the National Security adviser and the Secretary of State no 
longer existed after Kissinger's appointment as Secretary of State in 
1973. Although Kissinger was removed from the National Security 
Council post in the so-called "Sunday Night Massacre" on 2 Novem-
ber 1975, Brent Scowcroft, Kissinger's successor, was no match in 
competing with Kissinger for power in foreign policy affairs. Secre-
tary of Defense James Schlesinger was purged in the massacre. The 
difference of views between Kissinger and Schlesinger was not on U.S. 
policy on China but rather on U.S.-Soviet detente relations. During 
the Nixon administration, President Nixon and Kissinger held ulti-
9. Ambassador Harvey Feldman's personal letter to the author, dated 4 January 1984. 
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mate power in foreign policy decisions. In the Ford administration, 
Secretary of State Kissinger was generally believed to be not only the 
prime initiator but also the prime executor of American foreign policy. 
President Ford was guided by Kissinger in foreign affairs to a greater 
extent than had been President Nixon (Hinton, 1976:77). Without ac-
cess to official documents, it would be impossible to make definitive 
conclusions about the impact of the bureaucratic politics factor on the 
normalization decision during the stagnation period. But given the 
dominant nature of Kissinger's power during this period, it would be 
difficult to attribute the delay of normalization to pulling and hauling 
among the China players. 
The bureaucratic politics factor would be relevant to explain deci-
sion making involving conflict between at least different departments 
and a minimum of three participants. When one or two people make 
decisions, the rational choice explanatory model appears more rele-
vant (Snyder and Diesing, 1977:356). In the normalization case, the 
main decisions were made by President Nixon, Kissinger, and later 
President Ford. The bureaus were more involved in implementing 
presidential decisions than in making decisions. The departments had 
a good deal of influence in the implementation of presidential deci-
sions, such as easing trade restrictions against the PRC, gradually 
withdrawing personnel and military equipment from Taiwan, and 
arms sales to Taiwan. But the decision of when and how to normalize 
relations with the PRC was totally controlled by the White House. 
When the decision was made not to normalize relations with Beijing, 
implementation of the decision was irrelevant to its success. 
When President Carter took office in January 1977, the issue of 
normalization with the PRC was not on the list of foreign policy pri-
orities. This was not because the Carter administration was not inter-
ested in normalizing relations with Beijing; rather it was because other 
foreign policy matters, such as the Middle East peace talks, SALT II, 
and the Panama Canal Treaties had assumed greater urgency and re-
quired the immediate attention of the president. That normalization 
with the PRC was an ultimate goal of U.S. foreign policy, however, 
was not questioned in the Carter administration. 
In May 1977, President Carter indicated in his Notre Dame 
speech that the American-Chinese relationship is "a central element" 
of U.S. global policy. President Carter hoped "to find a formula" that 
could bridge some of the difficulties that still separated the United 
States and the PRC (Brzezinski, 1983:199). 
On 27 June 1977, a policy review committee under Assistant Sec-
retary Richard Holbrooke's direction recommended a "near term" 
recognition of the PRC (Vance, 1983:78). In late 1977, President 
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Carter met with Brown, Vance, Brezezinski, Holbrooke, and Ok-
senberg to discuss the strategic and domestic political implications of 
normalization of relations with the PRC. At the end of that meeting, 
President Carter said that he wanted to complete normalization and 
asked Vance to prepare a draft of a communique to be issued in Bei-
jing if the PRC responded favorably to a U.S. presentation (Vance, 
1983:79). President Carter approved the State Department's draft in 
early August. 
On 22 August 1977, one day before Vance's trip to China, how-
ever, President Carter had second thoughts and pulled back the nor-
malization decision after talking to Vice President Walter Mondale on 
the Panama Canal Treaties issue (Brzezinski, 1983:201. See also 
Vance, 1983:79). President Carter realized that it would be unwise to 
move toward full normalization with the PRC before final approval of 
the Panama Canal Treaties by Congress. The strategy used by the 
Carter administration during Vance's trip to China was to delay the 
normalization by proposing to the PRC a "maximum position": "U.S. 
government personnel would have to remain on Taiwan after normali-
zation, under an informal arrangement, for the purpose of rendering 
practical assistance to U.S. citizens in Taiwan" (Vance, 1983:79). In 
an interview with Richard Holbrooke, assistant secretary of state for 
the East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 1977-1980, Holbrooke said that 
"we knew the Chinese would turn down Vance's proposal. But we 
needed time. There was never any question in my mind that we would 
fall back." 10 
In brief, the delay of the normalization decision from 1974-1977 
was mainly a result of rational assessments of domestic and interna-
tional environments. The bureaucratic politics model explains very 
little about the decision-making process during the stagnation period 
of U.S.-PRC relations. Definitive judgments of the impact of the bu-
reaucratic factor, however, must await declassification of official 
documents. 
1978: The Year of the Normalization Decision 
Negotiations on normalization began in July 1978. The key players 
from the Carter administration were President Carter, Cyrus Vance, 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Harold Brown, Richard Holbrooke, and Michel 
Oksenberg. The inner group was deliberately limited to a few key cab-
inet members in order to prevent leaks. The head of the U.S. liaison 
office in Beijing, Leonard Woodcock, and the Chinese represent-
10. Interview with Richard Holbrooke, assistant secretary for State Department Bu-
reau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 1977-1980. 4 June 1982. Washingt?n, D.C. 
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ative, Chai Tse-min, presented each government's positions on 
normalization. 
Secretary of State Vance was out of the country during the last 
stage of intensive negotiations in December 1978. On 13 December 
1978, two days before the normalization announcement, President 
Carter asked Vance to return to Washington from the peace negotia-
tions in Jerusalem. Brzezinski's influence on the timing of the normal-
ization announcement and the final negotiations of the terms of the 
normalization agreement was much greater than Vance's. For exam-
ple, Brzezinski was the one who suggested using the formula of "agree 
to disagree" on the arms sales issue, which was the last objection Bei-
jing raised before the final wrapping up of the normalization 
agreement. 
Vance was reported to be skeptical of the timing of the normaliza-
tion announcement because of his concern of its potential impact on 
the SALT II negotiations. 11 There was little disagreement, however, 
on the terms of the normalization agreement. It was generally agreed 
among the White House, the State Department, and the Defense De-
partment that: 
1. the benefits of normalization with Beijing outweighed 
the potential costs of severing diplomatic and military 
relations with Taiwan; 
2. Taiwan's strategic importance as a military base dimin-
ished considerably after the fall of Vietnam; 
3. there was no point to press the PRC to formally re-
nounce the use of force against Taiwan since this was a 
non-negotiable term the PRC had reiterated publicly 
throughout the 1970s; 
4. The PRC had no intention or capability to launch a war 
against Taiwan in the near future. Therefore, Taiwan's 
security would not be in danger immediately after the 
normalization of relations between Washington and 
Beijing. 12 
President Carter's China team consisted of like-minded players. 
II. Whit Stillmen, "Sincerity in Foreign Policy," American Spectator 12, 2 (February 
1979), cited from U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Taiwan hearings, 
96th Congress, 1st session, February 5-8, 21, 22, 1979:480. See also Vance, 1983:118). 
12. For details see: testimonies of Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense; General David 
Jones, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense; Warren Christopher, Dep-
uty Secretary of State Department; Michael Armacost, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State; and Roger Sullivan, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, in U.S. Senate, Taiwan hearings. See also 
Vance, 1983:75-78, 81, 117; Brzezinski, 1983:196-233; and Carter, 1982:186-201. 
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Although there was little pulling and hauling among the key partici-
pants on accepting PRC's three conditions for normalization, there 
were some disagreements on other matters. Ambassador Feldman, 
Director of Republic of China Affairs, State Department, 1977-1979, 
pointed out in a personal letter as follows: 
Some of the participants were quite willing to agree to Chi-
nese demands that all treaties and agreements with the Re-
public of China were to end at normalization; others were 
not. Some participants were prepared to accede to the PRC 
position that granting Ex[port]-Import loans was an official 
act of government, and that therefore no such loans could be 
made to Taiwan after normalization. And some advisers 
were even prepared to accept the PRC position on arms 
sales.U 
General David Jones, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pre-
ferred an absolutely firm commitment in writing from the Chinese that 
under no conditions would they attack Taiwan. 14 The Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, however, were not involved in the negotiations. During congres-
sional hearings on Taiwan relations legislation on 22 February 1979, 
General David Jones, asked by Senator Charles H. Percy why the 
Carter administration did not insist on a commitment from Beijing not 
to use force against Taiwan, replied: "I think a very precise answer 
would have to come from those who were running the negotiations." 15 
The bureaucratic factor, however, was not completely irrelevant 
to the final outcome of the normalization agreement. Various inter-
agency studies were requested by the White House, and these bureau-
cratic studies were valuable in providing background information. 
One secret study by the Defense Department, entitled Consolidated 
Guidance Study No. 9, was leaked to the press. This document as-
sessed what Taiwan's defense needs would be after normalization of 
relations between Washington and Beijing. This study was a working 
level draft and never got into final form. 16 The contents of this docu-
ment, however, provide a clue as to why the Carter administration 
insisted on the limited arms sales to Taiwan during the normalization 
negotiations. The 60-page document stressed that the United States 
must continue military links to Taiwan and keep Taiwan's forces from 
falling into disarray. This document assumed that Taiwan could de-
fend itself against attack so long as the United States maintained an 
13. Ambassador Feldman's personal letter to the author, dated 4 January 1984. 
14. Testimony of General David Jones in Taiwan, op. cit., p. 752. 
15. Ibid. 
16. lbid:750. 
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arms sale relationship with Taiwan and provided some air support. 
This study suggested, therefore, that the United States should continue 
to supply air defense equipment, military spare parts, and other mate-
rial to Taiwan (Weinraub, 1978:23). 
The bureaucratic politics model also enriches analysis of the nor-
malization decision making by its assumption that governmental ac-
tions are intranational political resultants. Although the 1978 
normalization decision making could be better explained by like-
minded players than by pulling and hauling among players, the pulling 
and hauling between Vance and Brzezinski still contributed to an ex-
planation of the timing of the normalization agreement. 
Allison points out that power determines each player's impact on 
results. Bargaining advantages, and skill and will in using bargaining 
advantages, are some of the main elements of power. Allison further 
elaborates the main sources of power, as follows: 
The sources of bargaining advantages include formal author-
ity and responsibility (stemming from positions); actual con-
trol over resources necessary to carry out actions; expertise 
and control over information that enables one to define the 
problem, identify options, and estimate feasibilities; control 
over information that enables chiefs to determine whether 
and in what form decisions are being implemented; the abil-
ity to affect other players' objectives in other games; personal 
persuasiveness with other players (drawn from personal rela-
tions, charisma); and access to and persuasiveness with play-
ers who have bargaining advantages drawn from the above 
(based on interpersonal relations, etc.) (Allison, 1971:168-
69). 
The power struggle between Secretary of State Vance and Na-
tional Security Adviser Brzezinski was out in the open in April 1980 
when Vance resigned in protest against President Carter's Iran rescue 
mission. The Vance-Brzezinski relationship was similar to the Rogers-
Kissinger relationship during the Nixon years, and perhaps to the 
Haig-Allen conflict during the Reagan administration. The main dif-
ference was that National Security Adviser Kissinger was the winner 
in most foreign policy disputes with Secretary of State Rogers, but 
National Security Adviser Brzezinski did not always prevail over Sec-
retary of State Vance. 
The successful opening of China was important to Brzezinski in 
his power struggle against Secretary of State Vance. The two did not 
disagree over the importance of normalization. The difference was 
rather in how to approach Moscow and Beijing at the same time. 
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Should the United States take an "evenhanded" policy toward the 
PRC and the Soviet Union? Or should the United States play the 
China card to induce Soviet cooperation with Washington? Would it 
be better for the United States to first conclude SALT II, and then to 
normalize relations with the PRC? Or should normalization with the 
PRC proceed first, before SALT II? 
As a lawyer, Vance believed in mediation and compromise be-
tween conflicting parties at home and abroad. He thought that the 
United States and the Soviet Union had mutual interests (Gelb, 
1980:A23). Brzezinski, on the other hand, believed that Soviet-Ameri-
can relations were deeply adversary. Detente with the Soviet Union 
created a false sense of security for the American people. Brzezinski 
favored taking a tougher stand toward Soviet aggression in the world. 
Normalization with China was viewed by Brzezinski within the con-
text of global U.S.-Soviet relations. 
At the beginning of the Carter administration, the president 
adopted Vance's view of an "evenhanded" policy toward Moscow and 
Beijing, but after Soviet interventions in Ethiopia and Zaire, President 
Carter leaned toward Brzezinski's position. In a speech delivered in 
March 1978, President Carter linked trade and future Soviet-Ameri-
can scientific and economic cooperation to Soviet aggression in Africa 
and the growth of Soviet military power (Garrett, 1981 :242). Brzezin-
ski's subsequent trip to China in May was interpreted as another step 
in this move against the Soviet Union. Secretary Vance opposed 
Brzezinski's trip to China, believing it might complicate Vance's 
scheduled meeting with Gromyko in New York at the end of May 
1978. 17 
Brzezinski's visit to China was a turning point in Sino-American 
relations; negotiations of normalization began after he returned. But 
Brzezinski's anti-Soviet view greatly departed from Vance's "even-
handed" approach. In the spring of 1978, the Vance-Brzezinski rift 
over power and policy grew to such proportions that the House Inter-
national Relations Committee wrote a letter to President Carter ask-
ing who was running foreign policy (Quinn, 1979a:C3). Vance 
reportedly told President Carter that he would have to choose between 
Brzezinski's hard line and his own cooler approach toward the Soviet 
Union. In June 1978, at a regular meeting of senior foreign policy 
advisers, President Carter reassured Vance that he was the principal 
foreign policy spokesman (Kaiser, 1980:A21. See also Brzezinski, 
17. Interview with Michel Oksenberg, a staff member of the National Security Council 
during the Carter administration, 4 September 1981. New York City. See also Vance, 
1983:114-15 and Brzezinski, 1983:202-09. 
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1983:220-21). For months before the announcement of the normaliza-
tion agreement, Brzezinski kept a low profile. 
Normalization, for Brzezinski, was a significant personal tri-
umph. He was the key figure in Washington in negotiating the nor-
malization agreement during the final crucial period, December 13-15, 
and was the dominant influence in the timing of the announcement. 
Holbrooke revealed in an interview that the PRC originally proposed 
1 January 1979 as the date for the announcement, but Brzezinski suc-
ceeded in convincing President Carter to change the time to 15 De-
cember 1978 in order to prevent leaks. 18 Before he left for the Middle 
East on 11 December 1978, Vance personally approved the final in-
structions to Ambassador Woodcock for Woodcock's meeting with 
Teng Hsiao-p'ing. The report of the Teng-Woodcock meeting came 
back on 13 December 1978, when Vance was in Jerusalem. The final 
negotiations on the normalization agreement and the time of its an-
nouncement were made without the participation of Vance (Vance, 
1983:118-19; Brzezinski, 1983:231-32). By the time Vance returned to 
Washington, it was too late to change the timing of the announcement. 
Vance would have preferred to delay the announcement until after the 
Vance-Gromyko meeting to be held before Christmas 1978 (Vance, 
1983:118-19). Holbrooke believed that Brzezinski chose a wrong tim-
ing, but it reflected that Brzezinski had more influence than did Vance 
in conducting the final negotiations. 
CONCLUSION 
The main problem of the bureaucratic politics model is that it underes-
timates the power of the president. From study of the U.S.-China nor-
malization of relations decision making, we witness that the president 
turned out to be the one who could initiate, dictate, as well as imple-
ment the new China policy. 
President Nixon had the power to cut the State Department out 
of the making of the China initiative, in order to avoid bureaucratic 
battles. President Carter included the State Department in negotiating 
the normalization agreement with the PRC. President Carter, how-
ever, had the power to choose the players. According to Holbrooke, 
the East Asia and Pacific Affairs division of the State Department was 
the center of the normalization negotiations. Holbrooke accepted the 
position of assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific Affairs 
18. Interview with Richard Holbrooke, 4 June 1982. Washington, D.C. Brzezinski, 
however, pointed out in an interview that President Carter did not need to be convinced by 
him. Carter was the one who decided to announce the normalization as early as possible in 
order to prevent leaks. 21 February 1986. Washington. D.C. 
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after President Carter and Secretary of State Vance agreed to put 
China back into his bureau. 19 Participation of Holbrooke's bureau and 
Secretary of State Vance in the normalization negotiations did not im-
ply involvement of the whole State Department. As a matter of fact, 
in the State Department, Vance, Holbrooke, and Warren Christopher, 
the Deputy Secretary of State, were the only officials who knew of the 
negotiations.20 The Policy Planning Division of the State Department, 
for example, was cut out of the decision making on normalization per 
Secretary of State Vance's personal instruction.21 
In the Defense Department, Secretary of Defense Brown was the 
only person who participated in the negotiations.22 The Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, the Commerce Department, the CIA, the Treasury Depart-
ment, and the Justice Department did not know anything about the 
normalization decision making. 23 
The most complicated aspect of the normalization issue was the 
legislation-the so-called Taiwan Relations Legislation Act. President 
Carter had considered letting the Justice Department do the drafting 
of the Taiwan Relations Act, but decided against it for fear of leaks. 
Instead, President Carter had a separate team of lawyers, completely 
separated from the negotiation team, work on the legislation issue. 
These lawyers were not knowledgeable about the negotiations.24 
Each department was asked to submit a policy study and formal 
19. Interview with Richard Holbrooke, 4 June 1982. Washington, D.C. 
20. Ibid. Ambassador Harvey Feldman, however, had a different opinion. Feldman 
indicated in a personal letter to the author, dated January 4, 1984, that "I think Holbrooke 
is covering his tail-and maybe Vance's too--because that was his (and Vance's) instruc-
tion from Carter. In point of fact, others knew as well: Roger Sullivan, who was then 
Deputy Assistant Secretary in East Asian Bureau; Harry Thayer, the Country Director for 
PRC Affairs; and to a degree (though less than the others) I also. Herb Hansell, the Legal 
Adviser, was consulted from time to time. Donald Anderson, Thayer's deputy, had a gen-
eral idea. In Beijing, J. Stapleton Roy, the Deputy Chief of Mission, was fully involved. 
21. Interview with Richard Holbrooke, June 4, 1982. Washington, D.C. 
22. Ibid. 
23. Ibid. 
24. Ibid. Ambassador Feldman did not agree with Holbrooke's view. Feldman 
pointed out in a personal letter to the author, dated January 4, 1984, that "as far as I am 
aware (and granted, I do not claim to know everything that was going on), the only lawyers 
working on normalization issues were: Herb Hansell, the Legal Adviser, who, together 
with me consulted in secret with former Attorney General Herbert Brownell; Jim Michel, 
who occasionally was asked by Hansell to write a paper on a specific subject; Steve Orlins, 
who occasionally was asked by me to write on a specific legal subject. At normalization, 
work was begun on a crash basis by teams of lawyers in the Legal Division of the State 
Department, consulting with other agencies of government as necessary. Jim Michel began 
drafting the Taiwan Relations Act with help from Steve Orlins, from the then Assistant 
Secretary of State for Administration, John Thomas, and from me. A group of lawyers 
under Assistant Legal Adviser Lee Marks began working on topics like Ex-Import loans, 
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statement on the normalization issue to the White House. But once 
their views were presented to the White House, they were cut out of 
the decision-making process.25 Congress also was deliberately cut out 
of the negotiation process by President Carter. 26 
The opening of China in 1971 was made possible because Presi-
dent Nixon successfully kept the initiative secret and bypassed the po-
tentially most troublesome department-the State Department. 
President Carter used the same strategy. The inner group was small 
and the whole negotiation process was kept secret. 
In brief, the normalization process from 1969 to 1978 provided an 
illuminating case study that demonstrated the importance of presiden-
tial preferences. President Nixon initiated and implemented the open-
ing of the new China policy through backchannels. During Nixon's 
trip to China in 1972, Nixon and Kissinger dominated the negotiations 
of the Shanghai Communique. In 1973, once again, President Nixon 
and Kissinger responded to Chinese subtle suggestions and moved to-
ward establishment of the liaison offices. From 1974 to 1977, Presi-
dents Nixon, Ford, and Carter separately came to the same decision to 
delay normalization for domestic and international considerations. 
Three conclusions emerge. First, presidential preferences were of 
overriding importance in explaining the timing and terms of the nor-
malization decision. The president had the power to select players and 
action channels, thus manipulating the bureaucratic politics game. 
Second, the bureaucratic politics model is of only limited use in ex-
plaining the normalization decision making. The normalization deci-
sion-making processes are better explained by the workings of like-
minded players than by the bureaucratic politics perspective. The 
governmental departments, however, had contributed to the normali-
zation decision making by providing critical background information 
in their policy review studies. Implementation is another area in 
which the bureaucratic politics factor may have its imprint on policy. 
On the normalization issue, the importance of implementation ranked 
second only to the decision itself. Once the U.S. government an-
nounced the normalization agreement, poor implementation of the 
agreement by any responsible department would not change the fact 
that the United States had already recognized the PRC and severed 
diplomatic relations with the Republic of China in Taiwan. The U.S. 
Congress, however, was more germane to the successful implementa-
IAEA inspections, treaty obligations, etc. But I want to emphasize that no practical legal 
work, and no legislative drafting, was done prior to the December 15 announcement." 
25. Interview with Richard Holbrooke, June 4, 1982. Washington, D.C. 
26. Ibid. 
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tion of the normalization agreement. Both the appointment of the 
U.S. ambassador to the PRC and enactment of the Taiwan Relations 
Act, for example, required the approval of Congress. 
Third, the assumption of "where you stand depends on where you 
sit" explains some of the department's stand, but it does not help illu-
minate the timing and the terms of the normalization agreement. The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff's stand on obtaining a firm commitment from the 
PRC not to use force against Taiwan could be explained from the per-
spective of the military branch's parochial and dominant concern-
keeping military bases and commitments. A firm commitment from 
Beijing on the Taiwan issue would secure Taiwan as a military base 
from falling into the hands of a communist country. If Taiwan's se-
curity was not in danger, the charges against the U.S. decision toter-
minate the defense treaty with Taiwan could also be lessened. In the 
early years of the Nixon administration, the State Department was 
reluctant to cooperate with the White House on the new China policy 
because of the diplomatic consequences of the China initiative. Secre-
tary of State Vance's preference for the timing of the normalization 
announcement-after the final round of negotiations on SALT 11-
could also be explained from this perspective. 
Some of the characteristics of bureaucratic behavior, such as iner-
tia, preference for the status quo, lack of innovation, and incremental 
,changes, also help us understand why major policy shifts, such as the 
new China policy, are initiated from the top level of the government 
rather than from the lower level of bureaus. The personal power 
struggle and bureaucratic rivalry between the State Department and 
the National Security Council (Rogers vs. Kissinger and Vance vs. 
Brzezinski) enriches analysis of normalization decision making. Bu-
reaucratic rivalry, however, was not a determining factor in influenc-
ing the outcome of the normalization decision making. Presidential 
preference is the most important explanation of the normalization is-
sue. The bureaucratic politics model can be seen as a supplementary 
element in the analysis of the normalization case. 
In a negative and paradoxical sense, however, the influence of the 
bureaucratic politics model in the normalization decision making was 
not insignificant. Just as no decision is one kind of a decision, so also 
was the absence of bureaucratic politics (avoidance of bureaucratic 
participation and rivalry) tantamount to a kind of bureaucratic politics 
game. The very fact that Nixon, Kissinger, Carter, Brzezinski, and 
Vance were successful in cutting out all other governmental actors and 
units from the process points to the significant influence of bureau-
cratic politics. Otherwise, Nixon and Carter would not have bothered 
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to maintain such extraordinary secrecyY 
Domestic politics must be considered as still another factor that 
affected the pace of normalization decision making. One example can 
demonstrate this point. Secretary of State Vance's visit to China in 
August 1977 came after the Panama Canal Treaties were concluded. 
National Security Adviser Brzezinski's trip to Beijing in May came 
right after the Panama Canal Treaties were ratified by the Senate. 
President Carter did not want to take up two controversial foreign 
policy issues at the same time, which was the main reason the normali-
zation decision was delayed until the final settlement of the Panama 
Canal Treaties. The impact of domestic politics on the normalization 
issue is the main focus of analysis of the next chapter. 
27. This perspective came from a discussion with Dr. Stanley J. Heginbotham, Chief, 
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of 
Congress, in November 1984. 
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THE DOMESTIC POLITICS MODEL 
No analysis of the normalization decision making would be complete 
without considering the domestic politics factors. By the late 1960s, 
the emotional debate on "who lost China" had subsided. But whether 
the United States should normalize relations with the PRC was still a 
controversial domestic issue. There was, however, no strong domestic 
movement to reconsider the old containment policy toward the PRC. 
In 1970, the U.S. Congress still publicly opposed the seating of the 
PRC in the United Nations and supported the continuing seating of 
the Republic of China. Public opinion and congressional attitudes 
changed significantly after President Nixon's trip to China in 1972. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to examine the extent to which the 
domestic politics factors-public opinion, Congress, presidential elec-
tion, and interest groups-affected the timing and terms of the nor-
malization decision. 
THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION 
The main problem of using public opinion as a guide for policy makers 
is that the vast majority of Americans are either ill-informed or apa-
thetic about foreign affairs. Public opinion on foreign policy issues 
tends to be unstable, acquiescent, and manipulable (Kegley and 
Wittkopf, 1982:270-93). As a consequence, the American public looks 
to the president for cues. Various data indicate that American public 
opinion is inclined to be permissive and supportive of presidential deci-
sions in foreign affairs (Spanier and Uslaner, 1978:92-93; Almond, 
1960:29-68). 
Shifts of American public attitudes toward the PRC provides an 
illuminating example of the volatility of public opinion. There have 
been significant changes in public opinion toward Beijing since 1949. 
In December 1950, a poll indicated that 81 percent of respondents 
blamed the Soviet Union for Chinese intervention in the Korean War. 
Only 5 percent of the people polled believed that the PRC had acted 
on its own initiative (Oksenberg and Oxnam, 1978:78). The PRC was 
perceived a Soviet puppet. But as the war advanced, American hostil-
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ity toward the PRC increased. The American image of an aggressive 
and expansionist China was further reinforced by the Formosa Strait 
crisis in 1958 and the Sino-Indian War in 1962. 
In the 1950s, the American public supported the government's 
policy of nonrecognition (see table 2). The American public also op-
posed seating the PRC in the United Nations throughout the 1950s 
and 1960s (see table 3). In 1967, during the Cultural Revolution and 
the Vietnam War, a Gallup poll indicated that 71 percent of the Amer-
ican public thought China a greater threat to world peace than the 
Soviet Union (20 percent saw Russia as the greater threat; 9 percent 
were undecided). 
Table 2 
U.S. Attitudes Toward Dealing With Communist China* 
June Apr. July Feb. Aug. July Dec. Feb. Jan. Aug. 
1949 1950 1954 1955 1955 1956 1956 1957 1958 1958 
Favorable 23 26 8 20 17 11 15 13 17 20 
Unfavorable 50 57 79 62 71 74 69 70 66 63 
No Opinion 21 16 12 17 12 15 15 17 17 17 
No Answer 6 1 
• Poll results provided by The Roper Public Opinion Research Center. All data are from 
American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup). Percentages of respondents answering 
are shown. Data source: Robert Newman, Recognition of Communist China? (New 
York: Macmillan Company, 1961): 15. 
Meanwhile, the American public began to show interest in im-
proving relations with the PRC in the 1960s. In 1961, 53 percent fa-
vored taking steps to improve relations with China with only 32 
percent against it. Forty-seven percent of the American public fa-
vored establishment of trade relations with the PRC (35 percent op-
posed it) (Oksenberg and Oxnam, 1978:81). A national survey of 
American opinion on U.S. policy toward the PRC, conducted in May 
and June 1964, also showed that a large majority of those polled (73 
percent) favored following presidential leadership in improving rela-
tions with the PRC, such as easing trade restrictions (Steele, 1966:277, 
281-82). 
In October 1966, a Gallup poll of an elite group, whose members 
appeared in Who's Who, revealed that 64 percent favored admitting 
the PRC to the United Nations and only 32 percent opposed it, 
although a poll of the mass public still showed that a majority of 
Americans still opposed admission of the PRC to the United Nations 
(56 percent to 25 percent) (Oksenberg and Oxnam, 1978:81). In May 
1971, five months before the PRC was admitted to the United Nations, 
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Table 3 
Admittance of the PRC as a Member of the 
United Nations* 
Date Should Should Not No Opinion 
% % % 
1950 11 58 31 
July 1954 7 78 15 
Aug. 1954 8 79 13 
1956 11 74 15 
1957 13 70 17 
1958 17 66 17 
Oct. 1961 18 65 17 
Feb. 1964 15 71 14 
Apr. 1966 25 55 20 
Feb. 1969 33 54 13 
Oct. 1970 35 49 16 
May 1971 45 38 17 
* Surveys were conducted by American Institute for Public Opinion: Do you think that 
Communist China should or should not be admitted as a member of the United Nations? 
Data source: Public Opinion Quarterly, 44, No.2 (Summer 1980): 270. Technically, the 
question before the UN was not the admission of the PRC as a UN member, but rather 
what government (PRC or ROC?) should be seated as the representative of China-a 
charter member state of the UN. 
the American public, for the first time, shifted to favor admission of 
Beijing in the United Nations (see table 3). 
On the issue of recognition of the PRC, American public opinion 
supported the extension of diplomatic ties with Beijing even before 
President Nixon's trip to China (see table 4). A majority of the Amer-
ican public, however, did not favor establishing full diplomatic rela-
tions with the PRC at the cost of severing diplomatic ties with Taiwan. 
Public polls indicated that the overwhelming majority of Americans 
favored continuing diplomatic relations with Taiwan. But the Ameri-
can public was reluctant to provide military aid to Taiwan if attacked 
by the PRC (see table 5). 
The American public's knowledge about China, however, was 
limited. In April 1977, a survey by the Gallup organization for the 
Potomac Associates revealed that 56 percent of individuals questioned 
were not sure whether the government in Taiwan was communist 
(Kau, 1978:138). One-third of the respondents did not even know 
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Table 4 
Diplomatic Ties with the PRC and Taiwan (ROC)* 
Establish Ties Continue Ties Derecognize Taiwan 
with PRC with Taiwan in Favor of Source 
Normalization 
with PRC 
Date 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
% % % % % % 
1966 43 33 Harris 
1967 41 34 Harris 
1968 39 44 Harris 
1971 55 20 Harris 
1975 61 23 70 14 10 70 Gallup 
1976 64 18 26 51 Foreign Policy 
Association 
1977 (April) I 68 19 33 53 Foreign Policy 
Association 
1977 (April) 62 21 61 22 28 47 Potomac Associates 
1977 (August) 56 23 64 12 8 65 Gallup 
1978 66 25 Harris 
1979 (January) 60 27 Harris 
• It should be noted that the wording of the questions asked was not identical, but the contents are roughly comparable. Data from the Foreign Policy 
Association polls are based on ballots cast by its study groups across the nation. The Potomac Associates poll was conducted by the Gallup Organization. 
The "no opinion" responses are not shown here, but obviously amount to the remaining percentage of respondents in each case. Data source: from 
Michael Y. M. Kau et al., "Public Opinion and Our China Policy," Asian Affairs 5, no. 3, (January-February 1978): 136 and Connie De Boer, "The Polls: 
Changing Attitudes and Policies Toward China," Public Opinion Quarterly, 44, no. 2, (Summer 1980): 271. 
Table 5 
Provide Military Aid to Taiwan if Attacked* 
Date Yes No Source 
% % 
1971 41 45 Potomac Associates 
1973 27 54 Harris 
1974 17 59 Harris 
1975 (April) 35 54 Gallup 
1975 (October) 47 31 Gallup 
1977 (April) 43 40 Foreign Policy Association 
1977 (April) 36 40 Potomac Associates 
1978 32 48 Potomac Associates 
1979 34 51 Potomac Associates 
• The wording of the questions varies, but the contents are roughly comparable. The "no 
opinion" responses are not shown here, but obviously amount to the remaining percent-
age of respondents in each case. Data source: Kau, "Public Opinion and Our China 
Policy," p. 137 and Richard Sneider and William Watts, The United States and Korea: 
New Directions for the '80s (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Associates, 1980), p. 15. 
whether "mainland China" had a communist government. 1 The sub-
stantial ignorance or misinformation of the American public suggested 
that the president had much freedom to set his policy direction and to 
shape public opinion on the issue of normalization of relations with 
China. For example, the American public image of the PRC had sig-
nificantly improved since President Nixon's new China policy. In the 
fall of 1971, 56 percent of the Americans polled thought China its 
greatest threat, while 27 percent believed the Soviet Union as its great-
est danger (Solomon, 1978:329). In 1976, the American public treated 
China and the Soviet Union just about the same; a Gallup poll re-
vealed that 21 percent had favorable views of China while 20 percent 
viewed the Soviet Union favorably (Solomon, 1978:329). American 
favorable views of China jumped from 26 percent in 1977 to 65 per-
cent in 1979, after the full normalization of relations with China (see 
table 6). 
In July and August 1977, just before Vance's trip to China, a 
survey of "opinion elites" was conducted by a research team at Brown 
University. Questionnaires were sent to 1,800 elites, including all 
I. William Watts, Ralph N. Clough, and Robert B. Oxnam, The United States and 
China: American Perception and Future Alternatives (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Associ-
ation, 1977), pp. 27-28. 
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Table 6 
Scalometer Ratings of China (PRC) and Taiwan (ROC)* 
China (PRC) Taiwan (ROC) 
Date Favorable Unfavorable Favorable Unfavorable 
% % % % 
1967 5 91 
1972 23 71 53 38 
1973 49 43 
1975 28 58 48 39 
1976 20 73 55 34 
1977 26 52 56 18 
1979 65 25 64 20 
• All data taken from Gallup polls. The 1975 poll was conducted by the Gallup Organiza-
tion for the Chinese Information Service, and the 1977 and 1979 polls for Potomac Asso-
ciates. The "no opinion" responses are not shown here, but obviously amount to the 
remaining percentage of respondents in each case. Data Source: Kau, "Public Opinion 
and Our China Policy," p. 135 and Sneider and Watts, The United Stares and Korea: 
New Directions for the '80s, p. 18. 
members of the U.S. Congress, members of Democratic and Republi-
can National Committees, State governors, State legislative leaders, 
State Chairmen of both Democratic and Republican Parties, publish-
ers and editors of major newspapers, and executive officers and news 
directors of major television stations. Forty-one percent of the elites 
responded. While endorsing the principle of normalization, the survey 
revealed that nearly nine out of ten opinion leaders were opposed to 
normalization of relations with the PRC under Beijing's three condi-
tions (see table 7). Fifty-five percent of the respondents favored con-
tinuation of diplomatic relations with Taiwan after normalization of 
relations between the PRC and the United States. While 40 percent of 
opinion elites favored maintaining U.S. security commitments and 
military presence in Taiwan after normalization, 58 percent wished to 
reduce the security commitments to the island (see table 8). 
In brief, the mass public and elite opinion polls in the 1970s all 
indicated that the American public's distrust of Beijing had signifi-
cantly diminished after President Nixon's China initiative. A majority 
of Americans favored negotiation with, rather than confrontation to-
ward, the PRC. Full normalization of diplomatic relations with the 
Chinese Communists had become well supported by the American 
people. The only reservation was that a majority of American people 
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Table 7 
Brown University Survey of Opinion Leaders' Attitudes 
toward U.S.-China Normalization and Taiwan* 
Question Favor Oppose No Opinion 
% % % 
Accept the PRC's "three demands" 
as the precondition for 
normalization. 5 93 2 
Pursue normalization without 
jeopardizing the "independence and 
freedom" of Taiwan. 89 7 4 
Continue to honor our diplomatic 
ties and defense treaty with Taiwan 
if it declares independence. 75 11 14 
Agree Disagree No Opinion 
% % % 
Taiwan can survive the PRC's 
economic and military pressure 
without outside aid. 8 67 25 
Unilateral U.S. disengagement 
from Taiwan would hurt our 
leadership and credibility in Asia. 72 23 5 
U.S. derecognition and 
disengagement from Taiwan may 
prompt Taiwan to seek Soviet aid 
and/or develop nuclear weapons. 45 26 29 
* Conducted July-August 1977. Data are based on returns from 733 respondents. Data 
Source: Kau, "Public Opinion and Our China Policy," p. 141. 
did not want to normalize relations with the PRC at the expense of 
Taiwan-American relations. 
THE ROLE OF CONGRESS 
In 1971, Roger Hilsman described the power of Congress in foreign 
affairs as a "negative, limit-setting power-the power of deterrence 
and the threat of retaliation" (Hilsman, 1971:83). The role of Con-
gress in the making of foreign policy underwent some significant 
changes in the 1970s. In the wake of the Vietnam war and Watergate, 
Congress no longer felt content to continue the passive role it had 
played in foreign affairs since World War II. Charles Kegley and Eu-
gene Wittkopf summarized the following actions to show growing con-
gressional assertiveness in foreign affairs, as follows: 
• In 1970 Congress "repealed" the Gulf of Tonkin Resolu-
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Table 8 
Brown University Survey on Minimum Policy Options 
that the United States Should Take* 
Policy Options Choice 
% 
I. Diplomatic Representation in Taiwan 
A. Maintain the present embassy. 55 
B. Reduce representation to a liaison office. 28 
c. Reduce representation to a consular office. 11 
D. Reduce representation to an "unofficial" office. 4 
E. No opinion. 2 
2. Military Ties with Taiwan 
A. Maintain current security commitments and military presence. 40 
B. Reduce commitments to formal security guarantees and 
provide military aid. 36 
c. Reduce commitments to informal security assurances and 
provide arms sales. 16 
D. Reduce commitments to arms sales only. 6 
E. No opinion. 2 
3. Treaty Relations with Taiwan 
A. Maintain all treaties (military, economic, and cultural) 
currently in force. 56 
B. Reduce relations to economic and cultural treaties only 
(concerning loans, nuclear fuel, investment guarantees, most-
favored-nation tariff status, and so forth). 29 
c. Reduce relations to selective economic and cultural agreements. 9 
D. Reduce relations to trade relations only, with no special or 
preferential arrangements. 4 
E. No opinion. 3 
* See the explanatory note to table 7. Data Source: Kau, "Public Opinion and Our China 
Policy," p. 143. 
tion, which had given President Johnson, as interpreted 
by him, a "blank check" for prosecuting an undeclared 
war in Southeast Asia. 
• In 1973 Congress overrode President Nixon's veto to 
write the War Powers Act into law, thus requiring a 
modicum of consultation between the president and Con-
gress on the issue of dispatching troops abroad. 
• In 1974 Congress embargoed arms sales to Turkey in re-
taliation for its invasion of Cyprus, despite the protests of 
the Ford administration. 
• In 1974 Congress refused to permit the president to ex-
tend "most-favored-nation" (MFN) trade treatment to 
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the Soviet Union by linking MFN to emigration of Soviet 
Jews. 
• In 1975 Congress ensured termination of American par-
ticipation in the Vietnam war by denying the president 
authority to provide emergency military aid to the South 
Vietnamese government to forestall its imminent collapse 
in the face of communist forces. 
• In 1976 Congress prohibited continued expenditures by 
the CIA to bolster anti-Marxist forces fighting in Angola. 
• In 1976, fully 20 years after the proposal was first intro-
duced, the Senate established a permanent intelligence 
oversight committee to monitor the sprawling intelli-
gence community; the House followed suit a year later. 
• In 1980 Congress passed legislation designed to establish 
its right to prior notice by the executive branch of covert 
intelligence activities abroad (Kegley and Wittkopf, 
1982:394). 
The power of Congress in foreign policy decision making, how-
ever, is still limited. Congress is poorly equipped to compete effec-
tively with the executive branch in exercising direct control of, or in 
taking initiatives in, foreign affairs. Congressional weaknesses most 
often mentioned in making foreign policy were parochialism, lack of 
expertise, and organizational weaknesses (Kegley and Wittkopf, 
1982:403-12). 2 
Congressional preoccupation with biennial elections made Con-
gress more interested in domestic rather than foreign policies. Former 
Senator William Fulbright had the following observation: 
With their excessively parochial orientation, congressmen 
are acutely sensitive to the influence of private pressure and 
the excesses and inadequacies of a public opinion that is all 
too often ignorant of the needs, the dangers, and the oppor-
tunities in our foreign relations (Kegley and 
Wittkopf: 1982:403-04). 
Congress is also poorly equipped in terms of technical expertise and 
intelligence information to conduct foreign affairs. The decentraliza-
tion of power and responsibility within Congress and the overload of 
2. Aside from congressional weaknesses in the conduct of foreign affairs, it should be 
noted that constitutionally the president alone in external affairs has the power to speak 
and listen as a representative of the nation, and, moreover, only the presidency has the very 
delicate and exclusive power as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of 
international relations. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304 
(1936). 
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work by most representatives and senators further prevented Congress 
from taking a leadership role in foreign affairs. 
In this connection, it is not difficult to explain why the China 
initiative of the early 1970s came from the executive branch rather 
than from Congress. Congress, on the other hand, played a role of 
advice, consent, modification, restraint, and rejection, which also had 
an important impact on the process of the normalization of relations 
between the United States and the People's Republic of China. 
The Initiator-Respondent Role 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Congress supported the contain-
ment and isolation policy toward the PRC. Congress ratified the Mu-
tual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China in 1954 and the 
Formosa Resolution in 1955. Congress also backed the administra-
tion's policy of nonrecognition of the PRC and opposed the admission 
of Beijing to the United Nations. The old proposition that "the Presi-
dent proposes, Congress disposes" quite accurately described the rela-
tionship between the executive and the legislative branches on the 
China question. 
In the 1950s, new policy proposals toward Beijing made by some 
congressional representatives usually ended with no substantial re-
sults. For example, a few senators in 1957 advocated changing the 
nonrecognition policy toward Beijing. On 18 February 1957, Senator 
Theodore F. Green, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, 
suggested that the United States "should recognize Red China sooner 
or later" (Congressional Quarterly, 1980:28). In June 1957, Senator 
William Fulbright, second ranking majority member of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, said that recognition of Red China by 
the United States was inevitable in the course of time; the only ques-
tion was "when and how you do it" (Congressional Quarterly, 
1980:28). The Quemoy crisis of 1958, however, put an end to the ris-
ing sentiment in Congress for a revision in U.S. policy toward the 
PRC. 
In the mid-1960s, Congress began a series of debates over Viet-
nam and U.S. policy toward the PRC. Concerned about China's reac-
tion to growing American military involvement in Vietnam, the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee started a three-week hearing on U.S. 
policy toward China on 8 March 1966. Leading China scholars and 
experts were invited to give their thoughts on how to deal with the 
China issue. Professor A. Doak Barnett of Columbia University sug-
gested that "rigid dogmatism cannot point the way toward sound poli-
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cies."3 The maJonty of witnesses proposed a more flexible policy 
toward China, such as an expansion of trade relations, admission of 
the PRC into the United Nations, and recognition of the PRC by the 
United States.4 
On 19 May 1966, the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the 
Far East and Pacific released a hearing report on U.S. policy toward 
Asia. The report suggested that the United States should prevent Bei-
jing from engaging in expansion in Asia. Meanwhile, the United 
States should also continue to seek peaceful contacts with China (Con-
gressional Quarterly, 1980:33). 
Congressional interest in China was renewed at the end of the 
1960s. On 10 March 1969, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield 
urged the United States to put an end to special travel restrictions 
toward China. Mansfield also suggested that trade with China in non-
strategic goods should be put on the same basis as U.S. trade with 
other communist nations (Congressional Quarterly, 1980:36). Senator 
Edward Kennedy further advocated that the United States should es-
tablish consular relations with Communist China and should support 
the admission of Beijing to the United Nations. Kennedy also stated 
that these steps should be taken without jeopardizing U.S. relations 
with Taiwan (Congressional Quarterly, 1980:36). 
In September 1969, by a 77-3 roll-call vote, the Senate passed a 
resolution (S. Res. 205) which declared that U.S. recognition of a for-
eign government did not "of itself imply that the U.S. approves of the 
form, ideology or policy of that foreign government" (Congressional 
Quarterly, 1980:36). Senator Thomas J. Dodd, who voted against pas-
sage, said, "if the resolution is not intended to clear the way for the 
recognition of Communist China ... then it is difficult to understand 
the motivation behind it. ... " (Congressional Quarterly, 1980:36). 
A hearing report, published in July 1970 by the Senate Foreign 
Relations Subcommittee on U.S. Commitments Abroad, revealed that 
U.S. policy toward Taiwan was in a period of transition. Administra-
tion witnesses disclosed that U.S. military assistance was being phased 
out (Congressional Quarterly, 1980:36). Meanwhile, most ofthe China 
experts, who testified before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee 
on Asian and Pacific Affairs in the fall of 1970 and the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee in June 1971 and July, had urged a normaliza-
3. Quoted from A. Doak Barnett's testimony in U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China hearings, 89th Congress, 2nd 
session, March 8, 10, 16, 18, 21, 28, 30, 1966, p. 3. 
4. For details, see ibid. 
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tion of relations with the PRC. 5 
In the early 1970s, congressional support for U.S. commitment 
toward the Republic of China in Taiwan was firm. There was, how-
ever, a rising desire from Congress to revise the U.S. containment and 
isolation policy toward Beijing. Congress had supported President 
Nixon's policy to ease the trade embargo and travel restrictions to 
China. Congress also welcomed President Nixon's decision to visit 
China. In 1971, for the first time in 20 years, Congress failed to go on 
record against Beijing's admission to the United Nations. Senator 
Strom Thurmond stated in a news conference that, although he still 
supported nonadmission of the PRC to the United Nations, he was not 
sure that "the majority of Congress would oppose the seating of Com-
munist China in the United Nations this year" (Congressional Quar-
terly, 1980:37). 
There was, however, strong opposition in Congress against the 
expulsion of Taiwan from the United Nations. Immediately after the 
General Assembly's decision to expel Nationalist China from the 
United Nations on 25 October 1971, some members of Congress pro-
posed a reduction in U.S. financial support of the United Nations. 
Senator Barry Goldwater even suggested that the United States should 
withdraw from the United Nations (Congressional Quarterly, 1980:37). 
In 1971, the Nixon administration had urged the Senate to repeal 
the Formosa Resolution. The Senate failed to act on it because the 
debate on the repeal took place right after the expulsion of Taiwan 
from the United Nations. After repeated attempts, Congress, on 11 
October 1974, finally repealed the January 1955 Formosa Resolution, 
which had given the president the power to intervene in the Taiwan 
Strait in order to defend Taiwan. The administration wanted Con-
gress to repeal this resolution as part of the effort to normalize rela-
tions with the PRC (Congressional Quarterly, 1980:215). After the 
opening of the China door, Congress had also been supportive of the 
administration's policies of gradual withdrawal of American troops 
from Taiwan, less military aid to the government in Taiwan, and rap-
prochement with the PRC. 
In brief, at one level of analysis, the term "initiator-respondent" 
was rather accurate in describing the executive-congressional relation-
ship on the China issue. Bipartisan support on the China issue had 
5. For details see U.S. Congress, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on 
Asian and Pacific Affairs, United States-China Relations, A Strategy for the Future hear-
ings, 9lst Congress, 2d session, September 15-16, 22-24, 29-30; 6 October 1970; U.S. Con-
gress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, United States Relations with the People's 
Republic of China hearings, 92d Congress, 1st session, June 24-25, 28-29, and July 20, 
1971. 
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temporarily disappeared during 1949-1959 over the emotional debate 
of the "who-lost-China" question. Republicans in Congress blamed 
the Truman administration for betraying the Nationalist Government 
to the Chinese Communists. Both Republican and Democratic mem-
bers in Congress, however, gave their support to President Truman's 
policy to send the 7th Fleet to the Taiwan Strait to prevent any attack 
on Taiwan by the PRC. Subsequently, U.S. policy toward China dur-
ing the Eisenhower years had bipartisan cooperation. In the mid-
1960s, those members in Congress who advocated a policy of "con-
tainment without isolation" toward Beijing were mainly Democrats, 
with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as a base (Congressional 
Quarterly, 1980:25). Although there had been many arguments in 
Congress in favor of easing tensions with the PRC, there was no seri-
ous effort in Congress to push the administration to change U.S. policy 
toward Beijing. A.T. Steele in 1966 offered the following explanation 
for the passive congressional actions toward the China issue: 
There are many reasons, but several stand out: first, a kind of 
congressional paralysis, based on the assumption that any 
suggestion of change would provoke a hostile public reac-
tion; second, the reluctance of the administration and of in-
fluential private groups to take the initiative in encouraging a 
new look at the China situation; third, the quite evident con-
viction of a large sector of Congress that our present policy is 
right and offers the only acceptable choice under existing cir-
cumstances (Steele, 1966:205). 
The Restraining Role 
The executive branch was the main initiator of the new China policy 
in the early years of the Nixon administration. Congress responded 
favorably toward Sino-American rapprochement, but not at the ex-
pense of Taiwan's security. Facing a strong congressional and domes-
tic political opposition toward normalization with the PRC at the 
expense of Taiwan, President Nixon was particularly cautious during 
the drafting of the Shanghai Communique to avoid any charge that 
Sino-American rapprochement was achieved by abandoning Taiwan. 
President Nixon even used domestic political reasons to convince the 
Chinese of "the necessity of exercising moderation" on the Chinese 
claim to Taiwan during the negotiation of the Shanghai Communique 
(Nixon, 1979, v.2:40). Since the Ntxon administration was not able to 
make further concessions to the PRC on the Taiwan issue, there was 
no possibility of establishing full diplomatic relations with the PRC 
during President Nixon's visit to China in 1972. 
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In July 1978, the American Conservative Union (ACU) con-
ducted a poll of members of the House of Representatives on the nor-
malization question. Each congressional office was asked the 
following question: "Would you support normalization of relations 
with the People's Republic of China if it meant that the United States 
would have to sever full diplomatic ties with [the] Republic of China 
and abrogate our Mutual Defense pact with that country?" Of the 435 
members of the House of Representatives and four delegates that 
ACU reached, 211 stated their opposition to normalization on Bei-
jing's terms. Another 34 members said they were "leaning against" 
normalization on such terms. Only six congressmen stated that they 
were either in favor, or were "leaning in favor." One hundred eighty 
Congressmen either made no response or were undecided, and eight 
members refused to answer the poll (American Conservative News, 29 
July 1978; Rowe, 1979:89). 
The result of the poll clearly indicated that only a small number 
of congressmen favored normalization on Beijing's three conditions. 
In the summer of 1978, both the House and the Senate adopted a reso-
lution that called on the president to consult with Congress before 
making any policy changes affecting the continuation of the defense 
treaty with Taiwan. The unanimous passage (94-0) of Dole-Stone 
Amendment by the Senate further indicated congressional concerns 
about its role in the process of the normalization of relations between 
Washington and Beijing. 
Congressional debates on the issue of normalization took place 
within the forum of congressional hearings, study reports, and individ-
ual congressmen's comments. In late 1975 and the first half of 1976, 
the House Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy Research and De-
velopment conducted a series of nine hearings to explore and reap-
praise Sino-American relations within the context of triangular 
relationships among Beijing, Washington, and Moscow.6 At the same 
time, the House International Relations Committee held a series of 
hearings to review and assess the prospects for normalization with the 
PRC. Witnesses in those hearings offered a wide divergence of views 
on triangular relations and normalization terms. 
On the issue of normalization, several conclusions emerged from 
these hearings. First, it was in the U.S. national interest to normalize 
6. See U.S. Congress, House, United States-Soviet Union-China: The Great Power 
Triangle hearings, part I, op. cit., and U.S. Congress, House Committee on International 
Relations, Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy Research and Development, United 
States-Soviet Union-China: The Great Power Triangle hearings, part II, 94th Congress, 23 
March, 6 April, 27 May and 23 June 1979. 
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relations with the PRC. Second, the process of normalization of rela-
tions with Beijing would necessarily involve a downgrading of the U.S. 
relationship with Taiwan, although it was not clear what that dees-
calation should encompass. Third, the Taiwan issue was the core 
problem preventing a full normalization of relations and its impor-
tance should not be underestimated. 7 
The most prominent member in Congress to urge normalization 
with the PRC was Senator Edward Kennedy. Senator Kennedy be-
lieved that Sino-American normalization of relations would contribute 
to Taiwan's security. Kennedy did not think U.S. interests would be 
damaged by accepting Beijing's three demands. On 15 August 1977, 
the eve of Secretary of State Vance's trip to China, Senator Kennedy 
stated that the Carter administration should speed up the normaliza-
tion process. Kennedy warned that further delay might bring more 
difficulties on normalization negotiations and might also increase the 
possibility of Sino-Soviet rapprochement (Chan and Reardon-Ander-
son, 1978:67-68). 
Kennedy's view on normalization was not widely shared among 
members of Congress. Among those who spoke out against normali-
zation under Beijing's three conditions were Republican Senators 
Barry Goldwater, Robert Dole, Howard Baker, and Jacob Javits, and 
Representative Philip N. Crane. Besides these conservative Republi-
cans, some influential Democratic congressmen were also against Bei-
jing's terms for normalization: Senator John Sparkman, and 
Representatives Clement J. Zablocki, Samuel Stratton, and Lester L. 
Wolff. Senator Goldwater repeatedly warned the president of the risk 
of impeachment if the president unilaterally terminated the defense 
treaty with Taiwan. 
In brief, while supporting the goal of normalization with the 
PRC, the majority of congressional representatives were against nor-
malization under Beijing's terms. Congress wanted to see more secur-
ity guarantees for Taiwan. Some members of Congress, such as Ohio 
Representative John Ashbrook, recommended the "German 
Formula" for normalization. 8 Idaho Representative George Hansen, 
and Wisconsin Representative Clement J. Zablocki, Chairman of the 
House Committee on International Relations, preferred the "In-
dependent Taiwan" formula as a solution for the Taiwan question.9 
7. U.S. Congress, House, United States-China Relations: The Process of Normalization 
of Relations, p. v. 
8. U.S. Congressional Record, 4 August 1977, H8685, cited from Contemporary 
China 2, no. I (Spring 1978):72. 
9. Cited from U.S. Congress, House, United States-Soviet Union-China: The Great 
Power Triangle, part I. See also the statement of George Hansen in U.S. Congress, House 
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Senator Kennedy supported the Japanese formula for normalization. 
Congressional reluctance to accept Beijing's conditions for nor-
malization had been a restraining factor in delaying the administra-
tion's move toward normalization, especially when the 
administration's domestic political position was weakened, such as 
during the Watergate scandal and the withdrawal from Vietnam. A 
weak administration would be more vulnerable to congressional pres-
sure for fear that congressional opposition on one issue might extend 
to other issues of foreign or domestic affairs. This was why President 
Nixon was unable to move toward normalization with the PRC during 
the investigation of the Watergate scandal. President Ford was also in 
a poor position to deal with normalization after U.S. failure in Viet-
nam and during the presidential election. 
Hilsman was correct in describing that the role of Congress in 
foreign policy was almost never direct or initiative-taking (Hitsman, 
1971:78). Congress, however, is quite capable of influencing the out-
come offoreign policy indirectly. The case of Sino-American normali-
zation of relations was a good example. The president had the power 
to make the decision to normalize relations with Beijing any time 
before 1978. But in view of the unfavorable domestic and interna-
tional environment, the executive branch chose to delay the normali-
zation decision. Were there no strong congressional opposition to 
Beijing's terms, full diplomatic relations between Washington and Bei-
jing might have been established long before 1978 or even during Pres-
ident Nixon's 1972 trip to China. 
Another indirect congressional influence on the timing of the nor-
malization decision consisted of congressional debates on the passage 
of the Panama Canal Treaties in 1977-1978. In the summer of 1977, 
negotiations on the Panama Canal Treaties ended. The treaties were 
signed by President Carter and General Torrijos on 7 September 
1977. 10 The Senate finally approved the Panama Canal Treaties on 16 
March and 18 April 1978. It was the second longest treaty debate in 
the history of the Senate. 11 Jimmy Carter revealed in his memoirs, 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Taiwan Legislation hearings, 96th Congress, 1st session, 
February 7-8, 1979:92-104, 108. 
10. One treaty was called the Panama Canal Treaty, the other the Treaty Concerning 
the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal, cited in Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., 
and Pat M. Holt, Invitation to Struggle (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 
1980:70). 
II. The debate of the Panama Canal Treaties ran for a total of 38 legislative days, 
making it the longest treaty debate in U.S. history except for the debate on the Treaty of 
Versailles after World War I, cited from U.S. Congress, Senate Debate on the Panama 
Canal Treaties: A Compendium of Major Statements, Documents, Record Votes and Rele-
vant Events, prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate by 
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Keeping Faith, that the fight over the passage of the Panama Canal 
Treaties was "the most difficult political battle I had ever faced, in-
cluding my long campaign for President" (Carter, 1982: 152). 12 
The Carter administration did not want to risk taking on two 
controversial issues at the same time. "We can't give away the Pan-
ama Canal and then in the next breath abandon a commitment to a 
long-standing ally," a State Department official said in August 1977 
(Wallach, 1977:A5). Michel Oksenberg, a member of Carter's China 
team, revealed in detail that Secretary of State Vance's trip to China in 
August 1977 could have led to serious negotiations on normalization 
had there been no domestic obstacle over the passage of the Panama 
Canal Treaties: 
In a July 30 (1977) meeting, when giving Vance instruc-
tions for his August China trip, the President said, "Cy, lay 
it all out on the line, I've never gained from procrastinating. 
Describe our full position." Carter said that if the Chinese 
were prepared to accept his package, 13 he was ready to nor-
malize, but if they were unwilling, then so be it. He would 
go no further. In fact, so serious was the Vance mission that 
the Secretary carried with him a draft recognition communi-
que which he was authorized to table and begin negotiating, 
should the Chinese react favorably to his presentation. 
Between the July 30 meeting and Vance's late August 
trip, however, a major political development intruded on the 
landscape: the growing recognition of the battle looming 
ahead to secure Senate approval of the Panama Canal Trea-
ties. The President's earlier willingness to absorb the recog-
nition was tempered by his desire not to jeopardize a single 
possible vote on the Treaties. As a result, Vance built some 
room for maneuver into his earlier, leaner presentation. Spe-
cifically, he indicated a preference, in the post-normalization 
period, for the United States to assign some governmental 
Congressional Research Service Library of Congress, 96th Congress, 1st session, February 
1979, p. 11. 
12. For more detailed analysis of the battle over the passage of the Panama Canal 
Treaties by Jimmy Carter, see Carter (1982:152-83). 
13. According to Michel Oksenberg, President Carter's package for normalization was 
made in June 1977. The U.S. conditions for normalization were: "first, that normalization 
would not prevent the United States from selling arms to Taiwan; second, that the Ameri-
can people could continue, unimpaired, unofficial cultural, economic, and other relations 
with the people of Taiwan; and third, that at the time of normalization the United States 
could make a unilateral, uncontested statement concerning its expectation that the Taiwan 
issue would be settled peacefully" (Oksenberg, 1982: 182). 
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employees to the non-official entity which would represent 
the American people in Taiwan (Oksenberg, 1982:182). 
It was under this portion of Vance's presentation that Vice Pre-
mier Teng commented that Vance's position on normalization was a 
retrogression from President Ford's. Holbrooke stated in an interview 
that the Carter administration knew that the PRC would not agree to 
switch embassy and liaison offices between Taipei and Beijing, but the 
Carter administration needed time. 14 President Carter needed time to 
resolve the Panama Canal Treaties. 
The timing of Brzezinski's trip to China was also influenced by 
the Panama Canal issue. This trip was initiated by the PRC (Ok-
senberg, 1982: 183). The Chinese were interested not only in Brzezin-
ski's tougher views toward the Soviet Union but also in creating 
bureaucratic rivalry between the National Security Council and the 
State Department (Oksenberg, 1982: 183). Oksenberg described how 
the timing of the decision of Brzezinski's visit to China was made: 
One day after the Administration won the vote on the first 
treaty, the Chinese were informed of Brzezinski's desire to 
accept the invitation they had extended in the winter, and 
the precise date for his visit was set on the day following the 
vote on the second treaty (Oksenberg, 1982:184). 
Congressional opposition to accepting Beijing's terms for normal-
ization explains in part why the Carter administration could not move 
toward normalization before the final approval of the Panama Canal 
Treaties by Congress. After the successful passage of the treaties by 
the Senate, President Carter gained confidence in dealing with Con-
gress on controversial foreign affairs issues. The international and do-
mestic environments in the spring of 1978 looked very favorable for 
moving toward full diplomatic relations with the PRC. The deteriora-
tion of Soviet-American relations concerning Soviet intervention in 
Africa and domestic Soviet human rights issues motivated the Carter 
administration to speed up the process of normalization. The cost of 
downgrading U.S.-Taiwan relations was justified in view of broader 
U.S. strategic benefits gained from closer relations with Beijing 
through normalization. Passage of the Panama Canal Treaties further 
cleared domestic obstacles. 
Since Nixon's 1972 trip to China, more and more members of 
Congress were invited to visit the PRC each year (see table 9). In 
1972, only four members of Congress visited the PRC-Senate Major-
ity Leader Mike Mansfield, Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott, 
14. Interview with Richard Holbrooke, 4 June 1982, Washington, D.C. 
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House Minority Leader Gerald Ford, and House Majority Leader 
Hale Boggs. By 1978, the number had grown to 65. Various trip re-
ports have been produced. 15 The majority of these trip reports recom-
mended that the United States should establish diplomatic relations 
with the PRC as soon as possible. Most members of Congress who 
had visited the PRC also recommended that normalization with Bei-
jing should be done in a way that would not jeopardize the peace and 
stability of Taiwan. 
Once international and domestic political situations became 
favorable for normalization, the administration, having constitutional 
power to recognize foreign governments and states, saw no reason to 
delay further the negotiation of the normalization agreement. Con-
gress was not consulted at all during the negotiation period. Hal-
brooke said that President Carter had deliberately kept Congress from 
participating in any of the negotiations on normalization. "Otherwise 
we could not have done it," added Holbrooke. 16 
The timing of the normalization announcement-IS December 
1978-was deliberately chosen by President Carter. Congress was in 
15. See reports such as, U.S. Congress, Senate, Journey to the New China April-May 
1972, Reports of Senator Mike Mansfield and Senator Hugh Scott, 92d Congress, 2d ses· 
sion, Senate Document No. 92-89; U.S. Congress, House, Impressions of the New China, 
Joint Reports to the United States House of Representatives by Majority Leader Hale 
Boggs and Minority Leader Gerald R. Ford on Their Mission to the PRC June 23 to 7 
July, 1972, 92d Congress, 2d session, House Document No. 92-337; U.S. Congress, Senate, 
China Report-Report of a Special Congressional Delegation, 93rd Congress, 1st session, 
July 1973, Senate Document No. 93-43; U.S. Congress, House, China: One Step Further 
Toward Normalization, A Report by Carl Albert, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, 
and John Rhodes, Minority Leader, U.S. House of Representatives, 94th Congress, 1st 
session, July 1975, House of Representatives Document No. 94-225, U.S. Congress, The 
United States and China, A Report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the 
House International Relations Committee by the Seventh Congressional Delegation to the 
PRC, October 28, 1975; U.S. Congress, The United States and China, A Report by Senator 
Hugh Scott to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 94th Congress, 
2d session, September 1976; U.S. Congress, China and United States Policy, A Report of 
Senator Henry M. Jackson to the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, 95th Congress, 2d session, March 
1978, Publication No. 95-94; U.S. Congress, The United States and the People's Republic of 
China, A Report of the Sixteenth Congressional Delegation to the PRC, 95th Congress, 2d 
session, May 1978; U.S. Congress A New Realism Factfinding Mission to the PRC, ARe-
port by the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs to the Committee on International 
Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 2d session, December 1978; U.S. 
Congress, Senate, China: A Quarter Century After the Founding of the People's Republic, A 
Report by Senator Mike Mansfield, Majority Leader, United States Senate, 94th Congress, 
1st session, January 1975; U.S. Congress, Senate, China Enters the Post-Mao Era, A Report 
by Senator Mike Mansfield, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, 2d session, November 1976, Report No. 3. 
16. Interview with Richard Holbrooke, 4 June 1982, Washington, D.C. 
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the midst of a three-month recess. Congressmen were caught unpre-
pared and thus unable to mobilize an effective opposition to President 
Carter's China decision. 
Table 9 
Members of Congress Who Visited the PRC, 1972-1978 
1972 
Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, D-Mont., Senate Minor-
ity Leader Hugh Scott, R-Pa.; House Minority Leader Gerald Ford, 
R-Mich., House Majority Leader Hale Boggs, D-La. 
1973 
Sens. Warren G. Magnuson, D-Wash., Robert P. Griffin, R-
Mich., John Sparkman, D-Ala. and Gale W. McGee, D-Wyo.; Reps. 
John J. McFall, D-Calif.; Jerry L. Pettis, R-Calif., Thomas E. Morgan, 
D-Pa. and W. S. Mailliard, R-Calif. 
1974 
Sens. Hiram L. Fong, R-Hawaii, and Henry Jackson, D-Wash.; 
Reps. WilliamS. Broomfield, R-Mich., Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen, R-
N.J., Barbara Jordan, D-Texas and Clement J. Zablocki, D-Wis. 
1975 
Sens. Sam Nunn, D-Ga., Charles Percy, R-111., Adlai E. Steven-
son, D-Ill., James B. Pearson, R-Kan., Jacob K. Javits, R-N.Y., and 
Robert C. Byrd, D-W.Va.; Speaker of the House Carl Albert, D-Okla., 
House Minority Leader John J. Rhodes, R-Ariz.; Reps. Paul N. Mc-
Closkey Jr., R-Calif., Patricia Schroeder, D-Colo., Patsy Mink, D-Ha-
waii, John B. Anderson, R-Ill., Cardiss Collins, D-Ill., Edward J. 
Derwinski, R-Ill., Lindy Boggs, D-La., Gladys Noon Spellman, D-
Md., Margaret W. Heckler, R-Mass., Millicent Fenwick, R-N.J., 
Helen Meyner, D-N.J., Bella Abzug, D-N.Y., Elizabeth Holtzman, D-
N.Y. and John M. Slack, D-W.Va. 
1976 
Sens. Ted Stevens, R-Alaska, J. Bennett Johnston, D-La., Mike 
Mansfield, D-Mont., Carl T. Curtis, R-Neb., John Glenn, D-Ohio and 
Milton R. Young, R-N.D.; Reps. William R. Dickinson, R-Ala., 
Yvonne Brathwaite Burke, D-Calif., Bob Wilson, R-Calif., William J. 
Randall, D-Mo., Samuel S. Stratton, D-N.Y., Lester Wolff, D-N.Y., 
and G. William Whitehurst, R-Va. 
1977 
Sens. William V. Roth Jr., R-Del., John C. Culver, D-Iowa, Ed-
ward M. Kennedy, D-Mass., John A. Durkin, D-N.H. and RichardS. 
140 
Table 9 (continued) 
Schweiker, R-Pa.; Reps. Jack Edwards, R-Ala., George E. Danielson, 
D-Calif., Barbara A. Mikulski, D-Md., Silvio Conte, R-Mass. and 
Mark Andrews, R-N.D. 
1978 
Sens. Dale Bumpers, D-Ark., Alan Cranston, D-Calif., Gary 
Hart, D-Colo., Lawton Chiles, D-Fla., Richard Stone, D-Fla., Rich-
ard G. Lugar, R-Ind., Edmund S. Muskie, D-Maine, Charles McC. 
Mathias Jr., R-Md., Edward M. Kennedy, D-Mass., Donald W. 
Riegle Jr., D-Mich., Howard W. Cannon, D-Nev., Harrison A. Wil-
liams Jr., D-N.J., Henry Bellmon, R-Okla., Bob Packwood, R-Ore., 
James Abourezk, D-S.D., Lloyd Bentsen, D-Texas, Patrick J. Leahy, 
D-Vt., and Henry M. Jackson, D-Wash. 
Reps. Tom Bevill, D-Ala., Jack Edwards, R-Ala., Bill Alexander, 
D-Ark., George Brown, D-Calif., J. Herbert Burke, R-Fla., Richard 
Kelly, R-Fla., William Lehman, D-Fla., Doug Barnard, D-Ga., 
Wyche Fowler, D-Ga., Daniel K. Akaka, D-Hawaii, Paul Findley, R-
Ill., Edward Madigan, R-111., Robert H. Michel, R-111., George M. 
O'Brien, R-111., David Evans, D-Ind., John T. Myers, R-Ind., Berkeley 
Bedell, D-Iowa, Neal Smith, D-Iowa, Keith Sebelius, R-Kan., Larry 
Winn Jr., R-Kan., Tim Lee Carter, R-Ky., Gillis W. Long, D-La., Bill 
Frenzel, R-Minn., Tom Hagedorn, R-Minn., David R. Bowen, D-
Miss., Harold Volkmer, D-Mo., Robert K. Garcia, D-N.Y., John J. 
LaFalce, D-N.Y., Charles B. Rangel, D-N.Y., Fred Richmond, D-
N.Y., James H. Scheuer, D-N.Y., Lester L. Wolff, D-N.Y., L. H. 
Fountain, D-N.C., Stephen L. Neal, D-N.C., Mark Andrews, R-N.D., 
Thomas L. Ashley, D-Ohio, Tennyson Guyer, R-Ohio, Mary Rose 
Oaker, D-Ohio, Charles W. Whalen Jr., R-Ohio, James Weaver, D-
Ore., Butler Derrick, D-S.C., James Mann, D-S.C., E. (Kika) de la 
Garza, D-Texas, Jack Hightower, D-Texas, J. Kenneth Robinson, R-
Va., John M. Slack, D-W.Va. and HenryS. Reuss, D-Wis. 
Source: Congressional Quarterly, China U.S. Policy Since 1945 (Washington, D.C.: Con· 
gressional Quarterly Inc., 1980), p. 38. 
Fear of leaks was the main reason why President Carter chose to 
bypass Congress on normalization negotiations despite the fact that 
Congress passed a resolution in the summer of 1978 that called for 
presidential consultation on the termination of the defense treaty with 
Taiwan. Senator John Glenn, Chairman of the Far East Subcommit-
tee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated that "calling a 
few of us in one hour before he [Carter] goes on television doesn't 
seem like much consultation" (Gayner, 1979:334). 
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President Carter's confidence in winning the legal battle over the 
normalization issue was another reason the Carter administration ig-
nored the congressional request for prior consultation on the termina-
tion of the defense treaty issue. President Carter's confidence came 
from two sources. 
First, there was no single, undisputed, procedure in the Constitu-
tion that specified a congressional role in terminating a treaty. Senator 
Goldwater argued that "the Senate, being a partner with the President 
to the treatymaking authority, possesses a special interest and role in 
the method used by the United States for the termination of trea-
ties.'m Precedents could be cited for three principal alternatives for 
the president to terminate a treaty: 
1. Congress may express its will that the President termi-
nate a treaty to which the United States is a party; 
2. The President acting in conjunction with the Senate may 
terminate a treaty; 
3. The President acting alone may abrogate a treaty (Find-
ley, 1978:8). 
There has never been a court decision, however, to determine 
which one of these methods is the Constitutional method. Under U.S. 
practice, the Senate and House of Representatives have acted jointly in 
the enactment of legislation terminating over 40 treaties. 18 The only 
defense treaty the United States has abrogated was by an act of Con-
gress signed into law by the president. This occurred in 1798 when the 
United States terminated a series of treaties with France, including a 
Treaty of Alliance (Findley, 1978:8). Senator Goldwater, therefore, 
believed that the president could not unilaterally terminate or abrogate 
a treaty without the approval of both houses of Congress. 
President Carter, however, did not agree. Article X of the Mu-
tual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of 
China stated that either party could terminate the treaty with one 
year's notice. Since the Constitution is silent on which branch of gov-
ernment can terminate treaties, President Carter believed that the 
president had the authority to terminate the defense treaty with Tai-
wan with one year's notice without the approval of Congress. 19 
17. Senate Concurrent Resolution 109, 95th Congress, 2d session, lO October 1978. 
For more detailed arguments of the treaty termination see U.S. Library of Congress, Prece-
dents for U.S. Abrogation of Treaties, 25 February 1974, and U.S. Congressional Record, 20 
October 1977, H 11402. 
18. Senate Concurrent Resolution 109, op. cit. 
19. For more information see U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Treaty Termination hearings, 96th Congress, 1st session, 9-11 April 1979. 
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In October 1979, Federal District Judge Oliver Gasch reviewed 
Senator Goldwater's suit against President Carter's unilateral decision 
to terminate the defense treaty with Taiwan and ruled that President 
Carter had to get approval from two-thirds of the Senate or from a 
majority in each house of Congress in terminating the defense treaty. 
The White House appealed that decision before the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals in November 1979. On 30 November 1979, the 
appellate court overturned the Gasch decision and upheld Carter's 
right to end the defense treaty without approval by Congress by a vote 
of 4-1 (Congressional Quarterly, 1980:40). On 13 December 1979, the 
Supreme Court denied Goldwater's appeal on the ground that the dis-
pute between Goldwater and President Carter was a "political ques-
tion" (Congressional Quarterly, 1980:42). President Carter's decision 
to terminate the defense treaty with Taiwan was thus prevailed. 
Second, President Carter was confident in withholding criticism 
from conservative members in Congress because the majority of the 
members of Congress believed that normalization between Washing-
ton and Beijing would enhance American strategic interests. Congres-
sional criticisms toward Carter's normalization announcement 
centered on President Carter's failure to consult with Congress on the 
termination of the defense treaty rather than on the decision to nor-
malize diplomatic relations with the PRC. President Carter found 
that opposition toward his China decision was less than expected: 
The serious opposition we had expected throughout our 
country and within Congress simply did not materialize. 
The press treatment was also favorable, expressing chagrin 
only at the fact that, without leaks, the media had been 
caught by surprise (Carter, 1982:200). 
The executive branch retained the ultimate authority to make for-
eign policy decisions. Congress, on the other hand, has rarely played a 
direct or initiative role in the making of foreign policy. 
THE ROLE OF INTEREST GROUPS 
The so-called "China Lobby" was believed to be one of the most effec-
tive interest groups in the 1950s. The "China Lobby," originating in 
the 1940s and 1950s, was a loose alliance of organizations that sup-
ported the Chinese Nationalists and opposed the Communist regime 
in China. Among the pro-Nationalist lobbies were: The Committee of 
One Million, the American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the 
executive council of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), the American Conservative 
Union, the American Security Council, the Young Americans for 
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Freedom, and some other organizations (Congressional Quarterly, 
1980:30; Steele, 1966: 119). The Committee of One Million, formed in 
1953, was the most notable group that for decades fought against ad-
mission of the PRC to the United Nations and U.S. recognition of the 
PRC. 
The Committee of One Million had obtained considerable con-
gressional support for its policy against the Chinese Communists. In 
August 1965, the Committee of One Million had attained 312 congres-
sional signatures, representing a majority of both houses, on its decla-
ration against policy change with regard to the PRC (Steele, 
1966: 122). Hilsman described the influence of the China Lobby as 
follows: 
In a sense the China Lobby was not an interest group organ-
ized by general citizens to put pressure on Congress, but an 
interest group organized by one set of congressmen to put 
pressure both on other congressmen and on officials in the 
Executive branch, and especially the latter. For the princi-
pal leaders of the Committee of One Million were Congress-
man Walter H. Judd of Minnesota and Senator William F. 
Know land of California. Both of these men were ardent sup-
porters of Chiang and the Kuomingtang and vehement op-
ponents of the Chinese Communists, and they used the 
China Lobby to further their own views (Hilsman, 1971:71). 
The influence of the Committee of One Million declined consider-
ably in the mid-1960s because of the death and retirement of some key 
members. Only former Representative Walter H. Judd remained ac-
tive. In 1966, the committee suffered further loss when some influen-
tial members resigned and others withdrew their support because of 
the committee's inflexible policy toward the PRC. 
During the cold war period, most members of Congress were con-
vinced that the general American public favored a tough line toward 
the PRC. The China Lobby had been effective against Beijing because 
it had the support of the executive, branch, the Congress, and the 
American public. The favorable international and domestic environ-
ments for the China Lobby gradually changed in the late 1960s. In the 
wake of new global balance-of-power situations after the Sino-Soviet 
border wars in 1969, many congressional members in the Committee 
of One Million became unwilling to support the rigid policy toward 
Beijing the committee had advocated for nearly two decades. Presi-
dent Nixon's sudden change of U.S. policy toward the PRC further 
triggered the decline of influence of the China Lobby. 
The China Lobby was effective because its position and the offi-
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cial position of the government were the same (Spanier and Uslaner, 
1978:86). When the Nixon administration changed its policy toward 
the PRC, the China Lobby, losing executive support, found itself pow-
erless to battle against the new China policy. 
On the eve of Nixon's China trip in 1972, the Committee of One 
Million reformed and changed its name to the Committee for a Free 
China. Walter Judd continued to serve as chairman. Among the 
founders of the new committee were seven representatives and two 
senators, Strom Thurmond (R-South Carolina) and Barry Goldwater. 
Later they were joined by Senators Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina), 
Gordon Humphrey (R-New Hampshire), Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), and 
Harry F. Byrd Jr. (D-Virginia) (Bachrack, 1979: A21). 
Although the influence of the China Lobby had dwindled consid-
erably since the change of U.S. China policy in the early 1970s, Con-
gress and the American public were not ready to see Taiwan punished 
because of the Sino-American rapprochement. Conservative members 
in Congress had strongly opposed normalization of relations with Bei-
jing at the expense of Taiwan. This is part of the reason why President 
Nixon could make no further concession on the Taiwan issue during 
his 1972 trip to China. The remaining influence of the China Lobby 
put a constraint on the administration toward Sino-American normali-
zation of relations. 
Bernard C. Cohen believed that interest groups rarely played a 
decisive role in foreign policy decision making (Cohen, 1959). Interest 
groups exerted a greater impact on foreign policy when their positions 
coincided with the administration's policy. The main cause of the 
seven-year delay of the normalization decision consisted of unfavora-
ble domestic and international situations. The China Lobby, as part of 
the unfavorable domestic political ingredient, did play a role in delay-
ing the normalization decision, but its power was overstated. During 
the Carter administration, the timing of the normalization decision 
was influenced by the Senate debate on the Panama Canal Treaties, 
whose major opponents were also supporters of the Committee for a 
Free China. It was no accident that President Carter decided not to 
take up the normalization issue while the Senate was still debating the 
passage of the Panama Canal Treaties. The China Lobby, therefore, 
contributed indirectly to the explanation of the timing of the normali-
zation decision. After the successful passage of the Panama Canal 
Treaties, the China Lobby, having only limited sources of influence 
without support from the administration, could no longer stand alone 
to fight the battle against Sino-American normalization of relations. 
President Nixon's new China policy in the early 1970s, on the 
other hand, had encouraged the reemergence of a new China Lobby-
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the so-called "Red China Lobby." Among those actively advocating 
recognition of the PRC were: the National Committee on United 
States-China Relations, Citizens to Change United States Policy, the 
National Council for United States-China Trade, and the Committee 
on Scholarly Communication With the People's Republic of China. 
The National Committee on United States-China Relations, a 
well-funded, pro-Beijing organization established in 1966, was the best 
organized. Charles Yost, former U.S. ambassador to the United Na-
tions, succeeded W. Michael Blumenthal-the Secretary of Treasury 
during the Carter administration-to head the organization in 1975. 
From 1966 to 1969, the committee brought the question ofU.S.-China 
relations to the attention of thousands of Americans through 130 sem-
inars and meetings throughout the U.S. (Congressional Record, 29 
September 1976:33409). This committee and the U.S. Table Tennis 
Association had jointly arranged and financed arrangements for 
China's table tennis team to be received in the United States in April 
1972 (Congressional Record, 29 September 1976:33409). The National 
Committee on United States-China Relations had been cited by Presi-
dent Ford for its "important contribution ... to our national effort to 
build a normal relationship with the PRC" (Congressional Record, 29 
September 1976:33409). 
These pro-Beijing lobby groups had similar policy objectives: 
ending all trade embargoes against the PRC, admission of the PRC to 
the United Nations, and the recognition of Communist China. The 
National Council for United States-China Trade, established in May 
1973 with the support and encouragement of the administration, is a 
nongovernmental organization to promote and facilitate trade between 
the United States and the PRC. By the end of 1977, the council had 
hosted or sponsored 21 trade delegations to and from the PRC (Lud-
low, 1978:25). Christopher H. Phillips, head of the council and a for-
mer deputy ambassador to the United Nations, had strongly urged the 
administration to move toward normalization. Phillips believed that 
the consequences of nonrecognition of the PRC would adversely affect 
trade and other American interests. The Committee on Scholarly 
Communication with the PRC was formed in 1966. This committee, 
however, was not active until 1971 when Americans began traveling to 
China. The committee received a third of its funding from the Bureau 
of Education and Cultural Affairs, Department of State. 20 
During a congressional hearing in December 1975, Phillips, of the 
20. The Committee on Scholarly Communication with the PRC receives a third of its 
funding from private foundations such as Ford, Rockefeller, Charles F. Kettering, and 
other private foundations, and a third from the National Science Foundation. 
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National Council for United States-China Trade, and Melvin W. 
Searls, Jr., vice president of the Committee on Scholarly Communica-
tion with the PRC, had both urged the normalization of relations in 
order to improve trade and exchange programs with the PRC.21 In 
April 1977, Phillips told Vance that trade between the U.S. and China 
had "bottomed out" because of a combination of political and eco-
nomic reasons (Gwertzman, 1977b:7). Vance had reportedly told 
Phillips of the Carter administration's strong backing for the council's 
effort to normalize political and economic relations with the PRC 
(Gwertzman, 1977b:7). 
It is difficult to assess the extent to which these groups affected 
the policy outcome of the administration. Roger Sullivan, former dep-
uty assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the State 
Department from June 1978 to 1980 and vice president of the Na-
tional Council for U.S.-China Trade, stated in an interview that eco-
nomic and commercial interests were not the main concern for the 
normalization decision in 1978. Sullivan revealed that he did not pay 
too much attention to the council when he served as deputy assistant 
to Richard Holbrooke. Only after he became vice president of the 
council did he realize how little the administration was concerned 
about the interests of an organization like the National Council on 
U.S.-China Trade.22 Sullivan also pointed out that the council re-
ceived more official attention and became more active after Sino-
American relations were normalized. 
Since President Nixon's trip to China, both old and new China 
lobby groups had tried various ways-through seminars, conferences, 
exchange programs, propaganda campaigns, and letter-writing cam-
paigns to the congressmen-to influence the administration, Congress, 
and the American public on the pros and cons of the normalization 
issue. The gradual change of American public opinion toward the 
PRC in the 1970s was a result. The remaining power of the old China 
Lobby, together with the domestic and international crises, had pre-
vented the administration from making the normalization decision. In 
1978, after seven years' delay, the domestic climate for normalization 
was more favorable than in 1972. President Carter seized the opportu-
nity and established full diplomatic relations with the PRC. 
21. U.S. Congress, House United States-China Relations: The Process of Normalization 
of Relations, pp. 72-96. 
22. Personal interview with Roger Sullivan, deputy assistant secretary for East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs, 1978-1980. 18 July 1982, Washington, D.C. 
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THE ROLE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
Besides public opinion, Congress, and interest groups, the presidential 
election had an impact on the timing of the normalization decision as 
well. There is no conclusive data available on the exact effects of pres-
idential elections on foreign policy issues. Some studies show that dur-
ing election years more attention is devoted to domestic politics than 
to foreign policy issues (Campbell, et al., 1954; Quandt, 1977:23). A 
commonly held assumption is that in presidential election years con-
troversial foreign policy decisions are delayed in order to deny a po-
tential opponent a major political issue. A presidential candidate, on 
the other hand, tries to generate a popular image as a peacemaker as 
well as one knowledgeable in foreign affairs (Halperin, 1974:66-67). 
U.S. foreign policy toward the PRC was not a major issue in the 
1972 or 1976 presidential elections. These elections, however, delayed 
the process of normalization of relations. Halperin raised two issues 
that concern presidential candidates: (1) appealing to the population 
as a whole, and (2) denying potential opponents a key issue. These 
two issues had some impact on the normalization decision during the 
1972 and 1976 presidential election campaigns (Halperin, 1974:67-70). 
Appealing to the Population as a Whole 
It is generally believed that a presidential candidate's popularity can 
be increased if the candidate can demonstrate ability and willingness 
to contribute to the cause of world peace. Rarely has any presidential 
candidate won the election because of "hawk talk." President John-
son successfully defeated Barry Goldwater by portraying Goldwater 
as a war-monger. President Nixon's landslide victory in 1972 was 
linked to his skill in creating an image of himself as a peacemaker. 
Nixon had effectively demonstrated his capability in easing world ten-
sion by initiating detente with the Soviet Union and rapprochement 
with the PRC. Shortly before the 1972 election, the Nixon adminis-
tration announced that peace in Vietnam "is at hand." Available data 
indicates that the American public in 1972 had cast their votes with 
Vietnam as a major issue in mind (Miller, et al., 1976:753-78). 
President Carter in 1978 also used "peace" as the major reason 
for his decision to normalize relations with the PRC. In the text of his 
statement on 15 December 1978, President Carter declared that "the 
normalization of relations between the United States and China has no 
other purpose than the advancement of peace" (see Appendix C). 
Completion of normalization with the PRC, SALT II, and the Camp 
David Accords on the Middle East could have brought spectacular 
foreign policy successes to President Carter as a peacemaker. 
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Denying Potential Opponents a Key Issue 
The opening-of-China policy initiated by President Nixon was wel-
comed by the American people because Sino-American rapproche-
ment could reduce tensions and the possibility of another war between 
two nuclear powers. President Nixon's popularity increased after his 
China trip in 1972 to a 56 percent approval rating, the highest in 14 
months of his presidency (Brown, 1976:9). Normalization between 
Washington and Beijing, however, would be an unpopular decision if 
it was achieved at the expense of Taiwan, especially during presiden-
tial election time. The normalization decision was delayed in 1972 
and 1976 because both Presidents Nixon and Ford did not want their 
opponents to use the normalization issue against them. 
Nixon stated frankly in his memoirs why no agreement concern-
ing Taiwan could be reached during his 1972 trip to China: 
We knew that if the Chinese made a strongly belligerent 
claim to Taiwan in the Communique, I would come under 
murderous crossfire from any or all the various pro-Taiwan, 
anti-Nixon, and anti-PRC lobbies and interest groups at 
home. If these groups found common ground on the eve of 
the presidential elections, the entire China initiative might be 
turned into a partisan issue. Then, if I lost the election, 
whether because of this particular factor or not, my succes-
sor might not be able to continue developing the relationship 
between Washington and Peking .... (Nixon, 1979, v.2:40-
41). 
Normalization of relations between Beijing and Washington in 
1972 was not possible because no agreement concerning Taiwan could 
be reached. The presidential election was a major factor in President 
Nixon's decision to postpone normalization during the second term of 
his presidency. 
In 1976, President Ford faced a strong conservative challenge 
from Ronald Reagan for the presidential nomination. Reagan had 
been a strong supporter of Taiwan and opposed Sino-American nor-
malization at the expense of U.S.-Taiwan relations. 
In August 1976, Reagan amended the Republican party platform 
by inserting a specific pledge that the United States would honor its 
defense treaty with Taiwan: 
The United States Government, while engaged in a nor-
malization of relations with the People's Republic of China, 
will continue to support the freedom and independence of 
our friend and ally, the Republic of China, and its 16 million 
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people. The United States will fulfill and keep its commit-
ments, such as the mutual defense treaty, with the Republic 
of China (Congressional Quarterly, 1980:61). 
It was obvious that President Ford was in a difficult situation to 
normalize relations with Beijing under its three conditions during the 
presidential election campaign. President Ford's 1975 trip to China 
ended with no progress on normalization. Like President Nixon, Pres-
ident Ford could only promise the Chinese host that he would move 
toward normalization if elected in 1976. 
The Democratic platform adopted on 14 July 1976 was rather 
vague on the issue of Sino-American normalization of relations. The 
plank stated: "Our relations with China should continue to develop 
on peaceful lines, including early movement toward normalizing dip-
lomatic relations in the context of a peaceful resolution of the future of 
Taiwan" (Congressional Quarterly, 1980:60). 
The normalization question was raised during the second nation-
ally televised debate between President Ford and candidate Jimmy 
Carter on 6 October 1976 in San Francisco. Ford and Carter, how-
ever, gave only general and unspecific answers on the ways in which 
normalization should be pursued. President Ford declared that the 
Ford administration "will not let down, will not eliminate or forget 
our obligations to the people of Taiwan" (Congressional Quarterly, 
1980:61). Candidate Carter stated that "I would never let that friend-
ship with the People's Republic of China stand in the way of the pres-
ervation of the independence and freedom of the people of Taiwan" 
(Congressional Quarterly, 1980:61). Neither President Ford nor Gov-
ernor Carter was interested in taking a strong stand on the controver-
sial normalization issue during election time. 
Another way to deny opponents a main issue is to preempt the 
issue. President Nixon did just that in 1972 when he opened the 
China door. The Democratic platform of 1968 stated that "we would 
actively encourage economic, social, and cultural exchange with main-
land China as a means of freeing that nation and her people from their 
narrow isolation" (Congressional Quarterly, 1980:59). The GOP in 
1968, however, reaffirmed its opposition to Beijing's admission to the 
United Nations and recognition of the PRC. Four years later, Presi-
dent Nixon's surprising China initiative denied Senator George Mc-
Govern, the 1972 Democratic presidential nominee, a key foreign 
policy issue. McGovern had favored improved relations with commu-
nist countries, such as the Soviet Union, China, and North Vietnam 
(Congressional Quarterly, 1980:60). President Nixon's detente policy 
toward Moscow and Beijing, and peace negotiations with North Viet-
nam, had undercut much of McGovern's positions. 
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President Carter's decision to normalize relations with the PRC 
in 1978 also denied Senator Edward Kennedy, a main supporter for 
normalization and a major challenger of President Carter for the 1980 
presidential nomination, a key foreign policy issue. 
The timing of the normalization announcement was also influ-
enced by congressional elections. On 16 May 1978, President Carter 
stated in his diary, on the ideal timing of the normalization issue, the 
following: 
I had a meeting with Brzezinski, Brown, Vance, Mondale, 
Jordan to discuss Zbig's trip to China, and decided that we 
would move on normalization this year if the Chinese are 
forthcoming. Our preference is to take final action after the 
November election. We all agreed that a better relationship 
with the PRC would help us with SALT (Carter, 1982:194). 
President Carter finally chose December 1978 to normalize relations 
with the PRC, a time when November 1978 congressional elections 
were just over, when Congress was out of session, and when political 
opponents were unable to mount a quick campaign against his normal-
ization decision. By the time of the 1980 presidential election, the es-
tablishment of diplomatic relations was a fait accompli. 
CONCLUSION 
Having analyzed four major domestic political factors-public opin-
ion, Congress, interest groups, and presidential elections-we con-
clude that the normalization decision was constrained and delayed by 
domestic realities. Presidential elections of 1972 and 1976 precluded 
the incumbent from making the controversial normalization decision. 
A weak administration, such as the Nixon administration during the 
Watergate period followed by the Ford administration, was more vul-
nerable than a strong administration to the pressures of domestic poli-
tics. The normalization decision was delayed because of prevailing 
public opinion and congressional attitudes against normalization 
under Beijing's three conditions. 
By 1978, the domestic environment was more favorable for the 
normalization decision. Successful passage of the Panama Canal Trea-
ties removed one major domestic obstacle. American public attitudes 
toward Beijing in the 1970s had gradually changed. More and more 
American people and congressmen had visited the PRC. The majority 
of public opinion and congressmen favored full normalization of rela-
tions with the PRC. On the other hand, the once influential "China 
Lobby" had lost support from important members in the Congress. A 
new "China Lobby," with the same policy objectives as the adminis-
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tration's, had reemerged and actively campaigned for full normaliza-
tion with Beijing in order to strengthen American strategic and 
economic benefits. 
The Chinese domestic environment in 1978 was also favorable to 
normalization. The mini-cultural revolution of 1973-1974, the second 
purge of Teng Hsiao-p'ing and the deaths of Chou and Mao in 1976, 
complicated the consideration of the normalization decision. The 
arrest of the "Gang of Four" and the gradual stabilization of Teng's 
power consolidated the capability of the moderate force in the PRC. 
Carter recalled in his memoirs, Keeping Faith, that in August 1977, 
during Vance's visit, the PRC was not ready domestically to move 
toward full normalization with the United States: 
When Secretary Vance began his exploratory discus-
sions in Peking on August 22, he found his hosts more cau-
tious than I had anticipated. With the deaths of both Chou 
En-lai and Mao Tse-tung in 1976, the new leaders of China 
had many internal political and economic questions to ad-
dress. In addition, they were still not well acquainted with 
me or my policies, and probably needed a few more months 
before deciding how far to trust us on the major decisions 
(Carter, 1982:191). 
In 1978, Teng's power was well established. In February 1978, 
the National People's Congress placed four modernization plans at the 
top of China's domestic agenda. The normalization of relations with 
the United States could certainly help its economic development. 
Meanwhile, the PRC had become seriously concerned about Soviet 
intervention in Africa and Soviet-Vietnamese relations. Full normali-
zation with the United States could give Beijing more leverage toward 
Hanoi and Moscow. President Carter grasped the opportunity and 
moved toward full normalization of relations with the PRC. 
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6 
THE IDIOSYNCRATIC, COGNITIVE, AND 
CYBERNETIC MODELS 
THE IDIOSYNCRATIC MODEL: THE "GREAT MAN 
THEORY" 
The main assumption of the idiosyncratic model is that the personal 
characteristics of decision makers can make a difference in policy out-
comes. The "Great Man Theory" stresses the importance of individ-
ual leadership. American foreign policy is considered to be the end 
product of the preferences and initiatives of presidents or secretaries of 
State. Some examples are the Marshall Plan, Truman Doctrine, Ei-
senhower Doctrine, Dulles' "massive retaliation," Kennedy's 
"frontiersmanship." Nixon's "detente policy," and Carter's "human 
rights policy" (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1982:493). The values, beliefs, 
personalities, and perceptions of the individuals who participate in the 
making of U.S. foreign policy decisions, therefore, are believed to have 
a major impact on the outcome of foreign policy. From the "Great 
Man Theory" perspective, the opening-of-China policy was the prod-
uct of President Nixon's personal leadership. 
The idiosyncratic model or the "Great Man Theory" approach 
has been criticized for its limited utility in explaining American for-
eign policy. The main counterargument is that situations, not the idio-
syncratic characteristics of individuals, determine a nation's behavior. 
Craig Haney and Philip Zimbardo made the following comment in 
1973 after a decade of research on this subject: 
If there has been one important lesson coming from all the 
research in social and personality psychology in the past few 
years, it is that situations control behavior to an unprece-
dented degree. It is no longer meaningful, as it once was, to 
talk in terms of personality "types," of persons "low in ego 
strength," or of "authorities"-at least it is not meaningful if 
we wish to account for any substantial portion of an individ-
ual's behavior. . . . Rather, we must look to the situation in 
which the behavior was elicited and is maintained if we hope 
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ever to find satisfactory explanations for it. The causes of 
behavior we have learned are more likely to reside in the na-
ture of the environment than inside the person (Kegley and 
Wittkopf, 1982:520, note 17). 
Applied to the normalization issue, President Nixon certainly de-
served personal credit in taking the China initiative. President 
Nixon's new China policy, however, was not made in a vacuum. The 
international environment, domestic political situations in both the 
United States and the PRC, and bureaucratic politics were factors in 
influencing President Nixon's policy toward China. Had there been 
little possibility of a major Sino-Soviet war at the end of the 1960s, and 
had there been little American anxiety to get out of the Vietnam war, 
the China door might have been opened much later. In other words, 
the international situation was one of the most important factors that 
motivated President Nixon to seek rapprochement with Beijing. 
President Nixon's personality, ideology, and value system played 
only a minor role in explaining the opening of China. In the 1950s, 
Vice President Nixon was a strong fighter against communism. Vice 
President Nixon had vigorously defended President Eisenhower's con-
tainment and isolation policy toward "Red China." A decade later, 
Richard Nixon, the same individual with no remarkable change in his 
personality and ideology, made a complete policy change toward the 
PRC. 
Another way to demonstrate the weak linkage between personal-
ity and foreign policy is to show that individuals with remarkably dif-
ferent personal backgrounds support similar policies (Quandt, 
1977:30). The nonrecognition policy toward the PRC had been fol-
lowed by four presidents-Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and John-
son-since the outbreak of the Korean War. There were significantly 
different personal characteristics among these four presidents; yet they 
all supported a similar policy toward the PRC. President Kennedy 
had wanted to improve relations with the PRC, but found it would be 
politically too risky to do so. President Johnson, while interested in 
easing tensions with the PRC, was unwilling to make concessions on 
the Taiwan issue. Since the Korean War, United States policy toward 
Beijing had remained basically the same. There were some incremen-
tal changes to ease tensions with the PRC; overall, though, the con-
tainment and nonrecognition policy was supported by four presidents. 
In the early 1970s, when the China door was opened and the U.S. 
policy direction toward the PRC was set, once again there were only 
incremental changes in terms of U.S. policy toward Sino-American 
normalization of relations. Normalization between Washington and 
Beijing had been repeatedly declared by Presidents Nixon, Ford, and 
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Carter as one of the U.S. foreign policy goals. Presidents Nixon, Ford, 
and Carter, with different idiosyncratic backgrounds, had come to the 
same conclusion-the importance of Sino-American rapprochement 
and normalization of relations vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. 1 Once the 
process of normalization of relations was completed, even President 
Reagan, a major opponent toward normalization as a presidential can-
didate in 1976 and a key supporter for reestablishment of U.S.-Taiwan 
diplomatic relations in 1980, felt compelled to carry out the normali-
zation agreement and to continue the course of policy direction to-
ward Beijing. 
The impact of presidential personality on the Sino-American nor-
malization of relations issue was not critical, considering the fact that 
the same person, Richard Nixon, had supported dramatically different 
policies toward Beijing, and presidents with remarkably different per-
sonalities had supported a similar policy toward China. 
There is still, however, an unanswerable question: had candidate 
Hubert Humphrey been elected president in 1968, would Sino-Ameri-
can relations have been different? The same question can be asked of 
Reagan. Had Reagan been elected president in 1976, would the nor-
malization decision have been delayed? 
President Nixon's personal distrust of bureaucratics and his pref-
erence for secret diplomacy was another important factor that contrib-
uted to the successful opening of China in 1972. Had someone else 
been president in 1968, with a different approach to handling the 
opening of China, the rapprochement between Washington and Bei-
jing might also have been delayed. 
THE COGNITIVE MODEL 
The cognitive model believes that the unitary rational actor model 
cannot accommodate "all the observed phenomena of decision making 
and should not be relied upon, therefore, as the only base theory for 
political analysis" (Steinbruner, 1974:14). The cognitive model as-
sumes that "an individual's behavior is in large part shaped by the 
manner in which he perceives, diagnoses, and evaluates his physical 
and social environment" (Holsti, 1976: 19). From the cognitive per-
spective, a nation's actions are dependent upon "its perception of the 
results of its own actions, which often depend on the estimate of the 
other country's future reactions" (Sullivan, 1976:272). 
William Quandt believed that "it is less the personality of the 
I. For further discussions of the different characters of presidents Truman, Eisen-
hower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford and Carter, see Barber (1977) and George 
( 1974:234-82). 
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president that must be understood than the way he and his advisers 
view the world and how they reason" (Quandt, 1977:29). Decision 
makers' world views and perceptions are, indeed, important sources in 
explaining a nation's foreign policy. How the U.S. decision makers 
perceived Beijing's "non-negotiable" principle on the Taiwan issue 
constituted an important ingredient in defining Washington's bargain-
ing position on normalization negotiations. 
Glen H. Snyder and Paul Diesing believed that "bargaining is 
largely a process of manipulating values and perceptions of them" 
(Snyder and Diesing, 1977:183). Thomas C. Schelling also stated that 
bargaining by one party "is guided mainly by his expectations of what 
the other will accept" (Schelling, 1980:21) Schelling further discussed 
how a convergence emerged from bargaining. 
A bargain is struck when somebody makes a final, sufficient 
concession. Why does he concede? Because he thinks the 
other will not. "I must concede because he won't. He won't 
because he thinks I will. He thinks I will because he thinks I 
think he thinks so .... " (Schelling, 1980:21-22). 
J. N. Morgan has described bargaining power as the power to fool 
and bluff, "the ability to set the best price for yourself and fool the 
other man into thinking this was your maximum offer."2 The main 
point of bargaining tactics is how to communicate effectively and per-
suasively one's demands, offers, commitments, threats, and conces-
sions to the other party. 
Since 1972, the major question regarding Sino-American normali-
zation of relations had been who should make what concessions on the 
Taiwan issue. Beijing's three conditions for normalization were well 
known. The U.S. position on the Taiwan issue had gone through sev-
eral changes. After his visit to the PRC in 1972, President Nixon pri-
vately reassured the Republic of China that the United States intended 
to "honor its defense treaty commitments" to Taiwan (Cohen, 
1971 :31 ). President Nixon also stated publicly that "our action in 
seeking a new relationship with the People's Republic of China will 
not be at the expense of our old friends" (Cohen, 1971:31 ). During a 
news conference on 6 May 1975, President Ford also reaffirmed U.S. 
commitments to Taiwan. 3 
The Nixon administration had a negotiating plan, however, to ac-
2. James N. Morgan, "Bilateral Monopoly and the Competitive Output," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 63 (August 1949):376 note 6, quoted from Schelling, 1980:23 note I. 
3. Excerpt from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 12 May 1975, in U.S. 
Information Agency, Major Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials January-June 
1975, 18 August 1975:20. 
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cept Beijing's three conditions for normalization if there was a firm 
commitment from Beijing to settle the Taiwan question peacefully. 
According to Eugene K. Lawson, a former officer on the Republic of 
China desk at the State Department, the Nixon administration had the 
following conditions for normalization: 
The defense treaty was, of course, the bottom line, and 
of Peking's three demands (break diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan, withdraw our military and end the treaty), that is 
the one we should have worked on. And, in fact, the Nixon 
Administration did have a package of minimum conditions 
in its mind to implement. 
The most important element in the Nixon plan included 
the ways and means to find a plausible substitute for the 
treaty. First, the United States would cite only those Peo-
ple's Republic statements that spoke of resolving the situa-
tion peacefully and ignore the more belligerent ones. 
Second, the president would issue with the Congress a state-
ment after normalization with Peking was achieved that 
force by anyone in the Taiwan Straits would cause the 
United States to consider whatever military actions appeared 
necessary to preserve peace. 
Moreover, we would continue to ensure that the inter-
national waters existing between the mainland and Taiwan 
would be open to all countries, and, finally, we would con-
tinue to sell defensive equipment to Taiwan. Our assump-
tion was that we were in the driver's seat and Peking needed 
us more than we needed it. While Peking had its conditions 
for normalization, we had ours. As for the future of Taiwan, 
we would follow the Shanghai Communique by keeping the 
door open on its ultimate status, in the same way Japan, 
Canada, the United Kingdom and others have done (Law-
son, 1978:A15). 
George Bush, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency 
and U.S. representative to Beijing, also indicated in the Washington 
Post on 24 December 1978 the U.S. position toward normalization: 
For several years, Peking had insisted on three preconditions 
before there could be "normalization" ... The United States 
had consistently balked at those terms, insisting that it 
would not formally recognize Peking until there was a firm, 
explicit commitment to settle the Taiwan issue peacefully. 
And there the negotiations were stuck .... 
The terms that the Carter Administration has accepted 
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and even trumpeted, are the same terms that have been avail-
able for the past seven years. But they were always refused 
before because we knew-just as the Chinese knew-that in 
the absence of sufficient guarantees, they were but a figleaf 
for an abject American retreat (Bush, 1978:03-4). 
The American conditions, as stated by Bush and Lawson, could 
be viewed as the initial U.S. bargaining stand. The bottom line, then, 
was that Washington would accept Beijing's three demands if Beijing 
would in return agree to settle the Taiwan question peacefully. 
U.S. insistence on a firm commitment from Beijing on the Taiwan 
issue had historical background. During the 1955-1956 ambassadorial 
talks, some 40 meetings were held to discuss the issue of the renuncia-
tion of force on Taiwan. Washington and Beijing exchanged seven 
proposals and counterproposals, but found no common ground on this 
issue.4 Beijing and Washington had different definitions of the "renun-
ciation of force on Taiwan." To Beijing, a renunciation of force meant 
an unconditional American withdrawal from Taiwan; whereas to 
Washington it meant an unconditional renunciation of efforts to take 
Taiwan by military means (Young, 1968:93). Beijing was not willing 
to accept the American demand at that time because it did not want to 
limit its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. To Beijing, a formal en-
dorsement of the American proposal would mean the acceptance of 
two Chinas (Sutter, 1978:55). Beijing, however, was willing to accept 
a renunciation of force agreement with no specific reference to the Tai-
wan area. Washington, on the other hand, insisted that its position on 
Taiwan was inflexible and "nonnegotiable" (Young, 1968:105). The 
issue of Taiwan had been a stumbling block between Washington and 
Beijing throughout the ambassadorial talks in the 1950s and 1960s. 
The normalization agreement was finally reached in 1978 after 
Washington gave up its once "nonnegotiable" principle of a firm 
pledge from Beijing not to use force to solve the Taiwan issue. Why 
did the Carter administration think that it was not possible to get a 
pledge from the PRC? How did the PRC persuade the United States 
that its stand on Taiwan would never change? 
There were three possibilities to interpret Beijing's firm and non-
negotiable conditions for normalization. First, the U.S. decision mak-
ers could interpret that Beijing was bluffing. Second, Washington 
could interpret that Beijing was not yet ready to yield on the Taiwan 
question but would soon. Third, the United States could believe that 
Beijing meant what she said-the leaders of the PRC would never 
4. For further information of the dialogue on the renunciation of force on Taiwan, see 
Kenneth T. Young, 1968:91-115 and appendix, pp. 414-17. 
158 
concede on the Taiwan question. The United States apparently 
adopted the third interpretation of Beijing's messages on the Taiwan 
question during the normalization negotiations in 1978. President 
Carter acknowledged in January 1979 that seeking a clear commit-
ment by Beijing to resolve the Taiwan issue peacefully had been a U.S. 
goal, but such a pledge "was not possible to achieve" (Oberdorfer, 
1979b:A2). 
Two major explanations can be given for the U.S. decision to nor-
malize relations with the PRC mainly on Beijing's terms. First, unlike 
the situation in the mid-1950s, the United States in 1978 sincerely in-
tended to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC. During the 
1955-1956 ambassadorial meetings, Beijing's real interest was to ar-
range a conference of foreign ministers "to settle through negotiations 
the question of relaxing and eliminating the tension in [the] Taiwan 
area" (Young, 1968 :415), meaning Washington's total withdrawal 
from Taiwan. The United States at that time did not intend to make 
any concession on the Taiwan question. Secretary of State Dulles, 
therefore, countered Beijing's initiative by insisting on the mutual re-
nunciation of the use of force in the Taiwan area as a precondition for 
further talks on the arrangement of a foreign minister's conference. 
Beijing refused, and no further talks were held. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the United States saw no significant bene-
fits from making any concession on the Taiwan issue. But the 1970s 
international environment was much more complex and dynamic, and 
the United States became interested in improving relations with the 
PRC in order to gain strategic, economic, and other benefits. The Tai-
wan question was temporarily put aside by Washington and Beijing in 
order to deal with a greater and much more urgent issue-Soviet 
hegemonism. The high-level summit, desired by the PRC since 1955-
1956, was finally arranged in 1972. The United States did not insist on 
any precondition, such as the non-use of force toward Taiwan. 
Neither did the PRC demand that the Nixon-Mao meeting settle the 
Taiwan question. The establishment of diplomatic relations, however, 
required breaking the impasse on the Taiwan issue. Detailed analysis 
of the timing of the normalization decision has been discussed in previ-
ous chapters. Sincerity, together with a favorable international and 
domestic political environment, motivated the United States to con-
cede on the Taiwan issue in order to gain other geopolitical benefits in 
1978. 
The second explanation of American willingness to compromise 
on the Taiwan issue is that the PRC had successfully persuaded the 
United States that Beijing would never make any concession on the 
Taiwan question. 
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Official Statements and Remarks 
Through various official statements, interviews, and meetings, Beijing 
had made known its position on the Taiwan issue. 5 It was non-negoti-
able. The PRC position, as stated in the Shanghai Communique, was 
that there is only one China and Taiwan is part of China. The PRC 
was strongly opposed to the "two Chinas," "one China, one Taiwan," 
"one China, two governments," and "independent Taiwan" formulas. 
The PRC had also declared many times that the liberation of Taiwan 
is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to 
interfere (see Appendix B). 
Empirical Demonstrations 
The PRC had also proved its credibility of firmness on the Taiwan 
question through empirical evidence. No country had been able to 
maintain diplomatic relations with Beijing and Taipei at the same 
time. In October 1971, before the admission of the PRC to the United 
Nations, 62 nations still recognized Taipei as the government of 
China. By the end of 1972, 23 countries had switched diplomatic rec-
ognition from Taipei to Beijing. By 1980, 23 other countries had fol-
lowed suit (see table 10). In August 1981, Taipei retained diplomatic 
relations with only 23 countries, five of which had extended diplo-
matic recognition since 1971 (see table 11 ). 
In the 1970s, Beijing concluded 75 joint communiques with for-
eign countries concerning normalization of diplomatic relations (Shen, 
1982: 33). Six nations "recognized" the PRC as the "sole legal gov-
ernment of China" and also "recognized Beijing's claim that Taiwan is 
'an inalienable part of the territory of the PRC.' " While recognizing 
Beijing as the sole legal government of China, 25 nations chose to use 
ambiguous wording toward Beijing's claim to Taiwan such as, "take 
note of," "understand," "respect," and "acknowledge," rather than 
formally "recognize" that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory 
of the PRC. Forty-four states, mostly small third world countries, did 
not mention the status of Taiwan in the joint communiques with 
which they established diplomatic relations with the PRC. The PRC, 
however, always insisted on including a "Taiwan clause" in any joint 
communique with important Asia-Pacific countries or major U.S. al-
lies, namely: Thailand, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom, Spain, Greece, Italy, Canada, Belgium, Iceland, Brazil, Ja-
5. Chou En-lai, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and their associates held at least 20 interviews to 
elaborate their views on Taiwan. For detailed sources of those interviews see Chen. "Pe-
king's Attitude Toward Taiwan." in Chiu. ed .• 1978:35-36, note 4. 
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Table 10 
Countries Switching Diplomatic Recognition from Taipei 
to Beijing: October 1971-December 1980 
Oct. 25, 1971 (a) 
-Dec. 31, 1972 
Argentina 
Australia 
Chad 
Cyprus 
Dahomey 
(Benin) 
Ecuador 
Greece 
Guyana 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Lebanon 
Luxembourg 
Maldives 
Malta 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
New Zealand 
Peru 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Togo 
Zaire 
1977 
Barbados 
Jordan 
Liberia 
1973 1974 1975 1976 
Spain Brazil Botswanna Central 
Upper Volta Gabon Fiji (b) African 
Gambia Madagascar Republic 
Malaysia Philippines 
Niger Portugal 
Venezuela S. Vietnam 
Thailand 
W. Samoa (b) 
1978 1979 1980 
Libya United States Colombia 
(a) Beijing replaced Taipei in the China seat at the United 
Nations on 25 October 1971. 
(b) Established diplomatic relations with Taipei in 1971. 
Data Source: U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, The New Era in East 
Asia hearings, 97th Congress, 1st session, May 19, 20, 28; June 3, 10; and July 16, 1981, p. 
39. 
pan, Netherlands and the Philippines (Shen, 1982:79), the PRC-West 
Germany joint communique being the sole exception. 
The PRC also demonstrated its firmness toward the non-negotia-
ble one-China position in the forums of international organizations. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the PRC repeatedly declared that it would not 
join the United Nations if the Republic of China government was a 
member. In August 1971, two months before the United Nations 
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Table 11 
Countries Establishing Diplomatic Relations With Taiwan (ROC), 
1972-1981 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Fiji (a) South Africa 
Tonga (b) 
W. Samoa (a) 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Nauru (b) St. Vincent 
Tuvalu and the 
Grenadines 
(a) Severed relations with Taipei in 1975 
(b) Raised relations from consular to diplomatic level 
Countries maintaining diplomatic relations with Taipei as of August 1981 are: 
Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, 
Ivory Coast, South Korea, Lesotho, Malawi, Nicaragua, Nauru, Panama, Paraguay, 
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, St. Vincent, Swaziland, Tonga, Tuvalu, Uruguay, the 
Vatican. 
Data Sources: U.S. Congress, The New Era in East Asia, p. 40. 
General Assembly's vote on the admission issue, the PRC reiterated 
its position: 
Should a situation of "two Chinas," "one China, one 
Taiwan," or "the status of Taiwan remaining to be deter-
mined" or any other similar situation occur in the United 
Nations, the Government of the People's Republic of China 
will absolutely have nothing to do with the United Nations. 
(Beijing Review, 27 August 1971:7). 
After the expulsion of the Republic of China from the United 
Nations, the PRC successfully replaced the Republic of China in ten 
specialized agencies of the United Nations (Shen, 1982:84-85, note 32). 
In 1980, the Taipei government was expelled from the World Bank, 
the International Monetary Fund, the International Finance Corpora-
tion, and the International Development Association in favor of the 
PRC (Shen, 1982:85-86). 
In other words, Beijing consistently demonstrated to the United 
States as well as to other countries its credibility of standing firm on 
the Taiwan issue. Besides manifesting its position through official 
statements and empirical practices, the PRC also used three other tac-
tics to increase its bargaining position vis-a-vis the United States on 
the Taiwan issue. 
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Bolstering Beijing's Stakes on the Taiwan Issue 
Snyder and Diesing have discussed the importance of the decision 
maker's perception of the participating parties' comparative stakes: 
When a state yields on any issue, it is more likely to be be-
cause it believes its adversary's interests to be stronger than 
its own . . . than because its independent valuation of the 
stake is low. That is, a state's resolve in a particular case is a 
function of how it perceives the comparative interests of it-
self and its opponent. . . . Thus, when a state yields in a 
conflict where its own values at stake are of intermediate im-
portance, it may also yield on issues of greater importance if 
it thinks the adversary's stake is greater still; and conversely, 
it may be firm on lesser issues when it thinks the balance of 
interests favors itself .... (Snyder and Diesing, 1977: 186). 
For Washington, normalization challenged the "integrity of de-
fense commitments and the welfare of a long-time ally"; for Beijing, 
the issue of "sovereignty" was at stake (Solomon, 1978:325). Both 
Washington and Beijing's stakes on the Taiwan issue were high. But 
comparatively speaking, nothing was more important than a nation's 
sovereignty. Beijing repeatedly declared that the Taiwan issue is an 
issue of sovereignty.6 
Reducing Washington's Stakes on the Taiwan Question 
Washington's stake in breaking diplomatic relations and terminating 
the defense treaty with Taiwan was considered a function of its 
payoffs-its costs versus its benefits-from the normalization with 
Beijing. Beijing had tried to convince Washington that normalization 
under Beijing's terms would increase Washington's strategic and eco-
nomic benefits and eventually would reduce Washington's risk of be-
coming involved in another civil war in Asia. Former Foreign 
Minister Huang Hua allegedly stated in a speech on 20 July 1977: 
When the Chinese people deem the time to be ripe to liberate 
Taiwan by force, would the American people really have the 
resolve to live or perish with the Chiang dynasty, and share 
the fate of the island of Taiwan? Go read American history, 
we have not seen an instance in which the United States has 
6. For example, Hua Kuo-feng reiterated China's position on Taiwan in August 1977: 
"Taiwan Province is China's sacred territory. We are determined to liberate Taiwan. 
When and how is entirely China's internal affairs, which brooks no foreign interference 
whatsoever." Quoted from the political report by Hua Kuo-feng, Chairman of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party, to the Eleventh National Congress of the Communist 
Party of China, 12 August 1977 (Solomon, 1978:325). 
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had had such resolve and courage to sacrifice for others.7 
The lesson of Vietnam has been quite painful for the United 
States; if the United States had no intention of getting into another 
civil war in Asia, Washington would be wise to terminate the defense 
commitment with Taiwan. Besides decreasing Washington's cost of 
ending the defense treaty, Beijing had also tried to stress the benefits of 
an early normalization of relations between the United States and the 
PRC. The PRC had linked Sino-American economic, cultural, and 
exchange program relations with normalization. Sino-American trade 
setbacks in the mid-1970s was explained as the lack of full diplomatic 
relations by the PRC. In September 1977, Teng Hsiao-p'ing also 
hinted that Beijing's patience for normalization should not be taken 
for granted and would not last forever (Boccardi, 1977:A1, 21). The 
PRC had indicated to the United States the danger of further delay of 
the normalization decision and potential political and economic bene-
fits from an early decision to establish diplomatic relations. In brief, 
Beijing had tried to devalue Washington's costs in terminating the dip-
lomatic and military relations with Taiwan, and in the meantime 
stressed the benefits from an early decision toward normalization of 
relations. 
Challenging Washington's Legal Position on the Taiwan Issue 
In September 1977, after Secretary of State Vance's visit to China, 
Teng Hsiao-p'ing revealed in an interview that former President Ford 
"promised" in December 1975 that if reelected he would resolve the 
Taiwan problem the same way the Japanese had done it (Boccardi, 
1977:A1). Although President Ford had a different view on this sub-
ject, Teng insisted that President Ford had made the promise in 1975 
(Boccardi, 1977:A1, 21). Teng further commented that Vance's pro-
posal to set up a U.S. liaison mission in Taiwan was a step back from 
Ford's position. Teng's disclosure of Ford's position on the Taiwan 
issue was aimed at limiting President Carter's room for maneuver. 
The PRC also challenged Washington's bargaining position on the 
Taiwan issue by stressing the U.S. position in the Shanghai Communi-
que. In the Shanghai Communique, the United States had acknowl-
edged the one-China principle. From the PRC perspective, the United 
States had no legal right subsequently to set up a liaison office in Tai-
wan after the establishment of full diplomatic relations with Beijing. 
In brief, Beijing had used various channels and tactics to commu-
7. According to Taiwan's sources, the speech was ordered by the Central Committee 
of the Chinese Communist Party as one of the means to prepare its middle level cadres for 
the Eleventh Party Congress, held 11-18 August 1977 (Chiu, 1978: 188). 
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nicate with Washington its stakes and firmness on the Taiwan ques-
tion. The Carter administration in 1978 finally concluded that Beijing 
was immovable on the non-negotiable Taiwan issue; that is, Beijing 
would not make any concession on the Taiwan question. Washing-
ton's acceptance of Beijing's terms for normalization can be viewed as 
Beijing's triumph. 
THE CYBERNETIC MODEL 
The main point of Steinbruner's cybernetic model is that the funda-
mental decision problem is not "as a matter of maximizing expected 
utility (or any loose approximation), but rather as a question of simpli-
fying an incomprehensibly complex world" (Steinbruner, 1976:236). 
Steinbruner believes that "the decision maker does not resolve value 
conflicts; that is, he does not seek to produce an optimally balanced 
return to competing objectives" (Steinbruner, 1976:236). 
Under conditions of uncertainty or a value conflict situation, 
Steinbruner believes that decisions are structured not by rational pro-
cedures, but by nonrational rules of cognitive operations. For exam-
ple, the decision maker will tend to conceptualize his decision 
environment so as to avoid recognizing tradeoff relationships between 
his values. The decision maker will suppress the tradeoff's by concep-
tualizing his world in such a way that the values do not appear to 
conflict (Snyder, 1978:348). 
Leon Festinger also points out that the decision maker can reduce 
or even eliminate his cognitive dissonance by conceiving his decision 
as being the only choice he can possibly make under the circumstances 
(Snyder, 1978:348; Festinger, 1957:43-44). In brief, the cybernetic ap-
proach stresses that there are strong cognitive forces in operation 
"under conditions of uncertainty which predispose decision makers to 
deny the existence of trade-off's, to deny choice, and to impute unwar-
ranted certainty to this view of their situation" (Snyder, 1978:348). 
The announcement of the normalization agreement on 15 Decem-
ber 1978 came as a surprise to the U.S. Congress and American peo-
ple. The Republic of China government was informed only a few 
hours before President Carter's announcement. In a report of the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee, the Carter administration was criti-
cized by Congress on several accounts for not obtaining a better deal 
on the Taiwan question: 
First, the United States yielded on all three of the PRC's 
major conditions for normalization. . . . Even when the PRC 
dropped a newer fourth condition banning U.S. arms sales to 
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Taiwan, the United States agreed to a one-year moratorium 
on new sales commitments. 
Second, the United States did not obtain a pledge from 
the PRC that it would not take military action against 
Taiwan. 
Third, the language of the December 15, 1978 commu-
nique goes slightly beyond that of the 1972 Shanghai Com-
munique in recognizing China's claim to sovereignty over 
Taiwan. It also goes further than similar statements made 
by some other countries. In the Shanghai Communique the 
United States "acknowledges" and agrees not to challenge 
the position of Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Straits 
that Taiwan is part of China. 
In the December 15 Communique, the United States 
"acknowledges" as the Chinese position that Taiwan is part 
of China. The extent of this change is more marked in the 
Chinese translations of the two communiques, but the Com-
mittee was assured by Deputy Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher that the United States adheres to only the Eng-
lish translation. 8 
In February 1979, Dr. Ray Cline revealed his conversation with 
Kissinger on the normalization terms, in a congressional hearing: 
I happened to encounter Dr. Kissinger this morning. 
He works in the same institution, not the proposed nonprofit 
private institute, but Georgetown University's Research 
Center, where I work, and I again, only a few hours ago, 
asked Dr. Kissinger: "Did you and President Nixon ever 
give any assurance of normalization on the terms that Peking 
dictated and President Carter accepted?" And he said, "Ab-
solutely not. I am on the record repeatedly on this point." 
It is unfair to suggest that the Carter decision was the same 
one as the Shanghai Communique decision, which was to 
normalize with Peking but on terms where we preserved our 
relations with Taiwan.9 
In Years of Upheaval, Kissinger disclosed his conversation with 
Chairman Mao on 12 November 1973, on the settlement of the Tai-
wan Issue: 
8. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Taiwan Enabling Act, 96th 
Congress, 1st session, 1979, Report No. 96-7:9. 
9. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Taiwan Legislation hearings, 
96th Congress, 1st session, 7-8 February, 1979:115. 
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Having established the basic analysis of the interna-
tional situation in about an hour, Mao suddenly turned to 
the issue of Taiwan, and then not to state a challenge but to 
hint obliquely at a solution. He had heard that the three 
Baltic states still had embassies in the United States, he said. 
I affirmed it. "And the Soviet Union did not ask you first to 
abolish those embassies before they established diplomatic 
relations with you?" That was not exactly accurate, since 
the time relations were established the Soviet Union recog-
nized the Baltic states. But if Mao was implying that rela-
tions with Taiwan were no necessary obstacle to 
normalization with China, I saw no reason to draw fine his-
torical distinctions; so I assented to his proposition. Zhou 
[Chou] helpfully chipped in that though maintaining diplo-
matic relations with the United States, the Baltic states did 
not have access to the United Nations. Did all this mean, I 
wondered, that China might acquiesce in a separate legal sta-
tus for Taiwan, contenting itself with excluding Taiwan from 
the UN? ... 
What did all this mean? Was it another hint that nor-
malization could be separated from the issue of Taiwan? 
And that the rate of normalizing relations was up to us? ... I 
am inclined to believe that like Zhou on the day before, Mao 
was indirectly inviting a proposal that combined the princi-
ple of a unified China with some practical accommodation to 
the status quo .... (Kissinger, 1982:691-92). 
Mao in 1973 showed signs of some flexibility on the settlement of 
the Taiwan question after Sino-American normalization of relations. 
Whether the United States could have secured a better deal on the 
Taiwan issue in 1978 could be debated endlessly. The Carter adminis-
tration apparently thought the Sino-American normalization agree-
ment was good enough. 
The Sino-American normalization decision involved a tradeoff for 
the United States between two values-the avoidance of the charge of 
being an unreliable friend, and the promotion of U.S. geopolitical and 
economic benefits. Alexander George has discussed two major ways 
by which the policymaker may deal with a value conflict situation. 
First, the decision maker may recognize the value conflict and deal 
with the difficult tradeoff analytically and strategically. Second, the 
decision maker may seek to avoid a value conflict by denying its exist-
ence or playing down its importance (George, 1980:29). How did the 
U.S. decision makers deal with the value tradeoff problem relating to 
the normalization decision? 
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The Nixon and Carter administrations had different approaches 
to the value conflict situation. President Nixon and Kissinger realized 
that, in the process of normalizing relations with the PRC, U.S.-Tai-
wan relations would eventually be undermined. President Nixon, 
however, skillfully managed the value conflict in the best possible way. 
In 1972, the United States worked out the ambiguously worded 
Shanghai Communique with the PRC. The political relationship be-
tween Washington and Taipei was downgraded. The Nixon adminis-
tration, however, was able to reiterate that U.S. commitments to 
Taiwan were unaffected, right after President Nixon's trip to the PRC. 
In 1973, the United States and the PRC established their liaison of-
fices. The United States, however, still managed to maintain diplo-
matic relations with the Republic of China. Kissinger described one 
instance in which he faced the value tradeoff situation: 
I had one of the more painful meetings of my career on 
July 1, 1971. The Ambassador of the Republic of China, 
James Shen, came to see me about preserving Taiwan's seat 
at the next United Nations General Assembly vote on Chi-
nese representation. Shen lodged an extensive objection to 
the State Department plan for "dual representation," which 
would have attempted to admit Peking to the UN without 
expelling Taiwan. I found it difficult to concentrate on the 
details, for that July 1 was the very day I was due to leave on 
my trip to Asia for the secret rendezvous in Peking. No gov-
ernment less deserved what was about to happen to it than 
that of Taiwan. It had been a loyal ally; its conduct toward 
us had been exemplary. Its representatives, most notably its 
Ambassador, had behaved with that matter-of-fact reliability 
and subtle intelligence characteristic of the Chinese people. I 
found my role with Shen particularly painful, since I knew 
that before long his esoteric discussion of UN procedural 
maneuvers would be overtaken by more elemental events; 
but I could say nothing to him, and indeed it was essential 
that I maintained as normal and nonchalant a schedule as 
possible (Kissinger, 1979:733). 
Kissinger also recounted his meeting with Shen after President 
Nixon's China trip in 1972. "The most painful was my meeting with 
Ambassador James Shen from Taiwan; we had not in fact made any 
commitments undercutting Taiwan security, but the entire process 
was bound to be inimical to its status" (Kissinger, 1979: 1094). 
Unlike the Nixon administration, the Carter administration tried 
to deny the existence of any value conflict when it dealt with the nor-
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malization issue. President Carter even believed that the people of 
Taiwan were not hurt by his normalization decision. In an interview 
on 19 December 1978, President Carter made the following statement: 
My reports from Taiwan, in the last few days or few 
hours, has (sic) been that they studied the agreements with 
the People's Republic, that their original concerns have been 
substantially alleviated, and I don't think that the people of 
Taiwan are any more concerned about future peace than 
they were before .... But as of the first of January, we will 
have relations with and acknowledge the nationhood of 
China. And Taiwan will no longer be a nation in the view of 
our own country .... I think what we've done is right. It's 
better for our country. It's better for the people of China. It 
does not hurt the people of Taiwan. It's good for world 
peace. I think we've benefitted greatly, and I'm very proud 
of it. 10 
How could President Carter believe that the people in Taiwan 
were not hurt while the newspapers were reporting otherwise? The 
Washington Post, for example, had the following report on 17 Decem-
ber 1978: 
Taipei, Taiwan, Dec. 16-Anti-American demonstra-
tions erupted here today as the Taiwan government reacted 
sharply and swiftly to the sudden U.S. announcement that 
the United States will recognize the Peking government and 
end its diplomatic ties with Taiwan. 
Taiwan postponed its parliamentary elections scheduled 
for next week and the country's foreign minister resigned. 
Thousands of jeering demonstrators, dragging an Amer-
ican flag in the dirt, gathered outside the dingy yellow U.S. 
Embassy and U.S. military headquarters to denounce Presi-
dent Carter as a "coward" and to wave placards saying, 
"Down with Yankee bandits!" (Matthews, 1978:A1). 
How did the Carter administration deal with the value tradeoff 
problem? Did it resort to defensive avoidance to deny the value con-
flict problem? 
Procrastination 
Any tradeoff between two important values would violate the principle 
10. Excerpt from President Carter's interview with Walter Cronkite, 19 December 
1978, in U.S. Department of State, U.S. Policy Toward China July 15, 1971-January 15, 
1979, Selected Documents No. 9:49, 51. 
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of cognitive consistency. Procrastination is one major method the de-
cision maker can use to avoid recognizing tradeoff relationships be-
tween his values. 
The United States had delayed the normalization decision for al-
most seven years. In a way, it can be seen as a calculated procrastina-
tion. The first few years after the signing of the Shanghai 
Communique, the PRC had on various occasions indicated that the 
United States has the time if she needs it to solve her domestic 
problems relating to the Sino-American normalization of relations. 
The 1972 and 1976 presidential elections, Watergate, and the fall of 
Vietnam were all good and legitimate reasons for postponing the nor-
malization decision. Another reason was that the United States was 
using the strategy of "calculated inactivity" to delay the settlement of 
the Taiwan problem. The Carter Administration had used the same 
strategy to postpone consideration of the normalization decision until 
settlement of the Panama Canal Treaties in order to avoid confronting 
two controversial foreign policy issues at the same time. 
The Taiwan issue, however, was not solved when the United 
States normalized diplomatic relations with the PRC. Washington 
and Beijing agreed to disagree on the issue of arms sales to Taiwan. In 
the normalization agreement, the United States was allowed to state 
unilaterally that it expects Taiwan's status to be settled peacefully. 
The official Chinese statement on 15 December 1978, however, de-
clared that the method of reunifying Taiwan with the PRC is "entirely 
China's internal affair" (Oberdorfer, 1979b:A2). On 15 January 1979, 
Teng Hsiao-p'ing indicated that China preferred a peaceful solution, 
but refused to rule out the use of military force (Oberdorfer, 
1979b:A2). The formula of "agree to disagree" was invented to avoid 
a difficult value conflict situation. The United States and the PRC 
were able to make separate statements on the Taiwan question to sat-
isfy each country's domestic needs. Neither the United States nor the 
PRC would admit that it had made any tradeoff of values. The Tai-
wan issue, however, remained to be solved. 
Bolstering 
Bolstering is another major way a decision maker can avoid recogniz-
ing tradeoff relationships between his values. Janis and Mann defined 
bolstering as "an umbrella term that includes a number of different 
psychological tactics that contribute to creating and maintaining the 
decision maker's image of a successful outcome with high gains and 
tolerable losses" (Janis and Mann, 1977:91). In the normalization de-
cision, the Carter administration used three major bolstering tactics 
for defensive avoidance. 
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Exaggerating favorable consequences. This is the tactic used most 
often by a decision maker, according to Janis and Mann, to resolve a 
conflict that otherwise would leave him in a painful state of indecision 
(Janis and Mann, 1977:91). In December 1978, President Carter 
made the following statement: 
The change that I'm announcing tonight will be of great 
long-term benefit to the peoples of both our country and 
China-and, I believe, to all the peoples of the world. Nor-
malization-and the expanded commercial and cultural rela-
tions that it will bring-will contribute to the well-being of 
our own nation, to our own national interest, and it will also 
enhance the stability of Asia. These more positive relations 
with China can beneficially affect the world in which we live 
and the world in which our children will live. 11 
In February 1979, three months after the normalization an-
nouncement, however, the PRC launched a military attack into Viet-
nam. The Carter administration had hoped normalization would 
motivate the Soviet Union to be more cooperative with the United 
States. President Carter firmly believed that Sino-American normali-
zation of relations "will not put any additional obstacles in the way of 
a successful SALT agreement and also will not endanger our good 
relationships with the Soviet Union." 12 
On 19 December 1978, President Carter disclosed a message from 
Leonid Brezhnev "very positive in tone" that conveyed the Soviet 
leader's understanding of the American decision to normalize rela-
tions with the PRC. 13 The Soviet Union, however, made public in 
Tass on 21 December 1978 the details of Brezhnev's message to Presi-
dent Carter, in an apparent attempt to show that President Carter mis-
interpreted Brezhnev's message. Brezhnev expressed concern about 
the United States and the PRC condemning "hegemony" in their joint 
normalization communique. Brezhnev also raised questions about the 
new Chinese-American relationship and vowed to watch it closely 
(Shipler, 1978:Al, 7). 
In January 1979, highly placed Soviet officials acknowledged for 
the first time that Brezhnev put off his trip to the United States to 
avoid being upstaged by Teng's visit (Whitney, 1979:A9). Some of 
Secretary of State Vance's advisers thought that the Soviet Union had 
11. U.S. Department of State, U.S. Policy Toward China July 15, 1971-January 15, 
1979, p. 46. 
12. Excerpt from President Carter's Interview with Walter Cronkite 19 December 
1978, in ibid., p. 49. 
13. Ibid. 
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apparently decided to put off an agreement on SALT II because of 
deep concern over Sino-American normalization of relations 
(Whitney, 1979:A9). Later, Brzezinski also came to the conclusion 
that normalization had complicated SALT II negotiations, after meet-
ing with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and talking to U.S. officials 
who had been in Geneva in December 1978 for the SALT II negotia-
tion (Talbott, 1979:247). President Carter finally admitted in January 
1979 that normalization did create problems for SALT II negotiations 
(Oberdorfer, 1979a:A8) 
Minimizing unfavorable consequences. Another way of "bolstering" is 
to minimize unfavorable costs of the preferred choice. The decision 
maker may attempt to convince himself that the preferred choice 
could minimize the likelihood of an unfavorable outcome, and those 
rejected alternatives would bring more negative consequences. 
Secretary of State Vance stated in January 1979 that "failure to 
try to move forward would have left us in danger of moving back-
ward-at great cost to our global position." 14 "We did not have the 
option of temporizing . . . we had the choice of moving forward or 
allowing the situation with China to erode," said a senior official in the 
Carter administration (Oberdorfer and Walsh, 1978b:A1, 12). The 
Carter administration had tried to use the strategy-"normalization 
now or never" and "cost less now or cost more later"-to reduce the 
value tradeoff problem. 
The Carter administration believed that the PRC does not have 
the capability of launching a 120-mile attack across the ocean against 
Taiwan in the next five years. By assuming that no negative result 
would happen in the foreseeable future, the Carter administration 
tried to reduce the cost of terminating the defense treaty with Taiwan. 
In other words, the United States could terminate a defense treaty 
with an ally, for example, Israel or Korea, if the United States could 
be sure that country would not be attacked by its enemy within five 
years after the termination of the defense treaty. Ambassador Wood-
cock stated in a press conference, "As each day goes by and the island 
is not sinking into the sea, the political pressure will lessen" (Washing-
ton Post, 2 January 1979:A9). 
President Carter also explained the need for secrecy and the in-
cremental essence of his normalization decision as follows: 
We did not depart from the established policy of our 
country that's been extant since President Nixon went to 
14. U.S. Department of State, U.S. Policy Toward China July 15, 1971-January 15, 
1979, p. 56. 
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China in 1972. And I think had we caused a public debate in 
our country about all the ramifications of the negotiations at 
the very time we were trying to conclude these discussions 
with the Chinese, it would have resulted in failure. And our 
country would have lost a wonderful opportunity to [gain] a 
great stride forward and all the benefits that be derived from 
this agreement. 
So, I don't have any doubt that what I did was right and 
correct. I don't have any doubts that had we made a public 
issue of it, it would have complicated the issue 
unnecessarily. 15 
President Carter was apparently convinced that the timing, man-
ner, and terms of the normalization decision were not merely right, 
but also represented the only choice he could possibly make under the 
circumstances. By stressing his normalization decision as merely in-
cremental progress of U.S. policy toward China that had been devel-
oping since the early 1970s, President Carter tried to dispel any 
astonishment concerning his sudden announcement on 15 December 
1978. 
Denying the significance of negative feeling. Value conflict could also 
be minimized by denying the significance of aversive feelings (Janis 
and Mann, 1977 :92). 
President Carter indicated that in recognizing the PRC "we are 
recognizing simple reality." 16 Brzezinski stated that the real signifi-
cance of Carter's decision to normalize relations with the PRC was 
that "it ends a long period of illusion." 17 President Carter further 
explained that: 
By establishing relations with the People's Republic of China 
the United States is terminating a fiction and catching up 
with reality. The fiction has been that we recognized the au-
thorities on Taiwan to be the legitimate government of 1 bil-
lion Chinese on the mainland. This has not been the case for 
29 years, and the situation is not going to change. Both Pe-
king and Taipei insist each is the government of all of China, 
and no country in the world has diplomatic relations with 
both. Neither side allows it. Over 100 countries now recog-
nize the Peking government, including all our European al-
15. Ibid., p. 50. 
16. Ibid., p. 46. 
17. Excerpts from Speeches by Vance and Brzezinski on America's China Policy, New 
York Times 16 January 1979:A11. 
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lies, and we are adjusting our diplomatic stand in conformity 
with international practice. 18 
Secretary of State Vance echoed President Carter: 
By the time we took the decisive step, every other member of 
NATO, our two treaty partners in ANZUS (Australia-New 
Zealand-United States), and Japan had long since recognized 
the P.R.C., as had most other nations of the world. 19 
The Carter administration displayed a characteristic pattern of 
defensive avoidance by bolstering the expected gains and minimizing 
the likelihood of costs from normalization. The significance of termi-
nating diplomatic ties and the defense treaty with Taiwan was down-
graded so that there would be less of a tradeoff problem. The Carter 
administration was right in stating that the government in Taiwan in 
the preceding 29 years was not the government of 1 billion people on 
the mainland. The reality, however, was not as simple as the Carter 
administration claimed. China had two governments, each of which 
effectively controlled different parts of Chinese territory. According to 
Senator Jesse Helms at that time, a realistic policy would have been 
"to recognize each government as competent in the territory it con-
trols. " 20 "There is no need to recognize the claim which each makes 
to the territory controlled by the other, nor is there any need to deny 
such claims."21 
CONCLUSION 
The U.S. normalization decision was influenced by various decision 
makers' perceptions and assessments of national interests, domestic 
politics, and personal political interests. Presidents Nixon, Ford, and 
Carter all came to the same conclusion-Sino-American relations 
must be normalized-even though each president had his own idiosyn-
cratic background and individual attributes. While precise causal rela-
tionships cannot be weighted, the Carter administration's perception 
of Beijing's "non-negotiable" principle, and its capability and inten-
tions toward the settlement of the Taiwan question, appeared to have 
exerted an important influence on President Carter's position on the 
Taiwan issue. 
When interviewed, former Ambassador Leonard Woodcock re-
18. "China," Background Report by Office of Media Liaison, The White House Press 
Office, 4 January 1979, Washington, D.C., p. 5. 
19. U.S. Department of State, U.S. Policy Toward China July 15, 1971-January 15, 
1979, pp. 56-57. 
20. U.S. Congress, Taiwan Enabling Act, 1979, p. 53. 
21. Ibid. 
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called that it was he who persuaded President Carter to drop the con-
dition that the PRC promise to renounce the use of future force 
against Taiwan on the ground that such a prior constraint would con-
stitute an infringement of China's sovereignty. Woodcock, moreover, 
maintained that, despite later criticisms of Carter to the contrary, a 
U.S. requirement of such a pledge from the PRC would have blocked 
any further negotiations. The PRC simply would have refused to ac-
quiesce to such a condition. 22 
There were still other considerations influencing the Carter White 
House, according to Woodcock. One was its assessment that Con-
gress, in any event, would never accord credibility to a communist 
country's pledge to renounce force against Taiwan. And another con-
sideration was the White House assumption that, under the most 
favorable scenario, the PRC would trade such a pledge only for a U.S. 
concession on its arms flow to Taiwan. 23 
According to President Carter's National Security Council staff 
member, Michel Oksenberg, in a 1985 interview, even had Ronald 
Reagan won the presidency in 1976-that would neither have delayed 
normalization nor altered U.S. terms. Despite Reagan's oft-repeated 
support for Taiwan, Republican Reagan would not have reneged on 
Republican Nixon's commitment, Oksenberg explained. A national 
direction, not just a Republican direction, had already been estab-
lished. Moreover, the fear of a PRC rapprochement with the Soviet 
Union would have then influenced Reagan as much as it did influence 
Carter, a Democrat, to follow Nixon's initiative.Z4 
Normalization between Washington and Beijing was achieved at 
the expense ofU.S.-Taiwan relations. It would have violated normali-
zation decision makers' cognitive consistency had they admitted that 
the Carter administration could have gained better terms on the Tai-
wan issue had it tried harder. It would also have violated President 
Carter's cognitive consistency had he admitted that Taiwan's interests 
were damaged by his normalization decision. To acknowledge the 
existence of a value tradeoff situation would create a problem of cogni-
tive dissonance, especially for a decision maker, such as President 
Carter, who stresses the importance of dignity, truthfulness, and hon-
esty. It is not surprising that the Carter Administration resorted to 
22. Interview with Ambassador Leonard Woodcock, U.S. ambassador to the PRC, 
1979-1981, U.S. representative to the liaison office in Beijing, 1977-1978. 29 July 1985. 
Ann Arbor, Michigan. 
23. Ibid. 
24. Interview with Professor Michel Oksenberg, a staff member of the NSC, 1977-1980. 
29 July 1985. Ann Arbor, Michigan. 
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defensive avoidance mechanisms to deny the tradeoff and therefore to 
ease cognitive dissonance. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Sino-American normalization decision making was an extremely 
complex and convoluted process. The rational actor model enabled us 
to see normalization decision making as a process of maximizing U.S. 
strategic, economic, and moral goals. The timing and terms of nor-
malization were assumed to be rationally chosen as a result of careful 
examinations of potential gains and costs of each alternative. The first 
question to which this study is addressed is repeated: 
Question 1-The Rational Actor Model 
Would the United States have rationally chosen the optimal timing 
and terms to normalize relations with the PRC, that is, (1) could the 
United States have maximized bilateral relations with the PRC, 
(2) could the United States have normalized relations with the PRC 
without sacrificing the detente relations with the Soviet Union, and 
(3) could the United States have normalized relations with the PRC 
with minimal costs to U.S.-Taiwan relations? 
From the analyses of this study, the 1972 opening of China pol-
icy, the 1973-1977 indecision toward full normalization of relations, 
and the December 1978 breakthrough were indeed rationally chosen 
by the U.S. decision makers after careful considerations of interna-
tional and domestic environments. The rational actor approach to ex-
plain the normalization decision was found to be particularly relevant. 
The United States, however, did not gain the maximum benefits 
hoped for in normalization. The Carter administration in 1978 had 
miscalculated Moscow's reaction toward normalization between 
Washington and Beijing. Sino-American normalization of relations 
had complicated SALT II negotiations. 
At the bilateral level, in the years immediately following the nor-
malization decision, U.S.-PRC relations had greatly improved. Two-
way trade between the United States and the PRC had jumped from 
$5 million in 1971 to $2 billion in 1979, $4.9 billion in 1980, and $5.5 
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billion in 1981 (Hsueh, 1982: 11 ). 1 In 1985, two-way trade jumped to a 
record $7.7 billion, while United States-Taiwan trade in the same year 
was more than $22 billion (The Asian Wall Street Journal, 5 May 
1986:11; Lasater, 1986:11). In 1984, the PRC was the 21st largest 
trading partner of the United States, while Taiwan was the fifth 
(Lasater, 1985:5). 
The United States had also given the PRC various trade benefits 
such as Most-favored-nation status (MFN), full access to Export-Im-
port Bank and Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) export credits, 
and participation in Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) 
programs (Daumbaugh, 1985:9). 
Cultural, scientific, and technological programs between Wash-
ington and Beijing had also significantly strengthened. In 1982, more 
than 100,000 Americans visited the PRC, while nearly 10,000 Chinese 
students were studying at American universities. 2 During the aca-
demic year 1983-1984, there were approximately 12,000 PRC students 
and scholars in America (Lampton, et. al, 1986:2). 
Sino-American relations, however, gradually deteriorated after 
President Reagan took office in 1981. The question of U.S. arms sales 
to Taiwan was not settled in the course of negotiations of the Sino-
American normalization agreement. The U.S.-PRC Joint Communi-
que of 17 August 1982 failed to solve the arms sales to Taiwan issue. 
This communique was the result of ten months of intense and difficult 
negotiations. The United States declared in the communique that "it 
does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, 
that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in 
quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years." The 
United States also indicated in the communique that "it intends to 
reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of 
time to a final resolution." (See Appendix D.) 
The PRC was, however, not satisfied with the U.S. position on 
the arms sales issue. The PRC wanted the United States to set a date 
for ending arms sales to Taiwan. The United States, on the other 
hand, insisted that this communique did not "provide either a time 
frame for reductions of U.S. arms sales or for their termination."3 
In the fall of 1982, the PRC began to widen its foreign policy 
options. Beijing had reemphasized its identification with the Third 
I. See also U.S. Department of State, "Foreign Policy Priorities in Asia," Current 
Policy No. 274 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Public Affairs, 24 April 1981:2). 
2. U.S. Department of State, "Developing an Enduring Relationship with China," 
Current Policy No. 460 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Public Affairs, 28 February 1983: I). 
3. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, China-Taiwan: United States 
Policy hearing, 97th Congress, 2d session, 18 August 1982:15. 
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World and resumed a dialogue with Moscow. Concurrently, the PRC 
had moved to alienate relations between Washington and Beijing. 
On 5 October 1982, the PRC and the Soviet Union resumed talks 
in Beijing. The ninth round of talks was concluded in October 1986. 
During these talks, Beijing and Moscow did not make significant pro-
gresses in narrowing their differences on strategic issues such as Soviet 
military withdrawals from Afghanistan, Mongolia, and the 
Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. The dialogue, however, had 
taken some of the "sting" out of the twenty-year hostility and rivalry 
between these two communist giants. One indicator of an improve-
ment in Sino-Soviet relations was their bilateral trade, which jumped 
from a total of $330 million in 1981 to $880 million in 1982 (Doder, 
1983c: A21). In 1985, Sino-Soviet trade rose 60% to more than a bil-
lion dollars (Kempe, 1986:11). 
On 28 July 1986, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev announced in 
a speech to reduce the number of its forces in Afghanistan and 
Mongolia. Gorbachev also declared that Moscow would be prepared 
to negotiate a border settlement on the basis of Beijing's claim that the 
"main channel" be used to demarcate the disputed boundary along the 
Amur river rather than the Chinese bank (Nations, 1986:33). On 25 
September 1986, the PRC announced that it will resume stalled border 
talks-frozen since the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan-with the 
Soviet Union at the vice foreign ministerial level in 1987 (The Wash-
ington Post, 26 September 1986a: A32). 
Better relations with the Soviet Union would greatly increase Bei-
jing's leverage toward Washington. In the 1970s, Washington was in a 
position to improve relations with Moscow and Beijing to gain strate-
gic leverage. In the 1980s, Moscow and Beijing tried to improve their 
relations as a means of influencing their respective relations with 
Washington. Beijing has been quite successful in using its diplomatic 
leverage vis-a-vis Moscow to gain Washington's attention. 
United States relations with the PRC have improved steadily 
since the summer of 1983. In May 1983, the Reagan administration 
further relaxed export controls to the PRC. Beijing was moved from 
Country Group P to Country Group V, joining other friendly Asian, 
African, and European countries. In October 1985, the United States 
reached an agreement with the Coordinating Committee (COCOM) 
for exports to communist countries, which helped to further speed 
U.S. technology exports to the PRC (Sutter, 1986:8). High-tech 
equipment exports to the PRC have increased significantly since 1983. 
By one estimate, the value of high-tech equipment exports, excluding 
commercial aircraft but including all the green line product categories, 
nearly doubled between 1982 and 1983 to more than $214 million. By 
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the same accounting method, high-tech equipment exports exceeded 
$300 million in 1984. This upward trend continued in 1985.4 
President Reagan's trip to China in April 1984 climaxed a series 
of high-level contacts between Washington and Beijing. United 
States-PRC military ties have gradually been built since Secretary of 
Defense Caspar Weinberger's September 1983 trip to China. In Au-
gust 1985 the PRC signed a contract with General Electric for five GE 
LM2500 gas turbine naval engines for destroyers. One month later, 
the Reagan administration notified Congress of its first Foreign Mili-
tary Sales (FMS) to the PRC, a $98 million package including the 
design and general layout of an artillery munitions factory and data 
packages for M82 primers, M577A1 fuzes, and M107 155mm projec-
tiles (Lasater, 1985: 10). 
In early 1986, the Reagan administration further decided to help 
modernize the PRC air force. On 8 April 1986, Congress was notified 
concerning the sale of $550 million of advanced avionics for 50 new 
Chinese F-8 aircrafts, which would give the aircraft all-weather capa-
bility (Chanda, 1986:11). In September 1986, an agreement was 
reached between the United States and the PRC on port calls by ships 
capable of carrying nuclear weapons. It will be the first time for U.S. 
warships to visit Communist China (Washington Post, 1 October 
1986b: A26). 
In retrospect, despite a difficult period during 1982-83, overall re-
lations between Washington and Beijing have been improved signifi-
cantly since normalization. Normalization, however, was no 
guarantee for endurable and friendly relations between the United 
States and the PRC. For example, Beijing threatened to downgrade 
relations with Washington if no agreement was reached on U.S. arms 
sales to Taiwan issue in early 1982. United States-PRC relations 
could also be strained for insignificant reasons. One example is that 
Beijing decided on 7 April 1983 to sever all sports and official cultural 
exchanges with Washington until the end of 1983 in retaliation for the 
Reagan administration's decision to grant political asylum to Chinese 
tennis player Hu Na. 
Relations between Washington and Taipei, on the other hand, 
have been conducted by nonprofit private corporations-the Ameri-
can Institute in Taiwan and the Coordination Council for North 
American Affairs-based on the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. U.S. in-
vestment and two-way U.S.-Taiwan trade have continued to grow 
since 1979. The government in Taiwan, however, had suffered great 
4. U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Export Controls and China," Gist. March 1985, 
pp.l-2. 
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political and diplomatic setbacks from U.S.-PRC normalization of re-
lations. The Reagan administration has progressively reduced Foreign 
Military Sales to Taiwan by about $20 million a year after the conclu-
sion of the 17 August 1982 Communique, from $780 million in 1983 
to $720 million in fiscal 1987 (Goldstein, 1986: 26). 
From the American perspective, tensions had been "markedly 
down in the Taiwan Strait area" since the U.S.-PRC normalization of 
relations. 5 Beijing, however, still refuses to make a pledge not to use 
military force against Taiwan. Since 1982 the United States has de-
clined to sell Taipei more advanced weapons than those it now pos-
sesses. Beijing, on the other hand, has progressed in its military 
modernization-with substantial assistance from the United States 
and other Western countries. Taiwan's long-term security remains 
uncertain. History will reveal whether the United States' strategy to 
normalize relations with the PRC at the expense of its relations with a 
long-term ally in Taiwan was a wise decision. To repeat our next two 
questions: 
Question 2-The Bureaucratic Model 
Could the timing and terms of the normalization decision have been 
best explained by the pulling and hauling of the bureaucratic players? 
Could each bureaucratic politics player's position on the normaliza-
tion issue have been predicted from his position in the bureaucracy? 
From 1969 to 1978, normalization decision making shows a con-
sistent pattern of limited participation of a few people. Fears of leaks 
and bureaucratic fights compelled President Nixon to bypass regular 
bureaucratic channels to formulate the new China policy. The Carter 
administration used the same strategy to conduct the normalization 
negotiation. 
The original target date-1 January 1979-and U.S. terms for 
normalization were reached on 20 June 1978 with little pulling and 
hauling among the key players-Carter, Vance, Brzezinski, Brown, 
and Jordan (Brzezinski, 1983:233). The timing and terms of normali-
zation were better explained by like-minded players than by pulling 
and hauling among them. Question (2) is not supported from the 
analyses of this study. 
The bureaucratic politics model, however, enhanced our under-
standing of the political context of the normalization decision making. 
The final timing of the normalization announcement was influenced by 
Brzezinski's personal interests in speeding up the normalization pro-
5. U.S. Department of State, "Review of Relations with Taiwan," Current Policy No. 
190 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Public Affairs, II June 1980:1). 
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cess in order to gain strategic benefits vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Two 
days after the normalization announcement, President Carter told 
Brzezinski that "you are genuinely the driving force behind the whole 
effort. Whenever I wavered, you pushed me and pressed me to go 
through with this" (Brzezinski, 1983:233). In 1981, during Brzezin-
ski's visit to Beijing, Teng Hsiao-p'ing also told Brzezinski that "you 
and I together overcame the last difficulties" of normalization" 
(Brzezinski, 1983 :230). 
Brzezinski's May 1978 trip to China and his advocacy of a 
tougher line toward the Soviet Union did generate and increase his 
clash with Secretary of State Vance. In February 1978, Vance told 
Brzezinski explicitly that he was "strongly against" Brzezinski's plan 
to go to China (Brzezinski, 1983:204). In order to overcome Vance's 
resistance, Brzezinski had made a "sustained effort" to push President 
Carter's approval of his China trip. The strategy used by Brzezinski 
was to "fashion an alliance" to support his China trip (Brzezinski, 
1983:204). Brzezinski finally obtained the support from Vice Presi-
dent Mondale and Secretary of Defense Brown (Brzezinski, 1983:204). 
Brzezinski won a bureaucratic fight when President Carter decided to 
let him go to China. 
There was no disagreement, however, between Vance and 
Brzezinski on the importance of Sino-American normalization of rela-
tions. Nor was there any difference on the terms of normalization 
(Brzezinski, 1983:223). The difference was that Vance did not want 
the National Security Council to undercut the State Department's 
right to conduct U.S.-PRC relations. 
The answer to our question, "Does where you stand depend on 
where you sit?" explains some of the Department's stand, discussed in 
chapter 4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff's preference to get a pledge from 
Beijing and the State Department's concern over the impact of nor-
malization on the SALT II negotiations were understandable from the 
viewpoint of their respective bureaucratic responsibilities and con-
cerns. The normalization decision was reached through consensus 
among the players. Those departments who might have different 
views on the normalization issue were not included in decision 
making. 
Overall, the bureaucratic politics model did not portray the es-
sence of normalization decision-making processes. The president had 
the dominant power to make decisions. President Carter alone made 
the decisions to let Brzezinski visit the PRC and start normalization 
negotiations. President Carter personally "worked on every line of the 
communiques going to Woodcock in Peking" (Carter, 1982: 197). 
President Carter, like President Nixon, was also the one who made the 
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decision to conduct normalization negotiations in strict secrecy. In a 
memo to Vance in June 1978, President Carter stated: 
Cy-Devise special procedures; leaks can kill the whole ef-
fort. We should limit the dispatches and the negotiating in-
formation strictly-maybe just to the PDB group. Avoid 
any public hints of degree of progress. I don't trust ( 1) Con-
gress, (2) White House, (3) State, or (4) Defense to keep a 
secret. JC. (Brzezinski, 1983:224). 6 
Question 3-The Domestic Politics Model 
President Carter's normalization decision was also influenced by the 
realities of domestic politics. By reference again to our original 
questions: 
Did stronger public or elite opinion and interest groups against 
normalization with the PRC at the expense of Taiwan delay the nor-
malization process and elicit tougher U.S. conditions for Taiwan's se-
curity guarantee, and vice versa? 
Did more members in Congress against normalization with the 
PRC at the expense of Taiwan delay the process of the normalization 
decision and toughen the U.S. stand toward the question of Taiwan, 
and vice versa? 
From the analyses of chapter 5, these two questions are answered 
affirmatively. From 1972 to 1977, Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter 
had decided to delay the normalization process because of unfavorable 
domestic situations. The main cause was that the majority of U.S. 
public opinion and members of Congress had opposed normalization 
at the expense of U.S.-Taiwan diplomatic and military relations. By 
1978, more and more members of Congress favored normalization. 
Favorable public and elite opinions toward the PRC and normaliza-
tion had also increased significantly since the early 1970s. The influ-
ence of the "China Lobby" had declined considerably. Since the 
executive branch has the sole power to make decisions to normalize 
relations with foreign countries, President Carter saw no reason to de-
lay normalization with the PRC. 
The timing of the normalization announcement-December 
1978-was carefully chosen in order to avoid antagonizing domestic 
constituencies (Brzezinski, 1983:200). The timing of normalization 
was influenced by congressional approval of the Panama Canal Trea-
ties and the November 1978 congressional elections (Brzezinski, 
6. President's Daily Brief (PDB) is accessible only to the president himself, the vice-
president, Vance, Brown, and Brzezinski. 
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1983:206). President Carter's insistence on continuing arms sales to 
Taiwan after normalization was also influenced by domestic political 
considerations. Brzezinski recalled the final stage of negotiations on 
the arms sales issue, as follows: 
Not everything went smoothly. I noted on December 
15: "Unfortunately, at the last minute the arms sales issue 
has arisen. The Chinese are operating on the assumption 
that we will discontinue immediately. We made it clear that 
we will continue after a one-year pause during which the 
treaty is being abrogated .... 
We were faced with the prospect of a last-minute fiasco. 
Vance was out of the country and the situation called for fast 
action. Even though Woodcock demurred, believing that a 
direct statement by the President would force a negative Chi-
nese reaction, I insisted that he tell Deng [Teng] that "we 
will try to be as restrained as we can on the subject of arms 
sales, but that within the United States political process it is 
simply impossible for the United States not to reaffirm its 
position on this subject. . . . " 
The President, his domestic advisers, and I all felt 
strongly that normalization would run into major political 
difficulties in the United States if we were not clear on this 
subject (Brzezinski, 1983:231-32). 
In 1978, the majority of the American people still opposed nor-
malization of relations with the PRC should Taiwan be "abandoned" 
by the United States. President Carter realized that he could not with-
hold public criticisms if he failed to insist on the arms sales to Taiwan 
condition. 
Did the impact of a presidential election on the process of nor-
malization depend on the strength of the existing administration? Did 
a weak administration which could not mobilize domestic opposition 
for normalization with the PRC tend to stall or delay the considera-
tion of normalization decision in order to deny the potential opponent 
a major issue at the presidential election period? 
This question could not be answered completely affirmatively 
from the analyses of this study. A weak administration, such as Presi-
dent Ford's in 1975-1976, was apparently in no position to move to-
ward normalization with the PRC during the 1976 presidential 
election period. The Nixon administration in 1972 was comparatively 
much stronger than the Ford administration. President Nixon, how-
ever, still hesitated to deal with the controversial normalization issue 
during the 1972 election year. The evidence suggests that in presiden-
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tial election years controversial foreign policy decisions, such as the 
normalization issue, tend to be delayed in order to deny a potential 
opponent a major political issue, regardless of the strength of the ex-
isting administration. 
Question 4-The Idiosyncratic, Cognitive, and Cybernetic Models 
Did the personal characteristics of decision makers have an important 
impact on the normalization decision? 
The analyses of this study indicate that international and domes-
tic politics factors were more important than the idiosyncratic factor 
in explaining the timing and the terms of the normalization issue. It 
would be very difficult, however, to assess the extent to which the im-
pact of the decision maker's characteristics had on the normalization 
issue. Kissinger had the following observation on this point. 
The impact of personalities on events is never easy to 
define. To be sure, China and the United States were 
brought together by necessity; it was not abstract goodwill 
but converging interests that brought me to Peking; it was 
not personal friendship with Chou but a commonly per-
ceived danger that fostered the elaboration of our relation-
ship. But that these interests were perceived clearly and 
acted upon decisively was due to leadership that-on both 
sides-skillfully used the margin of choice available. That 
China and the United States would seek rapprochement in 
the early 1970s was inherent in the world environment. That 
it should occur so rapidly and develop so naturally owed no 
little to the luminous personality and extraordinary percep-
tion of the Chinese Premier (Kissinger, 1979:746). 
The amount of influence of presidential leadership on the normal-
ization decision making would be an interesting topic for further anal-
yses and debates. To repeat our last two study questions: 
Was the lowest level of acceptability on the terms of the Taiwan 
question influenced by the U.S. decision makers' interpretations and 
perceptions of (1) the PRC's military capabilities, (2) the PRC's inten-
tion toward the settlement of the Taiwan question, and (3) the PRC's 
stake on the issue of "sovereignty?" 
Given the assumption that any tradeoff between two equally im-
portant values violates the principle of cognitive consistency, can it be 
said that the normalization agreement could have been reached only at 
the expense of U.S. integrity of defense commitments and the welfare 
of a long-term ally, Taiwan, and that the U.S. decision makers then 
185 
would have had to suppress their recognition of value tradeoffs by en-
gaging various mechanisms for defensive avoidance? 
Affirmative answers to these last two questions were reached 
from the analyses of chapter 6. The cognitive model stresses the im-
portance of decision makers' perception. The Carter administration 
was convinced that the PRC had no intention or capability to attack 
Taiwan after normalization. Nor would the PRC make any conces-
sion on the non-negotiable principle toward Taiwan. The PRC had 
also successfully persuaded the United States that Beijing would never 
make any pledge not to use military force against Taiwan. President 
Carter finally came to the conclusion that it was "not possible" to get 
a pledge from Beijing because the Taiwan question, from the PRC's 
perspective, is a question of sovereignty. The Carter administration 
finally accepted Beijing's three conditions without a firm pledge from 
Beijing on the settlement of the Taiwan question. Normalization was 
achieved at the cost of U.S.-Taiwan diplomatic and military relations. 
The Carter administration did use defensive mechanisms to bolster the 
benefits of normalization and downgrade the costs of U.S.-Taiwan ties 
in order to avoid any cognitive dissonance. 
Sidney Verba stated that "no model and no theorist, no matter 
how committed to holistic principles, can encompass the totality of a 
situation (Verba, 1961: 106). The same is true for the explanation of 
the normalization decision. The rational actor model enabled us to see 
the central considerations of normalization more comprehensibly. 
The means-end rationality model, however, is only a simplification of 
the real decision-making process (Verba, 1961:108). The bureaucratic 
and domestic models highlighted the political context of the normali-
zation decision making. Bureaucratic or domestic politics per se, i.e., 
in isolation, did not explain much. The final decision was based on 
decision makers' perceptions and interpretations of the environment. 
The entire picture of the normalization decision-making process may 
never be realized, but if we share each scholar's insights we may come 
closer to reality. 
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APPENDIX A 
MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE 
UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC 
OF CHINA, DECEMBER 2, 1954 
AND NOTES EXCHANGED ON DECEMBER 10, 1954 
The Parties to this Treaty, 
Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of 
the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in 
peace with all peoples and all Governments, and desiring to 
strengthen the fabric of peace in the West Pacific Area, 
Recalling with mutual pride the relationship which 
brought their two peoples together in a common bond of 
sympathy and mutual ideals to fight side by side against im-
perialist aggression during the last war, 
Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of 
unity and their common determination to defend themselves 
against external armed attack, so that no potential aggressor 
could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone 
in the West Pacific Area, and, 
Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for 
collective defense for the preservation of peace and security 
pending the development of a more comprehensive system of 
regional security in the West Pacific Area, 
Have agreed as follows: 
ARTICLE I 
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United 
Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be in-
volved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace, 
security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their interna-
tional relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsis-
tent with the purpose of the United Nations. 
ARTICLE II 
In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty, 
the Parties separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid will 
maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist 
armed attack and communist subversive activities directed from with-
out against their territorial integrity and political stability. 
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ARTICLE III 
The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to 
cooperate with each other in the development of economic progress 
and social well-being and to further their individual and collective ef-
forts towards these ends. 
ARTICLE IV 
The Parties, through their Foreign Ministers or their deputies, 
will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation 
of this Treaty. 
ARTICLE V 
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific 
Area directed against the territories of either of the Parties would be 
dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to 
meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional 
processes. 
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof 
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United 
Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Coun-
cil has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain interna-
tional peace and security. 
ARTICLE VI 
For the purposes of Articles II and V, the terms "territorial" and 
"territories" shall mean in respect of the Republic of China, Taiwan 
and the Pescadores; and in respect of the United States of America, 
the island territories in the West Pacific under its jurisdiction. The 
provisions of Articles II and V will be applicable to such other territo-
ries as may be determined by mutual agreement. 
ARTICLE VII 
The Government of the Republic of China grants, and the Gov-
ernment of the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose 
such United States land, air and sea forces in and about Taiwan and 
the Pescadores as may be required for their defense, as determined by 
mutual agreement. 
ARTICLE VIII 
This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affect-
ing in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the 
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Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Na-
tions for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
ARTICLE IX 
This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and 
the Republic of China in accordance with their respective constitu-
tional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratifica-
tion thereof have been exchanged by them at Taipei. 
ARTICLE X 
This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may 
terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party. 
In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed 
this Treaty. 
Done in duplicate, in the English and Chinese languages, at 
Washington on this second day of December of the Year One Thou-
sand Nine Hundred and Fifty-four, corresponding to the second day 
of the twelfth month of the Forty-third year of the Republic of China. 
For the United States of America: 
JOHN FOSTER DULLES 
For the Republic of China: 
GEORGE K. C. YEH 
Exchange of Notes 
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Department of State 
Washington, December 10, 1954 
APPENDIX B 
THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE, FEBRUARY 28, 
1972 
President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited 
the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-
lai of the People's Republic of China from February 21 to February 
28, 1972. Accompanying the President were Mrs. Nixon, U.S. Secre-
tary of State William Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry 
Kissinger, and other American officials. 
President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Com-
munist Party of China on February 21. The two leaders had a serious 
and frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs. 
During the visit, extensive, earnest and frank discussions were 
held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai on the nor-
malization of relations between the United States of America and the 
People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to 
both sides. In addition, Secretary of State William Rogers and For-
eign Minister Chi P'eng-fei held talks in the same spirit. 
President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, 
industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured Hangchow and 
Shanghai where, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they 
viewed similar places of interest. 
The leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United 
States of America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so 
many years without contact, to present candidly to one another their 
views on a variety of issues. They reviewed the international situation 
in which important changes and great upheavals are taking place and 
expounded their respective positions and attitudes. 
The U.S. side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the world re-
quires efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the 
basic causes of conflict. The United States will work for a just and 
secure peace: just, because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and na-
tions for freedom and progress; secure, because it removes the danger 
of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom 
and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside 
pressure or intervention. The United States believes that the effort to 
reduce tensions is served by improving communication between coun-
tries that have different ideologies so as to lessen the risks of confron-
tation through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. 
Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and be willing 
to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No 
country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared 
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to re-examine its own attitudes for the common good. The United 
States stressed that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to de-
termine their destiny without outside intervention; its constant pri-
mary objective has been a negotiated solution; the eight-point proposal 
put forward by the Republic of Vietnam and the United States on Jan-
uary 27, 1972 represents a basis for the attainment of that objective; in 
the absence of a negotiated settlement the United States envisages the 
ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with 
the aim of self-determination for each country of Indochina. The 
United States will maintain its close ties with and support for theRe-
public of Korea; the United States will support efforts of the Republic 
of Korea to seek a relaxation of tension and increased communication 
in the Korean peninsula. The United States places the highest value 
on its friendly relations with Japan; it will continue to develop the 
existing close bonds. Consistent with the United Nations Security 
Council Resolution of December 21, 1971, the United States favors 
the continuation of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan and the 
withdrawal of all military forces to within their own territories and to 
their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmire; the 
United States supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape 
their own future in peace, free of military threat, and without having 
the area become the subject of great power rivalry. 
The Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is 
resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and 
the people want revolution-this has become the irresistible trend of 
history. All nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should 
not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. 
China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power 
politics of any kind. The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports 
the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and 
liberation and that the people of all countries have the right to choose 
their social systems according to their own wishes and the right to 
safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, con-
trol and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their 
own countries. 
The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Viet-
nam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their 
goal and its firm support to the seven-point proposal of the Provisional 
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam and the 
elaboration of February this year on the two key problems in the pro-
posal, and to the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the 
Indochinese Peoples. It firmly supports the eight-point program for 
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the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of 
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April12, 1971, and the 
stand for the abolition of the "U.N. Commission for the Unification 
and Rehabilitation of Korea." It firmly opposes the revival and out-
ward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japa-
nese people's desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and 
neutral Japan. It firmly maintains that India and Pakistan should, in 
accordance with the United Nations resolutions on the India-Pakistan 
question, immediately withdraw all their forces to their respective ter-
ritories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and 
Kashmire and firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in 
their struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the 
people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-
determination. 
There are essential differences between China and the United 
States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two 
sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should 
conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other 
states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality 
and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes 
should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of 
force. The United States and the People's Republic of China are pre-
pared to apply these principles to their mutual relations. 
With these principles of international relations in mind the two 
sides stated that: 
-progress toward the normalization of relations· between China 
and the United States is in the interests of all countries; 
-both wish to reduce the danger of international military 
conflict; 
-neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and 
each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries 
to establish such hegemony; and 
-neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or 
to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at 
other states. 
Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of 
the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another 
against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world 
into spheres of interest. 
The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes be-
tween China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its 
192 
pos1t1on: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the 
normalization of relations between China and the United States; the 
Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal govern-
ment of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been 
returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's inter-
nal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all 
U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. 
The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at 
the creation of "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two govern-
ments," "two Chinas," and "independent Taiwan" or advocate that 
"the status of Taiwan remains to be determined." 
The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all 
Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one 
China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Govern-
ment does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a 
peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. 
With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the 
withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. 
In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military 
installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes. 
The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the under-
standing between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific 
areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journal-
ism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mu-
tually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further 
development of such contacts and exchanges. 
Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual 
benefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on 
equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the people of the two 
countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development of 
trade between their two countries. 
The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through vari-
ous channels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to 
Peking from time to time for concrete consultations to further the nor-
malization of relations between the two countries and continue to ex-
change views on issues of common interest. 
The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during 
this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the 
two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations be-
tween the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and 
American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in 
Asia and the world. 
President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed 
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their appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Gov-
ernment and people of the People's Republic of China. 
(Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXVI, No. 1708 [March 20, 1972], 
pp. 435-438.) 
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APPENDIX C 
JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT 
OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 
THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
JANUARY 1, 1979 
The United States of America and the People's Republic of China 
have agreed to recognize each other and to establish diplomatic rela-
tions as of January 1, 1979. 
The United States of America recognizes the Government of the 
People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. 
Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cul-
tural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of 
Taiwan. 
The United States of America and the People's Republic of China 
reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai 
Communique and emphasize once again that: 
-Both wish to reduce the danger of international military 
conflict. 
-Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region 
or in any other region of the world and each is opposed to 
efforts by any other country or group of countries to estab-
lish such hegemony. 
-Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third 
party or to enter into agreements or understandings with 
the other directed at other states. 
-The Government of the United States of America ac-
knowledges the Chinese position that there is but one 
China and Taiwan is part of China. 
-Both believe that normalization of Sino-American rela-
tions is not only in the interest of the Chinese and Ameri-
can peoples but also contributes to the cause of peace in 
Asia and the world. 
The United States of America and the People's Republic of China 
will exchange Ambassadors and establish Embassies on March 1, 
1979. 
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TEXT OF PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON TIES WITH 
CHINA 
Following is the transcript of President Carter's statement in 
Washington on normalizing relations with China, as recorded by The 
New York Times through the facilities of ABC News: 
Good evening. I would like to read a joint communique which is 
being simultaneously issued in Peking at this very moment by the lead-
ers of the People's Republic of China: 
"Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Rela-
tions Between the United States of America and the People's Republic 
of China, Jan. 1, 1979. 
"The United States of America and the People's Republic of 
China have agreed to recognize each other and to establish diplomatic 
relations as of January 1, 1979. 
"The United States recognizes the Government of the People's 
Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this 
context the people of the United States will maintain cultural, com-
mercial and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. 
"The United States of America and the People's Republic of 
China reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shang-
hai Communique of 1972 and emphasize once again that: both sides 
wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict. Neither 
should seek hegemony-that is the dominance of one nation over 
others-in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region of the world 
and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of coun-
tries to establish such hegemony. 
"Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any other third 
party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other 
directed at other states. 
"The Government of the United States of America acknowledges 
the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of 
China. 
"Both believe that normalization of Sino-American relations is 
not only in the interest of the Chinese and American people but also 
contributes to the cause of peace in Asia and the world. 
"The United States of America and the People's Republic of 
China will exchange Ambassadors and establish Embassies on March 
1, 1979." 
Yesterday, our country and the People's Republic of China 
reached this final historic agreement. On January 1, 1979, a little 
more than two weeks from now, our two Governments will implement 
full normalization of diplomatic relations. 
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As a nation of gifted people who comprise about one-fourth of the 
total population of the Earth, China plays, already, an important role 
in world affairs-a role that can only grow more important in the 
years ahead. 
We do not undertake this important step for transient tactical or 
expedient reasons. In recognizing the People's Republic of China, that 
is a single Government of China, we're recognizing simple reality. But 
far more is involved in this decision than just the recognition of a fact. 
'Long History of Friendship' 
Before the estrangement of recent decades, the American and the 
Chinese people had a long history of friendship. We've already begun 
to rebuild some of the previous ties. Now our rapidly expanding rela-
tionship requires a kind of structure that only full diplomatic relations 
will make possible. 
The change that I'm announcing tonight will be of great long-
term benefit to the peoples of both our country and China-and I be-
lieve for all the peoples of the world. Normalization and expanded 
commercial and cultural relations that it will bring-will contribute to 
the well-being of our nation to our own national interest. And it will 
also enhance the stability of Asia. These more positive relations with 
China can beneficially affect the world in which we live and the world 
in which our children will live. 
Special Message to Taiwan 
We have already begun to inform our allies and other nations and 
the members of the Congress of the details of our intended action, but 
I wish also tonight to convey a special message to the people of 
Taiwan. 
I have already communicated with the leaders in Taiwan, with 
whom the American people have had, and will have, extensive, close 
and friendly relations. This is important between our two peoples. As 
the United States asserted in the Shanghai Communique of 1972, is-
sued on President Nixon's historic visit, we will continue to have an 
interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. 
I have paid special attention to insuring that normalization of 
relations between our country and the People's Republic will not jeop-
ardize the well-being of the people of Taiwan. 
Broad Ties With Taiwan Pledged 
The people of our country will maintain our current commercial, 
cultural, trade and other relations with Taiwan through nongovern-
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mental means. Many other countries of the world are already success-
fully doing this. 
These decisions and these actions open a new and important 
chapter in our country's history and also in world affairs. To 
strengthen and to expedite the benefits of this new relationship be-
tween China and the United States, I am pleased to announce that 
Vice Premier Teng has accepted my invitation and will visit Washing-
ton at the end of January. His visit will give our Governments the 
opportunity to consult with each other on global issues and to begin 
working together to enhance the cause of world peace. 
Negotiations Begun By Nixon 
These events are the final result of long and serious negotiations 
begun by President Nixon in 1972 and continued under the leadership 
of President Ford. The results bear witness to the steady, determined, 
bipartisan effort of our own country to build a world in which peace 
will be the goal and the responsibility of all nations. 
The normalization of relations between the United States and 
China has no other purpose than this: the advancement of peace. It is 
in this spirit, at this season of peace, that I take special pride in sharing 
this good news with you tonight. 
Thank you very much. 
TEXTS OF STATEMENTS FROM U.S., CHINA AND TAIWAN 
Following are the texts of the United States statement on Taiwan, 
provided by the White House; the official English text of the Chinese 
statement on Taiwan read by Chairman Hua Kuo-feng, provided by 
Reuters from Peking, and an unofficial English translation of the state-
ment by President Chiang Ching-kuo of Nationalist China. 
United States' Statement 
As of January 1, 1979, the United States of America recognizes 
the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. 
On the same date, the People's Republic of China accords similar rec-
ognition to the United States of America. The United States thereby 
establishes diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. 
On that same date, January 1, 1979, the United States of America 
will notify Taiwan that it is terminating diplomatic relations and that 
the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Repub-
lic of China is being terminated in accordance with the provisions of 
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the Treaty. The United States also states that it will be withdrawing 
its remaining military personnel from Taiwan within four months. 
In the future, the American people and the people of Taiwan will 
maintain commercial, cultural, and other relations without official 
government representation and without diplomatic relations. 
The Administration will seek adjustments to our laws and regula-
tions to permit the maintenance of commercial, cultural, and other 
non-governmental relationships in the new circumstances that will ex-
ist after normalization. 
The United States is confident that the people of Taiwan face a 
peaceful and prosperous future. The United States continues to have 
an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and expects 
that the Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully by the Chinese 
themselves. 
The United States believes that the establishment of diplomatic 
relations with the People's Republic will contribute to the welfare of 
the American people, to the stability of Asia where the United States 
has major security and economic interests and to the peace of the en-
tire world. 
China's Statement 
As of January 1, 1979, the People's Republic of China and the 
United States of America recognize each other and establish diplo-
matic relations, thereby ending the prolonged abnormal relationship 
between them. This is a historic event in Sino-United States relations. 
As is known to all, the Government of the People's Republic of 
China is the sole legal Government of China and Taiwan is a part of 
China. The question of Taiwan was the crucial issue obstructing the 
normalization of relations between China and the United States. It 
has now been resolved between the two countries in the spirit of the 
Shanghai Communique and through their joint efforts, thus enabling 
the normalization of relations so ardently desired by the people of the 
two countries. As for the way of bringing Taiwan back to the embrace 
of the motherland and reunifying the country, it is entirely China's 
internal affair. 
At the invitation of the U.S. Government, Teng Hsiao-ping, Vice-
Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, will 
pay an official visit to the United States in January 1979, with a view 
to further promoting the friendship between the two peoples and good 
relations between the two countries. 
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Taiwan's Statement 
The decision by the United States to establish diplomatic rela-
tions with the Chinese Communist regime has not only seriously dam-
aged the rights and interests of the Government and the people of the 
Republic of China, but has also had a tremendously adverse impact 
upon the entire free world. For all the consequences that might arise 
as a result of this move, the United States Government alone should 
bear full responsibility. 
In the past few years, the United States Government has repeat-
edly reaffirmed its intention to maintain diplomatic relations with the 
Republic of China and to honor its treaty commitments. Now that it 
has broken the assurances and abrogated the treaty, the United States 
Government cannot be expected to have the confidence of any free 
nation in the future. 
The United States, by extending diplomatic recognition to the 
Chinese Communist regime, which owes its very existence to terror 
and suppression, is not in conformity with its professed position of 
safeguarding human rights and strengthening the capability of demo-
cratic nations to resist the totalitarian dictatorship. 
The move is tantamount to denying the hundreds of millions of 
enslaved peoples on the Chinese mainland their hope for an early res-
toration of freedom. Viewed from whatever aspect, the move by the 
United States constitutes a great setback to human freedom and demo-
cratic institutions. It will be condemned by all freedomloving and 
peaceloving peoples all over the world. 
Recent international events have proven that the United States' 
persuance of the "normalization" process with the Chinese Commu-
nist regime did not protect the security of free Asian nations, has fur-
ther encouraged Communist subversion and aggressive activities and 
hastened the fall of Indochina into Communist hands. The Govern-
ment and the people of the Republic of China firmly believe lasting 
international peace and security can never be established on an unsta-
ble foundation of expediency. 
Regardless of how the international situation may develop, the 
Republic of China, as a sovereign nation will, with her glorious tradi-
tion, unite all her people, civilian and military, at home and abroad, to 
continue her endeavors toward progress in the social, economic and 
political fields. The Chinese Government and the people, faithful to 
the national objectives and their international responsibilities, have full 
confidence in the future of the Republic of China. 
The late President Chiang Kai-shek repeatedly instructed the 
Chinese people to be firm with dignity and to complete the task of 
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national recovery and reconstruction. The Government and the peo-
ple of the Republic of China have the determination and the faith, 
which they will exert to their utmost, to work together with other free 
peoples in democratic countries to conquer Communist tyrannical rule 
and its aggressive policy. Henceforth, we shall be calm and firm, posi-
tive and hardworking. It is urged that all citizens cooperate fully with 
the Government with one heart and one soul, united and determined 
to fight at this difficult moment. Under whatever circumstances, the 
Republic of China shall neither negotiate with the Communist Chinese 
regime, nor compromise with Communism, and it shall never give up 
its sacred task of recovering the mainland and delivering the compatri-
ots there. This firm position shall remain unchanged. 
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APPENDIX D 
UNITED STATES-CHINA JOINT COMMUNIQUE 
OF AUGUST 17, 1982 
(1) In the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplo-
matic Relations on January 1, 1979, issued by the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of the People's Repub-
lic of China, the United States of America recognized the Government 
of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of 
China, and it acknowledged the Chinese position that there is but one 
China and Taiwan is part of China. Within that context, the two sides 
agreed that the people of the United States would continue to maintain 
cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of 
Taiwan. On this basis, relations between the United States and China 
were normalized. 
(2) The question of United States arms sales to Taiwan was not 
settled in the course of negotiations between the two countries on es-
tablishing diplomatic relations. The two sides held differing positions, 
and the Chinese side stated that it would raise the issue again follow-
ing normalization. Recognizing that this issue would seriously ham-
per the development of United States-China relations, they have held 
further discussions on it, during and since the meetings between Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan and Premier Zhao Ziyang and between Secretary 
of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., and Vice Premier and Foreign Minis-
ter Huang Hua in October, 1981. 
(3) Respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity 
and non-interference in each other's internal affairs constitute the fun-
damental principles guiding United States-China relations. These 
principles were confirmed in the Shanghai Communique of February 
28, 1972 and reaffirmed in the Joint Communique on the Establish-
ment of Diplomatic Relations which came into effect on January 1, 
1979. Both sides emphatically state that these principles continue to 
govern all aspects of their relations. 
( 4) The Chinese government reiterates that the question of Tai-
wan is China's internal affair. The Message to Compatriots in Taiwan 
issued by China on January 1, 1979 promulgated a fundamental policy 
of striving for peaceful reunification of the Motherland. The Nine 
Point Proposal put forward by China on September 30, 1981 repre-
sented a further major effort under this fundamental policy to strive 
for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question. 
(5) The United States Government attaches great importance to 
its relations with China, and reiterates that it has no intention of in-
fringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering 
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in China's internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of "two Chinas" or 
"one China, one Taiwan." The United States Government under-
stands and appreciates the Chinese policy of striving for a peaceful 
resolution of the Taiwan question as indicated in China's Message to 
Compatriots in Taiwan issued on January 1, 1979 and the Nine-Point 
Proposal put forward by China on September 30, 1981. The new situ-
ation which has emerged with regard to the Taiwan question also pro-
vides favorable conditions for the settlement of United States-China 
differences over the question of United States arms sales to Taiwan. 
(6) Having in mind the foregoing statements of both sides, the 
United States Government states that it does not seek to carry out a 
long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan 
will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level 
of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between the United States and China, and that it intends to 
reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of 
time to a final resolution. In so stating, the United States acknowl-
edges China's consistent position regarding the thorough settlement of 
this issue. 
(7) In order to bring about, over a period of time, a final settle-
ment of the question of United States arms sales to Taiwan, which is 
an issue rooted in history, the two governments will make every effort 
to adopt measures and create conditions conducive to the thorough 
settlement of this issue. 
(8) The development of United States-China relations is not 
only in the interests of the two peoples but also conducive to peace and 
stability in the world. The two sides are determined, on the principle 
of equality and mutual benefit, to strengthen their ties in the economic, 
cultural, educational, scientific, technological and other fields and 
make strong, joint efforts for the continued development of relations 
between the governments and peoples of the United States and China. 
(9) In order to bring about the healthy development of United 
States-China relations, maintain world peace and oppose aggression 
and expansion, the two governments reaffirm the principles agreed on 
by the two sides in the Shanghai Communique and the Joint Commu-
nique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations. The two sides 
will maintain contact and hold appropriate consultations on bilateral 
and international issues of common interest. 
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